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Dedication 
 
To all the things, especially the weird and eerie ones. 
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Abstract 
 
Drawing on two years of ethnographic field research 
conducted in an eco-survivalist community in central 
Vermont, this dissertation examines the ideological, 
philosophical, and political contexts of eco-survivalism 
and neo-primitivism. In particular, this research focuses 
on how the practices around which the community coheres––
ones commonly relegated to a pre-civilizational past––shape 
community members’ understandings of past, present, and 
future human-environment relations. Toward this end, this 
dissertation explores three primary practices––lithic tool 
making, animal tracking, and herbcraft––and discusses how 
such practices are capable of fostering intimacy with, and 
knowledge of, the world. Through an interdisciplinary, 
multi-method, and speculative mode of investigation, the 
findings suggest that while there are many risks––both 
conceptual and material––associated with eco-survivalist 
practices, they nevertheless offer insights for addressing 
present environmental uncertainties and offer a potential 
set of strategies for navigating future environmental 
challenges.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction: Writing with Ghosts 
Those who have come before us, those whose well-
trodden paths we walk, whose bodies and behavior we 
inherit, have also had their tolerance tested by the 
elements they relied upon, in more ways than we can 
ever know. We follow not only their successful moves, 
but also their hesitation, their stumbling or their 
overreaching. And even their disappearance (Clark 
2001: 193). 
  
1.1 Ghost stories 
What makes for a good ghost story? I pose this 
question not necessarily in reference to the kind of ghost 
story that causes one––with a rapid heartbeat, white 
knuckles, and dilated pupils––to jump in fright at ‘the 
reveal’. Such stories have their place, for sure. Rather, I 
have in mind the kind of ghost story that suggests 
something is not altogether right. That something about a 
given present moment, a lived experience, is subtly broken 
in a way that suggests reality is not as rationally ordered 
as perhaps assumed. 
I think here of Derrida’s (1994) discussion of the 
‘spectral moment’, which does not subscribe to a linear and 
modalized impression of time, moving from past to present 
and into the future. “We are questioning in this instant,” 
writes Derrida of the spectral moment, “we are asking 
ourselves about this instant that is not docile to time, at 
least what we call time” (1994: xix). With Derrida, the 
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unease of the spectral moment does not hinge on the 
particular figure of the ghost––its shape or sound––but 
rather stems from a mixing of temporalities, wherein what 
is often considered long gone suddenly shows up in the 
present. Unwelcomed. Unannounced. At such a moment, which 
cannot be reduced to a simple ‘now’, we come to realize 
that time does not adhere to what we thought it was––
orderly, predictable, universal––but is rather out-of-
joint. 
I also think of Mark Fisher’s discussion of ‘the 
weird’ and ‘the eerie’ (2016). For Fisher, ‘the weird’ 
involves the sensation of wrongness. “A weird entity or 
object,” writes Fisher, “is so strange that it makes us 
feel that it should not exist, or least it should not exist 
here” (2016: 15). In contrast, however slight it might be, 
for Fisher ‘the eerie’ is “constituted by a failure of 
absence or by a failure of presence. [It] occurs either 
when there is something present when there should be 
nothing, or there is nothing present when there should be 
something” (2016: 61).  
 Whether taking a cue from Derrida or Fisher or both, 
any good ghost story ought to draw attention to that which 
breaks the illusion of comfort and control. It ought to 
suggest that reality, and our presumed capacity to shape it 
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in accordance with reason and rationality, does not so 
easily bend to our will. Things are always much stranger 
than they appear, provided we know where and how to look. 
The time is ripe for such stories. Whether looking to 
climate change, oceanic acidification, massive loss of 
biodiversity, etc., the contemporary global environmental 
condition seems to suggest that something has gone 
dreadfully wrong in both space and in time. For at this 
moment, we confront circumstances that cannot so easily be 
controlled, and for which we do not seem to have readymade 
solutions. We confront the presence of things that should 
not be here, like plastics widely distributed throughout 
the oceans, or radionuclides embedded in the strata. We 
confront the absence of things that should be present, like 
insects in the European countryside, whose populations have 
crashed due to overuse of pesticides. The birds follow 
closely, and thus the warmer months are marked by the eerie 
absence of buzz and song.  
Perhaps, in this moment, what we confront most of all 
is the failure of progress to deliver its long-promised 
futures. And, is not progress a system of thought and 
practice geared not only toward space––in terms of securing 
the material conditions for a good society––but also toward 
time––in terms of ensuring the continuation of a good 
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society? Does progress not depend on a modalized sense of 
time that promises to deliver us from past savagery toward 
enlightened futures? And, does it not assume an ordered and 
orderable future? At this rate, we don’t seem to be heading 
in this direction. Anna Tsing is clear on this point, 
writing: “Progress is a forward march, drawing other kinds 
of time into its rhythms” (2015: 21). “The problem,” Tsing 
notes, “is that progress stopped making sense” (2015: 25).1 
 
1.2 The scope and plan of the project 
What follows over the next two-hundred odd pages is 
something like a ghost story. Scattered throughout are 
various attempts to write in the company of ghosts and in 
view of the weird and the eerie. Most of the ghosts in 
these pages are benevolent and offer valuable advice. 
Others, like the Fates and the Gorgons, come barreling and 
screaming, bringing degrees of madness. I aim to write with 
those who came before us, whose presence still remains, but 
not in obvious ways. Put differently, in what follows I 
enter into uneasy alliances with ghosts and within earshot 
other temporal rhythms that contrast with the ordered and 
                     
1 Or, as Fisher puts it: “Yet, if the [weird] entity or object is here, 
then the categories which we have up until now used to make sense of 
the world cannot be valid. The weird thing is not wrong, after all: it 
is our conceptions that must be inadequate” (2016: 15). 
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driving beat of progress (Tsing 2015: 21). I aim to tend to 
their stories and, in doing so, glean some insights about 
other times. Such insights, I hope, might prove relevant to 
our own present moment. Such alliances, I also hope, might 
prove strategic as we rush headlong into uncertain futures. 
Might the dead, who as Clark (2011) claims are still with 
us, teach us a thing or two? Might we carry some of their 
lessons along the way?  
To be sure, what follows is also a dissertation. It 
draws on more than two years of field research in an eco-
survivalist community/wilderness survival school located in 
rural Vermont. Its members routinely engage in practices 
commonly relegated to pre-civilizational times, like 
flintknapping, fire-by-friction, animal tracking, 
gathering, wildcrafting medicines, etc. Put differently, 
this community practices skills that appear to fall outside 
the timeline of progress. Their practices are often 
considered outmoded or outdated, which is to say, not in 
keeping with the times.  
There are a number of reasons that drive the 
community’s interests in such practices, which I discuss in 
detail in the pages to follow. However, for now it suffices 
to answer the question “Why?” in general terms and in view 
of Tsing’s call to attend to other temporal rhythms. 
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Members of this community engage such practices to seek 
solutions from what has been ignored or destroyed by 
progress. In doing so, they gather insights about how 
ostensibly old ways of living/doing/making remain relevant 
for contemporary times. Such practices, they feel, offer 
insights about the world, and about the possibilities for 
living otherwise and counter to the dictates of progress 
(Malabou 2012; Povinelli 2012).  
This work travels across a variety of topics, and 
draws on a wide range of literatures ranging from feminist 
technoscience, to animal tracking guides, and to obscure 
17th century treatises on witchcraft. Despite this wide 
range, these topics are nevertheless pulled into knots of 
relation by way of the aforementioned practices. Thus, in 
what follows I place practices at the center of focus, 
often over that of their practitioners. In particular, I am 
interested in what these things teach us about history, 
intimacy, knowledge, respect, collaboration, and 
entanglement with the world. Moreover, I am interested in 
how certain practices open the present to the past, and 
offer potential pathways to the future––pathways, ideally, 
that would prove less destructive than what progress has 
provided.  
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Following this short introduction, in Chapter 2 I 
situate questions around methods and methodologies amidst 
theoretical debates concerning nature-society relations. In 
particular, I draw attention to how conventional approaches 
to research and writing––ones predicated on the maintenance 
of an ostensibly objective distance between researcher and 
respondent, or between self and world––often fail to 
account for the complex ways in which we are entangled with 
the world. Put differently, I argue that entanglement, as 
an ontological and epistemological condition (Barad 2007), 
refuses the possibility of an objective distance, and thus 
requires new approaches to research methods and 
methodologies. In this call for rethinking how research is 
done, I argue for the need to write with the world, rather 
than of it. Indeed, it is my contention that the need for 
new approaches to research, writing, and storytelling is an 
urgent one, especially in times of great environmental 
uncertainty. And, taking inspiration from Ursula K. Le Guin 
(1994) and Anna Tsing (2015), I argue for modes of research 
and writing that tend to the often-overlooked margins where 
unexpected encounters take hold.  
In Chapter 3, I turn to the eco-survivalist community 
to address relationships among bodies, technological 
practices, and the environment. Writing against narratives 
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of techno-futurism and ‘Promethean mastery’ (Srnicek and 
Williams 2015), I argue that pressing debates around what 
the future holds for humans would do well to consider how 
past human-technology-environment relations remain relevant 
and practical. After working through some problematic 
political, philosophical, and aesthetic assumptions that 
emerge in eco-survivalism, I argue that ‘reclaiming’ 
technological practices commonly relegated to pre-
civilizational modes of existence, while risky, can 
nevertheless foster close relationships with the world, 
offer novel strategies for navigating environmental change 
and uncertainty, as well as open up new opportunities for 
other, perhaps better, futures. 
After a theoretically dense exploration of bodies, 
technologies, and environments, in Chapter 4 I turn to the 
practice of animal tracking. Drawing on lessons learned 
from a “Tracking and Awareness” course held in the eco-
survivalist community, I address the strategic benefits of 
rethinking modes of bodily movement and perception. Taking 
inspiration from Anna Tsing’s “arts of noticing” (2015), 
this chapter seeks to tread carefully off the beaten path 
to remain open to unanticipated encounters with peripheral 
and often unseen nonhuman others. Simply put, I follow 
animal pathways and discern animal sign in the Vermont 
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wilderness, framing tracking as a strategy for uncovering 
novel ways for ethically relating to the world. Moreover, 
this chapter revisits discussions around writing with, 
arguing that inhabiting the world differently offers 
opportunities to craft new kinds of stories with it.  
Drawing on field research involving herbalism and 
wildcrafting medicines from Vermont flora, in Chapter 5 I 
look to human-plant relations and examine how herbalism and 
‘poisoncraft’ offer insights about the nature of 
entanglement and risk. This chapter is the most 
experimental, wherein I take a literal approach to the 
method of ‘writing with’ by dosing myself with deadly 
nightshade [Atropa belladonna]. Wandering through a strange 
and admittedly uncomfortable haze, in this chapter I 
challenge the tendency to frame entanglement as an inherent 
‘good’ by exploring dangerous collaborations with plant 
poisons. After discussing, in great detail, my chosen 
poison and its curious location amid histories of 
witchcraft and violent repression, I explore how herbalism 
and poisoncraft connect us to past practices, why such 
practices are relevant to present environmental concerns, 
and how it can offer strategies of resistance born out of 
risky collaboration. 
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Rounding the dissertation out, in Chapter 6 I draw 
together the wide array of topics discussed and explore the 
promises of living otherwise in times of uncertainty. In 
the interest of intellectual honesty, I also address some 
of the empirical limitations that underpin this research, 
as well as address some of problematic theories that emerge 
from it. Yet, following Isabelle Stengers’ discussion of 
the pharmakon (2008; 2010), I argue that in times of great 
uncertainty, we find ourselves in circumstances that demand 
uneasy alliances with risky ideas. Closing off this chapter 
and the dissertation, I discuss the advantages of 
enchantment, hope (however guarded it might be), and even 
utopianism. 
 
1.3 Some disclaimers 
 Before proceeding to the next chapter, a few notes and 
disclaimers are in order. At the outset, I admit that what 
follows is a dissertation that unfolds with a measure of 
unease.  This is not to say that I write reluctantly, but I 
do write with some uncertainty. Reason being, the broader 
research around this project is shot through with numerous 
conceptual and contextual challenges. While I address 
concerns throughout the body of this dissertation, as well 
as revisit them in the conclusion, it is only fair and 
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proper to frontload some of them before proceeding to the 
primary text.  
 First, in what follows I work around and through some 
problematic theories, discourses, and ideologies, many of 
which stem from the various neo-primitivist and anti-
civilizationist beliefs that underpin the eco-survivalist 
community. As I discuss in greater detail in Chapter 3, 
reclaiming past practices for future scenarios is, by 
default, a strategy that risks idealizations of, and 
nostalgia for, the past. It also risks positing 
ideologically reactionary perspectives regarding the 
future. Take, for example, the anarcho-primitivist writings 
of John Zerzan: 
We must uncover some kind of deep memory to operate 
against the structural amnesia engineered and 
constantly reproduced by civilization. Memory’s best 
potential is the promise of a lifeline to the 99 
percent of human existence outside the machine of 
domestication which is civilization. What is not 
altogether dead may be reawakened and reanimated, if 
we can free ourselves from the order of time (2012: 
173). 
 
In spite of the merits of a critical academic 
upbringing––which has trained me to perhaps too quickly 
dismiss such a perspective on account of its universalist 
claim and its romanticization of pre-civilizational modes 
of existence––I am nevertheless willing to entertain such 
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beliefs. However problematic Zerzan’s claim might appear at 
first glance, it still holds insights worth considering. 
Insights that have a different way of exposing what many of 
us know to be true, but might be reluctant to admit: that 
something has gone dreadfully wrong in the world.  
My willingness to entertain such ideas, however, does 
not necessarily mean that I agree with them. Rather, both 
here and throughout my dissertation, I try to resist what 
Stengers refers to as “the learned codes of our [academic] 
milieus: derisive remarks, knowing smiles, offhand 
judgements” (2012: 6). These codes are well known and 
coveted, for they provide a strategic edge for crafting 
one’s own sense of intellectual purity. Yet, such codes 
also have a way of shutting down other stories, and thereby 
foreclosing on the possibility of uncovering points of 
contact, no matter how delicate they might be. To 
entertain, thus, is not to accept uncritically. Rather, it 
is to remain open to uneasy alliances with ideas that are 
often problematic.  
Engaging problematic discourses also brings up 
methodological and representational challenges, which I 
discuss in more detail in the next chapter. During the 
early stages of my research, I felt that some questionable 
ideological positions my research subjects articulated (and 
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there were more than a few) ought not show up in a 
dissertation or a journal article. I felt this out of 
personal concern for capitalizing on their roughly-hewn 
orientations to the world. I still feel this way. This is 
not to suggest that I feel the research subjects could not 
cope with academic criticisms. (To be frank, I am not sure 
they care that much.) Rather, the concern stems from an 
unwillingness to place someone in a critical light from 
which they lack an accessible means to shield themselves. 
This is, perhaps, the perennial problem of this kind of 
academic work: reciprocity is often lost when work is 
codified and modified in order to conform to conventional 
academic standards.  
This same hesitancy also factors into my decision to 
leave out aspects of this research, especially ones that 
address highly personal details of the community and its 
members. I make this decision on two fronts: First, there 
are ethnographies that simply should not be written, for 
they might generate information that would place a given 
community at risk (see Shukaitis et. al. 2007). My decision 
here comes with a risk: In deciding to not write about many 
aspects of the community, I sacrifice some empirical detail 
that would be conventionally expected in a dissertation. In 
response, my strategy (especially in chapters 4 and 5) is 
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to choose an encounter and situate it in broader 
theoretical debates around strategies for ‘living 
otherwise’. This is a difficult decision to make, and I 
fully accept the consequences of it, but I see no reason to 
compromise the ethical choice involved in remaining silent 
in many matters. Second, divulging the more provocative 
details of my time in the field is not worth sacrificing 
the relationships I have been fortunate to forge with 
members of the community. These relations are more 
meaningful to me as ongoing expressions of joy and care 
than they are as data points or arguments to be rendered on 
paper. Indeed, I would not write something that I did not 
feel comfortable sharing with the community (and in this, 
especially chapter 3, I feel I am already pushing the 
limits). It is therefore my choice to remain strategically 
silent on some matters concerning the community, and 
instead shift focus to the broader contexts within which 
the community and its practices are situated.   
Another issue that crops up in my dissertation is 
regular reference to “the body”, especially in Chapter 3. I 
recognize the risk in taking such a universalist and 
essentialized approach to discussing something as 
heterogeneous and fluid as “the body”. Moreover, I am 
conscious of how the phrase is often used to justify 
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normative declarations not only about what a body is, but 
also by extension what a body should be. As Plumwood 
reminds us, “The concept of the human has a masculine bias 
(among others)” (1993: 33).  
This is to say, that my use of the concept “the body” 
runs the risk of normalizing masculinity as well other 
essentialized claims. And though I do address this problem 
directly in Chapter 3, I nevertheless continue to use the 
phrase. For one, I do not feel that merely pluralizing 
“body” into “bodies” is sufficient to escape normative and 
masculinist biases. Instead, by drawing on the work of 
Elizabeth Grosz (2004, 2017), Stacey Alaimo (2010, 2016), 
and Dana Seitler (2008) I situate “the body” as site of 
experimentation open to the world, rather than being 
defined either against, or external, to it. Whether this 
conceptual shift is sufficient is, of course, up for 
debate.  
My use of the “the body” is further troubled by 
another challenge. Much of the field-based empirical 
experiences from which I draw primarily (but not 
exclusively) features white bodies. And, despite the 
‘survivalist’ tenor of the community, such bodies are 
relatively privileged ones, not only on account of 
whiteness but also in terms of class position. Indeed, 
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there is a curious irony underpinning this community: 
pursuing an eco-survivalist lifestyle is much easier if one 
has access to economic and social capital, which are always 
codified in terms of race, class, gender, etc. Admittedly, 
this is hardly an ideal empirical foundation upon which to 
articulate broad claims about humanity or the contemporary 
human condition. Moreover, it is difficult to articulate 
such claims without coming across as hopelessly 
Eurocentric. In the pages to follow I attempt to address 
the relatively homogenous character of the community, and 
how it plays a role not only in how individuals interact 
with the world, but also in how they experience risk and 
conceptualize the past, present, and future. Though I do 
flirt with various appeals to a broader notion of the 
human, which might help to displace fixations on identity, 
I do not attempt to wriggle my way out of this dilemma, 
preferring instead to “stay with the trouble” (Haraway 
2016). 
This brings me to the last significant conceptual 
challenge. In what follows I frequently invoke the royal 
“we”. Like “the body”, the pronoun “we” is laden with 
universalist and essentialist baggage. It often assumes a 
collective subject that does not exist, no matter how much 
one might wish it to. Further, as mentioned, many of the 
 	 17 
concerns expressed in these pages stem from a Eurocentric 
point of view, which ought not be considered universal no 
matter how adamantly Eurocentrism assumes this to be the 
case. My use of this pronoun is even trickier considering 
that I sometimes use it declaratively––i.e., “we must...”. 
A fair question, then, is what right do I have to marshal 
this universal “we”, much less demand action from it? I 
have neither a readymade, not satisfactory answer to this 
question. I do, however, take insight from Haraway’s 
discussion of the pronoun “us”. Worth quoting at length, 
Haraway writes:  
And who counts as ‘us’ in my own rhetoric? Which 
identities are available to ground such a potent 
political myth called 'us', and what could motivate 
enlistment in this collectivity?... For me––and for 
many who share a similar historical location in white, 
professional middle-class, female, radical, North 
American, mid-adult bodies––the sources of a crisis in 
political identity are legion. The recent history for 
much of the U.S. left and U.S. feminism has been a 
response to this kind of crisis by endless splitting 
and searches for a new essential unity. But there has 
also been a growing recognition of another response 
through coalition––affinity, not identity (2013: 155). 
 
 In this view, “we” might be understood as that which 
signifies not a universal and undifferentiated subject, but 
rather as that which provides shifting conceptual grounds 
for thinking in terms of affinity and kinship. Put 
differently, despite its designation as a pronoun, I prefer 
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to consider “we” as more like a verb. It is not lodged in 
the world like some mute and heavy icon, but rather it 
makes worlds. That is, it expresses capacities for affinity 
and kinship. Yet, like the phrase “the body”, this too is 
up for debate.  
 
1.4 Onward to the heart of the matter 
 Despite these and other conceptual leaps of faith that 
might result in an occasional stumble, what follows is at 
the very least provocative. (That it might be provocative, 
however, does not excuse that it might also be problematic 
in ways.) And, despite its seemingly rearward orientation 
that looks to old practices and thus runs the risk of 
further entrenching a nostalgic impulse, this research is 
committed to the possibility of other futures. Indeed, its 
chief aim is to unsettle an alleged grasp upon the present 
moment in order that we might uncover different ways of 
relating to past, present, and future. Most importantly, it 
seeks to open possibilities for different ways of relating 
to the world––perhaps, even, learning how to become 
enchanted with it once more. It strikes me that in these 
times, nothing is more pessimistic than to assume the 
present moment is an ontological given. The world, instead, 
is much weirder and eerier than what appears. As Haldane 
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put it, “The universe is not only queerer than we suppose, 
it is queerer than we can suppose” (1945: 298). What seems 
the best strategy at present is to unmoor ourselves from a 
commitment to what appears ‘as is’, and instead not just 
open ourselves to the question of ‘what can be’, but also, 
importantly, ‘what once was’. For in this latter inquiry we 
might discern the murmur of ghosts with important lessons 
to impart.  
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Chapter 2: Disrupting Divisions: On Writing as Method 
 
 
That's right, they said. What you are is a woman. 
Possibly not human at all, certainly defective. Now be 
quiet while we go on telling the Story of the Ascent 
of Man the Hero (Le Guin 1996: n.p.). 
 
 
The greatest challenge presented by these ‘more-than-
human’ styles of working is the onus they place on 
experimentation and, by implication, on taking (and 
being allowed to take) risks (Whatmore 2006: 607). 
 
  
2.1 On robins  
Over the course of my field research, one of the more 
pivotal interview exchanges was accidental in nature. Let’s 
call it an unanticipated encounter in which, for just a 
moment, an ostensible background was foregrounded. It was a 
mid-July day. I was setting up outdoors on a rock bench 
overlooking central Vermont’s Worcester Range to interview 
Sarah about her experiences with wilderness survival 
skills, environmentalism, and intentional communities. 
Before the interview formally began, the following took 
place:  
 
Sarah: Do I have to be close to [the recorder]? 
Harlan: No, it picks up pretty well. The bird songs, 
when I transcribe this, should be really nice to 
listen to.  
S: [Laughs] Remember that they’re robins. 
H: Is that what they are?  
S: Mmm hmm (S., personal communication, 2012). 
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 It’s a funny little thing, this encounter. At first 
glance, it is easy to dismiss as a trivial logistical 
exchange taking place at the margins of a proper interview. 
After all, is not the question-then-answer approach a 
standard method for extracting information and insight from 
a research subject? Of what possible importance could robin 
songs have in the pursuit of information? How could their 
song be any more than a momentary distraction?  
For such reasons, I almost did not transcribe the 
above exchange a couple months later; I figured it best to 
get on with the crux of the matter. And, yet, as I sat down 
to do precisely that, the robins’ calls were, in fact, 
‘really nice to listen to’. Perhaps this is not surprising 
in view of the common description of the American Robin’s 
call as “a series of rich caroling notes, rising and 
falling in pitch: cheer-up, cheerily, cheer-up, cheerily” 
(Bull et. al. 1977). As birdsongs emanated from my 
recorder, I found myself transported from my cramped 
Minneapolis apartment back to rural Vermont. My mind 
returned not in a research-driven sense, but rather to the 
textures of its environments––forests, fields, marshes, 
mountains––and to its fleeting summers bustling with vital 
activity, as if all forms of life are aware of the cold’s 
nearness, and so pack as much into the warmth as possible.  
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 I hesitate here. I feel as if I am capitulating to the 
kind of syrupy nature writing that dispenses with 
idealizations of nature and tropes of return to those ideal 
states. It is easy to do this, and often comforting. But it 
is not my aim. Rather than falling into Thoreauvian 
rumination, I wish to identify a critical edge that flashes 
up in this exchange among me, Sarah, and the robins. I ask 
again: Of what importance could the call of robins have in 
the pursuit of information? With an eye toward Whatmore 
(2006), I claim that a robin’s song offers a challenge for 
how one might think differently about research in a manner 
that cultivates attentiveness to the marginal, to the zones 
that often fall outside the purview of research proper.  
Like the Derridian arrivant––an unanticipated ethical 
demand appearing from the margins (1994: 49)––a birdsong 
intrudes and draws us to the edges of perception so that we 
might take notice of other co-extant modes of inhabiting 
the world. As I argue in this chapter, there is a pressing 
need to turn to these margins, their inhabitants, and the 
moments wherein paths unexpectedly cross. This must happen, 
I claim, in order that research might respond to a rapidly 
transforming world. How might, in other words, we come to 
produce and derive meaning about this world when the very 
stuff of this world is in varying states of ruin? Indeed, 
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since the world is changing, should not the methods used to 
derive meaning from it change as well? For the research at-
hand, the robins’ song gives reason not only to rethink 
research methods, but to rethink the heart of my research.  
  
2.2 Field methods  
My encounter with Sarah and the robins occurred during 
a period of field research in an eco-survivalist community 
situated in rural Vermont. For approximately two years I 
lived with a small group of people who dedicated much of 
their time and activity to wilderness survival skills like 
hunting, gathering, shelter building, fire-by-friction, 
lithic tool making, and hide tanning, amongst many other 
practices. Over the course of my time in this community, I 
conducted semi- and unstructured interviews with members, 
visually documented my time often through landscape 
photography, and, at least in the initial stages, took 
detailed field notes.  
However, as time went on and my own life became 
entangled with the lives of community members, I found that 
I began to question my identity as an academic researcher 
and, instead, focused on participation rather than 
observation. Put differently, I found it necessary to 
relinquish a sense of academic identity and give myself 
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over to more direct forms of engagement. Doing so came with 
great relief, for by the time I had entered the field I was 
already questioning my relationship to academic traditions. 
Namely, I had grown weary of certain critical traditions, 
which often seemed to require denunciation if not cynicism. 
My sense was that such traditions would only drive a wedge 
between myself and the community, which seemed to have 
little patience for overwrought and embattled intellectual 
endeavors. 
Thus, while I still have scraps of interviews and 
field notes from the earliest stages of my time in this 
community, any dedication to observations was eventually 
displaced with friendships, romances, and a host of other 
complications and complicities. My interviews gave way to 
unrecorded mundane conversations. My field notes were 
replaced with notes on how to track wildlife, gather 
plants, and make medicines. I came to see the value of an 
apothecary as being equal, if not at times greater, to that 
of a library.  
I do not intend this as an anti-intellectual argument 
about how an ostensibly grounded life is better than a 
bookish one. The point, rather, involves my own learning to 
be open to the myriad forms knowledge of this world might 
take. This required a willingness to suspend preconceived 
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notions in order that I might become better attuned to 
unfamiliar modes of being and practices, which cannot so 
easily be explained away using the critical tools developed 
in my graduate study. I take inspiration and guidance from 
Karen Barad, for whom “critique is over-rated, over-
emphasized, and over-utilized...a tool that keeps getting 
used out of habit perhaps, but it is no longer the tool 
needed for the kinds of situations we now face” (Barad in 
van der Tuin et. al. 2012: 49). Indeed, to explain away via 
critique is to risk establishing a boundary between self 
and world. And my choice was to dwell in the mess of it 
all, where divisions between researcher and respondent, 
field and home, writer and gatherer made little sense.  
Such a decision is in keeping with the speculative 
tenor of this dissertation. My aim is to avoid closure in 
order to remain open to the possibility that that this 
narrative might persist beyond its ostensible conclusion. 
This decision to opt for speculation over brute certainty 
also affects the complex nature of the relationship I have 
with the research subjects who crop up in these pages. 
Indeed, I find it challenging to appropriately and fairly 
render my respondents-become-friends on paper. Such a 
challenge stems from my own struggle to represent an 
individual’s vast complexities through conventional 
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academic writing. The challenge also coheres around the 
question of how to best ‘tell the story’ of my time with 
the eco-survivalists. 
 
2.3 On writing as gathering as method 
Admittedly, it has taken me some time to figure out 
ways around this problem of representation. But, I have 
done so by learning how to write differently and against 
traditions that tend to disassociate mythology from realism 
(Jameson 2005). This involves learning how to write again, 
to tell different kinds of stories that might, with a 
measure of effort and a little luck, unfold unto other 
futures. Hopefully the better kind. For this reason, I find 
myself in close company with Ursula K. Le Guin, who as a 
rule is good to think with.  
I turn to Le Guin because she teaches me that writing 
and research are inextricably linked. This is evident in Le 
Guin’s “The Carrier Bag Theory of Fiction” (1996). Here, Le 
Guin argues for modes of storytelling that acknowledge, and 
unfold with, the world. She writes of storytelling as akin 
to gathering the things of the world and placing them into 
“a leaf a gourd a shell a net a bag a sling a sack a bottle 
a pot a box a container” (1996: n.p.). For Le Guin, good 
stories emerge through attentiveness to the seemingly 
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insignificant and the marginal––some ‘seeds, roots, 
sprouts, shoots, etc.’ Anything, really, that allows us to 
carry things along as we make our way through the world, 
weaving stories as we go. In honoring daily acts of 
gathering, marginalized worlds might return to the stories 
we tell, shaping them accordingly. Le Guin writes: 
So, when I came to write science-fiction novels, I 
came lugging this great heavy sack of stuff, my 
carrier bag full of wimps and klutzes, and tiny grains 
of things smaller than a mustard seed, and 
interactively woven nets which when laboriously 
knotted are seen to contain one blue pebble, an 
imperturbably functioning chronometer telling the time 
on another world, and a mouse’s skull; full of 
beginnings without ends, of initiations, of losses, of 
transformations and translations, and far more tricks 
than conflicts, far fewer triumphs than snares and 
delusions (1996: n.p.).  
  
But Le Guin’s contribution is not merely a stylistic 
one concerning storycraft. Rather, for Le Guin, writing in 
the margins is an intervention. Le Guin knows nonhuman 
natures to be constitutive of the human, and thus works to 
decenter the human by placing it amidst the stuff of the 
world. Importantly, as Le Guin suggests, to rummage about 
in margins is to refuse to tell stories in a manner that 
relies on a heroic figure, wherein narrative is centered on 
conflict and the world seems to fade away. “Heroes are 
powerful,” writes Le Guin. She continues: 
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Before you know it, the men and women in the wild-oat 
patch and their kids and the skills of the makers and 
the thoughts of the thoughtful and the songs of the 
singers are all part of it, have all been pressed into 
service in the tale of the Hero. But it isn't their 
story. It's his (1996: n.p.).  
 
His. The masculine as default. Here once more is the 
old story of the hunt––the story of man’s slaying of 
beasts. His mastery of nature. In such stories, the 
subtleties of this world fade away leaving only a sanitized 
and often domineering humanity apart from the world. As I 
address below, this is perhaps a default mode of narrating 
the human’s place in the world, at least in western 
traditions stemming from the Enlightenment. It is one that 
often involves the imposition of human agency that carries 
on as if there were nothing else, no other beings, on 
stage.  
 This failure to attend to worlds is no longer a 
tenable position, if it ever was. And, that it is not 
tenable suggests an ethical dimension to the stories we 
tell. I argue that the kind of stories desperately needed 
are those that trouble distinctions between nature and 
society. As I discuss below, this means that the stories we 
need are unlikely to come from within those systems of 
thought (generally, but not exclusively, western) that 
hinge on a fundamental separation of society and nature. 
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Indeed, following Le Guin, we would do well to attend to 
other cosmologies that have managed to persist in a world 
catastrophically riven in two (see also Davis and Todd 
2018). This need is especially evident in view of a rapidly 
transforming world that bears the imprint of industrialized 
human activity. Dubbed, for better or worse, the 
Anthropocene (Crutzen and Stoermer 2002), it is 
increasingly important to tell different kinds of stories 
that succeed in cultivating awareness of the world and its 
ongoing transformations. The task is an urgent one. As Kate 
Rigby suggests, “our concern is with how to write in the 
midst of an unfolding disaster, the catastrophic 
culmination could perhaps yet be forestalled” (2009: 176).2  
 I look to Le Guin’s advice to write to the margins and 
around the edges as a method for crafting this 
dissertation. Moreover, I draw on her ‘principle of 
gathering’ as a complementary strategy. Gathering is not a 
purely mental construct projected onto the world. Rather, 
gathering involves embodied engagements with the world––
with people, animals, plants, rocks, weather, etc. It 
                     
2 Also, Rigby argues: “The plight of Earth’s waters, forests, soils and 
atmosphere, and of those myriad creatures, human and otherwise, whose 
life depends on them, obliges us to utterance, even though we know that 
our words, no matter how artfully wrought, are bound to be insufficient 
either to prevent or to bespeak the unprecedented horror of the ecocide 
of which we ourselves are both victims and perpetrators” (2009: 175). 
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strikes me as a good model for carrying out research in 
this world in a manner that looks to the margins where 
robins sing, mushrooms fruit, and plants decay. Like Anna 
Tsing’s “unruly edges” (2015), it is in the ostensible 
margins where we locate the things often overlooked, but 
which nevertheless shape our lives in meaningful ways. 
Indeed, to gather effectively, one must not only know what 
one is gathering, but also how and where to gather. It asks 
that we take notice of myriad yet often marginalized 
bodies, processes, and affects that inhabit the world.  
 
2.4 On the methodological implications of the nature-
society dichotomy 
 As the previous section suggests, writing and 
storytelling are much more than a matter of stylistic 
flair. Rather, they possess critical capacities that render 
them important strategies for thinking and engaging the 
world. In writing on Le Guin’s ethnographic sensibilities, 
Baker-Cristales suggests, “More than simply stylistic, Le 
Guin’s works mark an anthropological sensibility, a concern 
for understanding why societies and culture take the forms 
they do and why beings behave as they do” (2012: 16). 
Baker-Cristales further claims that Le Guin’s work poses 
the question of “what sorts of possibilities are there for 
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human existence, thought, and social ordering?” (2012: 24). 
There are, in other words, methodological dimensions to 
storytelling. To draw these out, I address debates that 
seek to reinterpret the human and its relations to more-
than-human worlds. I argue that dualistic framings of 
nature-society relations influence ways of engaging the 
world. By challenging dualistic framings, my aim is to 
provide a conceptual foundation that allows us to rethink 
research methods and methodological approaches to make 
better sense of a world in which entanglement is not always 
obvious.  
I do not wish, however, to underestimate the 
challenges involved in writing in the margins. Indeed, 
despite my various and deliberate attempts to do precisely 
this, I do not always succeed. It is, as Le Guin suggests, 
an uphill battle. It is one positioned not only against 
dominant masculine narratives, it also calls into question 
the authoritative position of the writer. Indeed, to write 
in the margins involves ceding territory to share the page 
with those that dwell in the margins. It asks that we 
relinquish control so that new kinds of stories emerge. 
Granted, in many respects it is hard to resist thinking of 
research and writing as something other than, if not more 
than, products of a singular mind. Put differently, the 
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tendency is often inward, where the mind is situated at a 
remove from the world (Bateson 1972; Ingold 2011). Le Guin 
offers a potential path around this issue, yet this inward 
tendency persists and is especially pronounced when setting 
out to conduct research and writing on nonhuman natures. 
Many of us are not, it seems, used to looking to the edges 
and rummaging around what generally falls outside the 
purview of explicitly human thoughts and values. The 
difficulty, arguably, is partly rooted in a conception of 
authorship as the expression of an intellectual self.3  
Yet, I wish to suggest this difficulty is primarily 
rooted in a longstanding conceptual division of nature and 
society, which renders each domain unique and separate. 
When setting out to conduct research on the world, it is 
perhaps wise to first account for how we think ourselves, 
our minds, and our bodies as relating to the world. This 
concerns the matter of epistemology (but not only 
epistemology, as I address later). If we think of ourselves 
standing squarely in the domain of society, conceiving our 
rightful place as that which is not in the domain of 
nature, then we will likely find ourselves telling only 
impoverished stories about this world––stories projected 
                     
3 Here, we might also hold academia responsible for its longstanding 
devaluation of collaborative work (see Choy et. al. 2009). 
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onto the world, rather than stories written with it (see 
Gibson et. al. 2015; Ingold 2010; van Dooren 2014). Such 
stories generally say more about us and our values than 
they do about the ways in which we are entangled in the 
vast materiality of the world. Thus, whatever difficulties 
we have in cultivating awareness of the world are 
difficulties that often stem from a conceptual detachment 
from it.  
Certainly, this tendency to relegate nonhuman natures 
to other realms is in keeping with a default Western 
cosmology––one predicated on a fundamental division between 
nature and society, wherein nature appears incommensurably 
‘other’. As Ingold points out, this division has been 
around for some time. “Ever since Plato and Aristotle,” 
Ingold suggests, “it has been customary in the West to 
envisage the world of nature as made up of a multitude of 
discrete objects, things, each with its own integrity and 
essential properties” (2011: 106).  
The dualistic tenor of western cosmologies makes it 
difficult to not only comprehend complex nature-society 
relations, it also makes it difficult to effectively, if 
not meaningfully, convey the richness of those relations. 
Indeed, in the division between nature and society, the 
latter domain is endowed with greater powers than the 
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former. Herein lies a problem for research and writing. 
Namely, the reduction of the world into essential and 
atomistic things bestows considerable power on those beings 
(i.e., humans) capable of perceiving and classifying 
things. Whether the things in this world fall into such 
categories as plant, animal, inanimate, animate, etc., the 
capacity to name and categorize is no small power since the 
primary point of reference––that who names––is exclusively 
human.  
We thus confront an entrenched anthropocentrism that 
orders the world into discrete categories and objects. Its 
power manifests within modes of representation and 
practices that render the world meaningful in accordance 
with explicitly human values. It could be argued that this 
is inevitable; that is, that we cannot escape our human, 
all-too-human, cognitive wiring and thus cannot but help 
render the world accordingly (Meillassoux 2008). However, 
though we might not be able to ‘be-animal’, we might take 
steps toward ‘becoming-animal’ by calling into question the 
ostensible sanctity, purity, and immutability of the human 
subject (Deleuze and Guattari 1987). Yet, failure to 
question the boundaries of human subjectivity arguably 
gives rise to methodological tendencies that not only 
reinforce the division between society and nature, but 
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invest the former with the power to represent the latter, 
thereby determining what is and what is not capable of 
either producing or contributing to meaning. Such a failure 
has, it seems, become ingrained in conventional 
methodological design.  
This is perhaps most evident in the tendency toward 
logocentrism. Amid attempts to represent nonhuman natures, 
a standard practice is “the loading of the world into 
words” (Hinchcliffe 2008: 93). Yet, here, despite well-
meaning efforts to acknowledge natures beyond the human, 
these natures nevertheless tend to be reduced to discrete 
objects, marked by an inability to ‘properly’ (i.e., 
linguistically) participate in the social domain. Phrased 
differently, logocentrism assumes that words and languages 
are expressions of a reality external to the mind. Since at 
the outset these externalized and othered ‘things’ are 
denied the capacity to ‘speak’, their identities come to 
rely on “wholly human representative accounts” (Buller 
2015: 376). Such methods work to re-inscribe a conceptual 
division between nature and society, since participation in 
society is thought to require the capacity to speak. As 
Buller argues,  
The anthropocentric and humanist social 
sciences...have traditionally placed language as a 
prerequisite basis for entry into the ‘social’.  As 
 	 36 
such, they retain what Murphy (1995: 689) calls the 
‘radical discontinuity’ between human and nonhuman 
animals by maintaining that social relations are 
necessarily human relations (2015: 375).  
 
 Accordingly, there seems an implicit bias in research 
and writing on nonhuman natures if the standard methods 
hinge on the capacity for nonhumans to make their presence 
known to humans only in ways that are defined by humans. 
Along similar lines, Hodgetts and Lorimer suggest:  
The bias towards ethnographic methodologies involving 
participant observation of humans in their 
interactions with nonhumans; interviews with human 
subjects about their experiences with nonhumans; 
discourse analysis of human representations and 
mobilizations of nonhumans; and the like––leads to the 
retention of a bias towards human sensings of 
nonhumans (2015: 287).  
 
Thus, despite efforts to tease out points of contact 
and interconnections among human and nonhuman natures, 
there remains that timeworn sense of detachment reinforced 
by conventional ways of framing the world as external to 
the mind. Such conceptual detachments risk severing the 
constitutive ties with nonhuman natures that permit us to 
experience the world, and to recognize ourselves and our 
bodies as necessarily inherent in the world. Indeed, if we 
hope to develop a politics adequate to the environmental 
challenges of the 21st century and beyond, it will emerge 
through recognition of attachment. As Braun notes, “Our own 
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capacity to be affected is part of what environmental 
politics must take as its concern” (2008: 671). Thus, to 
proceed with detachment, to disavow intimacies that cut 
across the nature-society divide, is to “render the 
nonhuman world a mute and stable background” (Hinchcliffe 
2008: 89).  
 
2.5 Bringing together storytelling and theory 
So, how might we get out of this logocentric dilemma, 
wherein the act of writing seems to take place at a remove 
from the world? Le Guin’s advice carries weight, but it is 
not clear to what extent it frees us from the clutches of 
this dilemma. Put differently, an epistemological approach 
to writing only carries us so far. What is also required is 
a strong ontological approach that attends to material 
relations that extend beyond the margins of the page. 
Toward this end, I attempt to bring Le Guin’s theory of 
fiction into contact with other ‘kin’ literatures that 
critically address the anthropocentric fault line that runs 
the gamut of western thought and practice. 
 Much has been written about this conceptual division 
and its broader implications for thinking complex relations 
that cut across the nature-society divide. Accordingly, one 
might look toward a wide range of literatures––from Marxian 
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analyses to Actor Network Theory––that challenge this 
longstanding dichotomy. Yet, my aim is to not rehash this 
debate, however important it might be.4 Rather, to account 
for the methodological implications of anthropocentrism, I 
turn primarily to three bodies of literature, among which I 
find generative points of contact: nonhuman and animal 
geographies, the environmental humanities, and feminist/new 
materialisms.  
 
2.5.1 Nonhuman geographies and methodologies 
Recent work in nonhuman geographies has shifted focus 
away from the dominant position of social worlds to take 
into account the co-productive, co-evolutionary, and 
‘lively’ relationships that inhere in the complex and 
inextricable connections of nature and society (Anderson 
1997; Braun 2004; Buller 2004, 2012, 2014; Davies 2012; 
Emel et. al. 2002; Johnston 2008; Lorimer 2006; Lorimer 
2007; Lulka 2004; Wolch and Emel 1998.) With an aim to 
“explore the complex nexus of spatial relations between 
people and animals” (Philo and Wolch 1998: 110), nonhuman 
geographies are typically positioned against “modernist 
                     
4 For a wide-ranging review of nature-society critiques, see Altvater 
2009; Burkett 1999; Callon 1984; Castree 1995, 2002; Foster et. al. 
2011; Foster and Burkett 2000; Harvey 1996; Henderson Johnston 2008; 
Jones 2009; Kirsch and Mitchell 2004; Latour 1993, 2004; Malm 2016; 
Mitchell 2002; Moore 2015; O’Connor 1988; Rudy 1994; Schmidt 2014; 
Smith 2010; Smith and O’Keefe 1996; Whatmore 2002.  
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structures, divisions, and orderings” that reduce the world 
to a system of discrete objects, each of which belongs to 
either nature or society (Buller 2014: 312).5 Buller’s call 
for “an interspecies contact or symbiogenesis” (2014: 314), 
for example, draws attention to how counter-anthropocentric 
approaches pose important challenges to preconceived 
boundaries, modify what counts as an actor, and thus has a 
political intent that “inherently challenges what it means 
to ‘belong’ or to ‘pertain’” (2014: 314).  
 At work here is an increasing recognition that “the 
worlds we inhabit exceed human control and representation” 
(Dowling et al. 2016: 1). In response, numerous scholars 
have issued calls for research methods that decenter the 
privileges granted to human perception and value. Buller, 
for example, lays out a “radical triple challenge” for 
animal geographers: “First, a genuine methodology for 
animal geography must reach beyond the all-too-easy 
collective and abstract categorizations of the non-
human...to focus rather upon animals as embodied 
                     
5 In an excellent overview of animal geography scholarship, for example, 
Buller argues that animal geographies encompass three needs:  “First, 
to recognize and demonstrate impacts of the purposefulness and agency 
of animals both on our co-habited worlds and in resistance to them; 
second, to thereby destabilize hitherto accepted dualistic approaches 
through a more fluid, turbulent, and relational human/animal 
ontological reconfiguration of the cultural practices, spatial 
formations and ultimately de-centered subjectivities; and, finally, to 
create a more radical politics that might accommodate all this 
complexity and the inherent variations within it” (2014: 312). 
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individuals living their lives entangled with humans and 
their own wider environment” (2014: 376). Buller’s second 
challenge identifies a need for “more approaches to 
understanding animals that do not rely on wholly human 
representative accounts” (2014: 376). The third challenge 
sounds a call to “move away from the 
traditional...separation of social and natural science to 
establish a set of concepts and methodologies that 
addresses what matters for both human and non-human animal 
subjects in their various relational combinations and 
spaces” (2014: 376). 
Buller’s triple challenge finds common ground with 
other geographers calling for novel methods that address 
co-productive and co-evolutionary relations. Whatmore, for 
example, argues for redirecting research toward more-than-
human modes of inquiry. For Whatmore, this involves an 
‘experimental imperative’ that invokes “the urgent need to 
supplement the familiar repertoire of humanist methods that 
rely on generating talk and text with experimental 
practices that amplify other sensory, bodily and affective 
registers and extend the company and modality of what 
constitutes a research subject” (2006: 607). In a similar 
vein, Dowling et. al. argue for methods that decenter human 
agency in order to “open research relationships, thinking, 
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and representations to beings, things, and objects 
previously ignored as active agents” (2016: 2).  
The call to amplify sensorial registers is also taken 
up in debates involving ‘geographies of encounter’ (see 
Ahmed 2000; Askins and Pain 2011; Bennett 2009; Bingham and 
Hinchcliffe 2008; Braun and Whatmore, 2011; Dewsbury et. 
al. 2002; Haraway 2008; Whatmore 2002). Rather than 
focusing on place and spatial change as the primary 
methodological concerns, “spaces of encounter”, argues 
Elizabeth Johnson, “reshape geographic methodologies 
demanding meticulous attention to the coming together of 
bodies and things as they come together in events” (2015: 
2). Johnson continues, “[Geographies of encounter] seek to 
account for how moving, more-than-human parts take hold of 
one another to produce our worlds, bringing to light these 
plural elements that shape events and constitute 
difference” (2015: 2). 
 
2.5.2 Environmental humanities  
Running roughly parallel with debates in nonhuman 
geographies, the environmental humanities have made 
significant contributions to more-than-human research 
methods by setting out “new ways to live with the earth” 
(Plumwood 2007). Several scholars pose challenges to 
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longstanding theoretical and methodological practices that 
frame the world in terms explicitly defined by human values 
(Davies 2012; Gibson et. al. 2015; Heise 2016; Ingold 2011; 
Kohn 2013; Plumwood 1993; Puig de la Bellacasa 2016; Rose 
2013; Tsing et. al. 2017; van Dooren 2014). Rose, for 
example, argues for “the need to work across the great 
divides in knowledge that have enabled us to sustain a 
faulty image of humanity, an image that holds humans apart, 
and in control” (in Gibson et. al. 2015: 3). Doing so 
requires mixing and melding worlds that have often remained 
conceptually separate, if not at odds.  
Yet, if one is to bridge that gap in order to ‘think 
with others’, one must first recognize that the nature-
society divide does not hold up in a world of political, 
social, economic, and environmental entanglement. This 
further requires that research methods be modified to 
incorporate nonhuman materialities and processes that have 
for too long remained marginalized. In this, we see calls 
to “forge new research practices to excavate, encounter, 
and extend reparative possibilities for alternative 
futures” (Gibson et. al. 2015). As Cameron notes, “such an 
approach would mean setting aside the idea of research as a 
neutral and objective activity in which there is a critical 
distance between research and the object of study” (in 
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Gibson et. al, 2015: 100). This call to place research in 
‘the middle of things’ offers opportunities for engaging 
differently with nonhuman others, thereby acknowledging the 
constitutive role they play in both research and writing. 
Simply put, research must become entangled with the world.  
Following Kato, for example, we would do well to 
listen and understand listening as a “critical practice for 
allowing our senses to awaken and become receptive to Earth 
Others” (2015: 111). And, following Instone, we must learn 
to walk differently and recognize that “whenever we walk we 
are walking alongside multiple others, human and nonhuman, 
and how we move is likewise not only a human achievement, 
but shaped by the more-than-human worlds through which we 
step” (2015: 136). As we turn to the often-overlooked 
margins where worlds take hold, we confront what Haraway 
refers to as “response-ability”––the ability to be able to 
respond with care to a suffering other, and in which 
questions of species difference are always conjugated with 
attentions to affect, entanglement, and rupture (2008: 89; 
see also Hustak and Myers 2012: 106).  
 
2.5.3 New materialisms 
 The last body of literature to address, before 
circling back to Le Guin and the problem of logocentrism, 
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is ‘new materialism’. The connection between generally 
dense socio-scientific theory and the comparatively lighter 
(but no less significant) work of Le Guin might not be 
obvious at first glance. However, when one considers that 
new materialism coheres around the refusal to “privilege 
matter over meaning or culture over nature” (Dolphijn and 
van der Tuin 2012: 86), the points of contact come into 
plain view.  
 As touchstones in new materialist theory, the works of 
Alaimo (2000, 2008, 2010, 2016), Barad (2007), Haraway 
(1988, 1989, 2013, 2016) and Stengers (2010, 2011), for 
example, offer critical insight into the gendered and 
racialized power dynamics at work in the production of 
scientific knowledge. With an aim toward examining how 
diverse bodies are caught up in the division of nature and 
society in standard scientific practice, these theories 
provide foundations for articulating new material 
assemblages conditioned by radical inclusivity rather than 
exclusivity. Moreover, the materialist dimension lends 
itself to rethinking and rewriting events that are most 
often the concern of natural scientists. Whether 
earthquakes, hurricanes, precipitous loss of planetary 
biodiversity, etc., new materialisms draw important 
attention to how the “material dimension creates and gives 
 	 45 
form to the discursive, and vice versa” (Dolphijn and van 
der Tuin 2012: 92).  
Matter and meaning, in other words, are not held at a 
distance from one another, reflecting the regrettable 
Cartesian division between mind and world. As Dolphijn and 
van der Tuin suggest, taking these apart happens through 
“the authoritative gesture of the scholar or by the 
commonsensical thinker” (2012: 91-92). Rather, against this 
authoritative impulse, we might do well to consider how 
matter and meaning are complexly entangled. Co-productive. 
Co-evolutionary. This carries the further suggestion that 
new materialist perspectives on ‘nature’ are transposable 
to the study of “culture”, and vice versa (see Dolphijn and 
van der Tuin 2012: 92).  
 In this vein, Karen Barad’s onto-epistemological 
framework ‘agential realism’ provides insight into the 
entanglement of matter and meaning. For Barad, agential 
realism ascribes agency to humans and nonhuman matter. As 
Barad frames it, “Agential realism rejects the notion of a 
correspondence between words and things and offers in its 
stead a causal explanation of how discursive practices are 
related to material phenomena” (2007: 44-45). This is no 
minor rejection since, as Barad suggests: 
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[Agential realism] provides an understanding of the 
role of human and nonhuman, material and discursive, 
and natural and cultural factors in scientific and 
other social-material practices, thereby moving such 
considerations beyond the well-worn debates that pit 
constructivism against realism, agency against 
structure, and idealism against materialism (2007: 
26). 
 
The implications of Barad’s ‘agential realism’ are 
both broad and significant. Of particular importance is how 
Barad draws out a fundamental connection between discursive 
practices and material phenomena. In linking these, as 
opposed to disassociating them, we are given a sense of how 
epistemological concerns are inextricable from ontological 
claims. Barad’s theoretical framework is important in the 
context of the present work. If, following ‘agential 
realism’, we can no longer view our bodies and ideas as 
somehow separate from the world, as if observing it from a 
freestanding perspective, then how we view, think, and 
write the world has important material consequences.  
For example, throughout this dissertation I use the 
term ‘entanglement’ to suggest the complex ways in which we 
are inextricably linked to, and conditioned by, the 
material world, or what Barad calls “intra-action” (2007: 
185). This usage might suggest only an ontological claim 
about connectivity and material relations. However, in 
keeping with Barad, I use it in a more expansive manner. 
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Entanglement does only not refer to ontology, but also to 
epistemology. Knowledge emerges in and through our 
relations with the stuff of the world. Simply put, 
“entanglement” is an onto-epistemological practice that 
necessarily calls into question longstanding divisions 
between ontology and epistemology––divisions, arguably, 
that provide the very basis for a nature-society dichotomy. 
Writing against this dichotomy, I am interested in how we 
think the world has material consequences for the world.6 
Coupled to this, I am interested in how the world’s agentic 
capacity has consequences for ‘our’ thinking of it.  
 For Barad, a refusal to hold ontology and epistemology 
separate has ethical implications. “The separation of 
epistemology from ontology”, Barad argues, “is a 
reverberation of a metaphysics that assumes an inherent 
difference between human and nonhuman, subject, and object, 
mind and body, matter and discourse” (2007: 185). As St. 
Pierre et. al. (2016) suggest, “Continuing to think and 
live in the structures of that image of thought [nature-
society dualism] is no longer possible or tolerable, 
                     
6 In a similar vein, Jason Moore (2017) argues that the nature-society 
dualism has both epistemological and ontological consequences. Applying 
this critique to colonialism, Moore argues: “The problem of Cartesian 
dualism goes well beyond philosophy. It is not only philosophically but 
practically violent. It is central to a way of organizing nature––
ontologically (what is?) and epistemologically (how do we know?)––that 
took shape between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries: the origins 
of the Capitalocene” (2017: 606). 
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and...unethical. Turns, ethical turns, become necessary 
when our encounters with the world can no longer be 
explained or justified by orthodox thinking” (2016: 100). 
Toward this end, Barad affixes the prefix “ethico” to 
“onto-epistemology”, giving us “ethico-onto-epistem-ology”–
–“an appreciation of the intertwining of ethics, knowing, 
and being” (Barad 2007: 185). Indeed, for Barad, the 
ceaselessly dynamic and entangled quality of the world 
offers a new sense of what ethical commitment might mean. 
Without the imposition of interiority and exteriority that 
undergird conventional scientific epistemology, we are 
given, suggests Barad, an ethics “not about right response 
to a radically exterior/ized other, but about 
responsibility and accountability for the lively 
relationalities of becoming of which we are a part” (2007: 
393).  
Such an approach challenges notions of objective 
distance through which one might think, experience, and 
come to know the world. To think/practice relationalities 
is to acknowledge how open textures and relations cut 
across longstanding divisions between nature and society. 
Its chief reward lies in its provision of different ways of 
understanding entanglement. Moreover, it offers strategies 
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for approaching the enormity of the catastrophic 
environmental condition in which we find ourselves.  
 
2.6 On stories that matter 
Via Barad’s ethico-onto-epistem-ology, and its refusal 
to draw a fundamental distinction between discourse and 
matter, we can return to the issue of logocentrism and Le 
Guin. In view of Barad, we might argue that logocentrism 
misunderstands the entanglement of discourse and matter, 
which is to say, the entanglement of epistemology and 
ontology. It misunderstands that stories matter in both 
senses of the word. First, they matter in the sense of ‘to 
be of importance, to have significance’. Here Haraway comes 
to mind as one who emphasizes the importance of stories. 
“It matters what stories we tell to tell other stories 
with” (2016: 12). That stories matter, in this sense, 
resonates with the ethical dimension of Barad’s ethico-
onto-epistem-ology. The stories we tell can unlock 
imaginations and strategies for bringing about different 
and possibly better futures. As van Dooren and Rose write, 
“Telling stories has consequences, one of which is that we 
will inevitably be drawn into new connections and, with 
them, new accountabilities and obligations” (2016: 89). 
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Stories also matter in the other sense, that which 
refers to material manifestation. Of becoming physical. Of 
becoming matter. Haraway continues: “It matters what 
stories make worlds, what worlds make stories” (2016: 12). 
Storytelling, in other words, offers not only a method for 
understanding the world, but also as a strategy for 
collapsing the distance between self and world (see Cameron 
2012; Cronon 1992; Gibson et. al. 2015; van Dooren and Rose 
2012). As Cameron suggests, “Stories do not simply 
represent...they affect, they move” (2012: 581). The 
stories we weave do things in the world. And the worlds we 
inhabit weave stories. Stories allow for us to not only 
understand the complex ways in which our pasts have evolved 
in tandem with the world, but also how our present moment 
is necessarily conditioned in and through our relationships 
with the world.  
This is why the robin’s song matters: it is not 
irrelevant chatter taking place external to what is 
important. To declare its insignificance is to regress into 
modes of storytelling that center on the human, and 
consequently disregard the nonhuman. This is an old story, 
and one neither interesting nor particularly well-suited 
for the future. Rather, the robin’s song matters because, 
simply put, it is important. It calls us to the edges if we 
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are willing to listen to what takes hold in these often-
overlooked domains. Moreover, the song matters because it 
adds weight to the world, however slight and fragile 
(albeit cheery) it might be. Still, it is physical 
nonetheless––literally an audible wave of pressure that 
confirms other presences. 
 
2.7 Onward to gathering stories 
In what follows, I write with Le Guin and kin in mind. 
I wish to evade the hero’s narrative, displace 
anthropocentrism’s entitlement, and fend off a world 
‘purified of things’. Put differently, my aim is not to 
designate the research subject as that which exemplifies 
the world. Here, Whatmore’s call to “extend the company and 
modality of what constitutes a research subject” (2006: 
607) is relevant. Rather than centering the human in my 
work, my aim is to tend to the milieus within which humans 
are situated––rich with ‘things’ that exceed merely human 
subjectivities. This requires that I sometimes turn away 
from respondents and their words and give attention to how 
their actions involve interrelations and negotiations 
across human and nonhuman natures. It is not that the human 
does not matter in this research, but rather that it does 
not, indeed cannot, matter independent of the material 
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conditions within which it is situated. Thus, instead of 
writing of humans, or of animals, and of plants, etc., in 
what follows my goal is to write with them. This requires 
that I tend to the stories that inhere around the subjects, 
in the world and often out of view. It is my intention, 
therefore, to proceed in a speculative manner, to look 
toward the edges, and to strive to hold open space for 
playfulness, for enchantment, and for unexpected 
encounters.  
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Chapter 3: ‘The Murmurs of the Past and the Potential of 
the Future’: Eco-survivalism and the Body 
 
 
We have forgotten where we come from (Grosz, 2004: 2). 
 
3.1 Toward a future body 
This chapter revolves around technological practices. 
In particular, I wish to draw attention to how 
technological practices factor into relationships between 
bodies and matter, and how these relationships matter (in 
both senses of the word) for future bodies and future 
environments. Toward this end, I take a cue from the 
following set of questions posed by Elizabeth Grosz: “What 
must a body, a ‘subject,’ be to make, inhabit, and 
transform its social and natural environment? What is this 
‘external’ environment, context, surrounding that excites 
and transforms the bodies, individual and collective, that 
inhabit it? And what might their relations become in the 
future?” (2005: 146). 
As Grosz notes, questions concerning technology are 
questions that necessarily concern bodies and environments. 
Or, as Braun and Whatmore put it, “body 
schemas...necessarily involve the body’s coupling to an 
external environment, a coupling that has always been 
accomplished through technical operations” (2010: xviii). 
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Any attempt to theorize the technological must necessarily 
take into account how technologies work in and through 
bodies, and how bodies modify environments in and through 
technological practice. It is thus crucial to consider the 
three terms––the technological, the body, and the 
environment––as being complexly entangled. Thus, when 
posing the question of what the future holds for human 
bodies, such a question must work within and across these 
three terms. 
 Let us briefly unpack the question of what the future 
holds for bodies and draw out some of the thornier issues 
that underpin it. First, it is a difficult question since 
we cannot depend on the prolongation of an ideal body that 
retains its form and function regardless of its immediate 
environmental contexts. Rather than a persistent and 
unchanging ‘thing’, the body is better thought of a process 
stretched across space and time, which continuously 
modifies, and is modified by, a particular milieu in which 
it finds itself (Alaimo 2010; Braun and Whatmore 2010; 
Seitler 2008). Simply put, bodies coevolve along with their 
environments.  
Second, nor can we depend on the prolongation of 
environmental conditions that made this world hospitable 
for the human body, aiding in its gradual proliferation 
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from the Great Rift Valley millions of years ago. Indeed, 
in light of recent work by Steffen et. al., it is 
increasingly evident that “the relatively stable, 11,700-
year-long Holocene epoch, the only state of the planet that 
we know for certain can support contemporary human 
societies, is now being destabilized” (2015: 1; see also 
Barnosky et. al. 2012; Foley et. al. 2011; Raworth 2012; 
Rockström et. al. 2009).  
So, as we are propelled into this uncertain future, 
how might we negotiate a place in an environment that may 
be inhospitable to our bodies? What technologies will be 
available that would allow for new ways of existing in new 
environments? What will bodies, in their biophysical and 
cultural senses, carry forth into a post-Holocene 
environmental reality? And, in our scramble to plan for 
uncertain environmental futures, what risks getting left 
behind or forgotten? 
In light of these questions, this chapter approaches 
the body as a site of struggle and technological 
experimentation. In what follows I turn to the question of 
the body and technological practice as they are understood 
and performed amidst a group of eco-survivalists situated 
in rural Vermont. In the next section, I briefly situate 
this research in debates around techno-futurism. Following 
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this, I address some conceptual problems associated with 
eco-survivalist and neo-primitivist subcultures. Then, I 
address the relationship between the body and non-
conventional (i.e., pre-civilizational) technological 
practices. Lastly, I turn to the question of the body in 
time, before concluding with a statement on the enduring 
value the deep past holds for uncertain futures. 
 
3.2 The techno-futurist and transhumanist gamble 
To begin, this chapter casts a cautionary view toward 
particular outlines for the future falling under the rubric 
of techno-futurism, including geo- and bio-engineering (see 
Asafu-Adjaye et. al. 2015; Gore 2007; Revkin 2014; Williams 
and Srnicek 2013).7 While it is the case that environmental 
crisis appears as a technological challenge, my central 
concern is how the scale and scope of proposed 
technological solutions risk disavowing ostensibly past 
technological practices that remain relevant, especially in 
the context of environmental uncertainty. Thus, despite its 
future orientation, this chapter acknowledges biological, 
                     
7 A fair question might be posed at the outset: If my research focuses 
on neo-primitivism, why begin with a discuss around advanced bio-
technologies? My reasoning is that prevailing discourses around the 
future of technology and the body reflect the latter approach. Most 
certainly not the former. It follows that to uncover the potential 
promises of neo-primitivism requires that I address these prevailing 
modes of thought. 
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technological, and environmental pasts as constitutive to 
the production of future bodies and future worlds.  
 When it comes to the immense question of technological 
assemblages adequate to 21st century environmental 
challenges, prevailing techno-futurist discourses carry the 
hope that technological ingenuity will successfully 
mitigate future environmental threats, thereby assuring 
future bodies will inhabit a planet rendered hospitable 
(whether Earth or some other planet). This, I would argue, 
is the default position, one that hinges on the notion of 
the ‘technological fix’. Indeed, for some, the Anthropocene 
is seen as something that is “good” (Revkin 2014). It 
presents an opportunity for humanity to marshal its ‘better 
angels’ (Pinker 2011) and unleash its technological prowess 
to bring forth a world that is reasonable, predictable, 
equitable, and safe.8  
Many issues regarding future body-technology-world 
relations have been taken up in nascent debates around 
transhumanism, which offers strategies that link the large 
                     
8 Such a positive spin on deeply troubling circumstances does not go 
unchallenged. Stengers, for example, is deeply suspicious of such 
claims, arguing, “The idea of a ‘good Anthropocene’ [unleashes] 
engineering dreams of control and command and [makes] geoengineering 
the logical scenario despite the deep uncertainty of climate 
manipulation and the political, social, and ecological dangers with 
which any attempt at this is replete” (2017: 384; see also Hamilton 
2016; Latour 2015; Szerszynski 2016).  
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scale of geoengineering with the small scale of 
bioengineering (Duarte and Park 2014; Ferrando 2013; Roden 
2015). In transhumanist discourse, the human body is often 
portrayed as imperfect and vulnerable. On account of the 
body’s alleged biophysical deficiencies, many 
transhumanists dream of “[overcoming] the human condition 
with the aid of new and emerging fields of technoscience, 
such as nanotechnology, biotechnology, information 
technology and cognitive science” (Duarte and Park 2014: 
260). In transhumanism, the body’s malleability provides 
the basis for modes of experimentation that seek not only 
to enhance the human––reordering its biophysical properties 
in response to environmental challenges––but also to 
ultimately transcend the human condition by creating bodies 
free of constraints and liberated from death and disease. 
As Duarte and Park observe, “transhumanism can be seen as 
an ideology that aims for a realization of religious 
narratives and promises by technological means” (2014: 
260).  
That techno-futurisms focus on the crucial role 
technology plays in mitigating global environmental crises 
is perhaps sensible. Yet, these concerns around global 
technological mastery necessarily touch down and manifest 
themselves at smaller scales. How this happens, however, is 
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often unclear and undertheorized. Namely, I am concerned 
how techno-futurism frames the body as fragile and thus a 
hindrance to be transcended. Doing so risks minimizing a 
crucial term in the aforementioned biology-technology-
environment triad. Indeed, inasmuch as the aim of 
geoengineering is to manage the planet via technologies 
capable of transcending and managing Earth System 
complexities, would not the same desire also potentially 
apply to bodies? That is, would a technological will to 
mastery also not render the body an object to be mastered 
along with the world? Here, the biophysical body fades 
away, subsumed by an emergent technological apparatus that 
seems somehow different from the longstanding relationships 
bodies have forged with technologies.9 Indeed, if we follow 
transhumanism’s portrayal of the body as weak and 
diminished, then we have little choice to submit it, and 
its evolutionary histories, to an emergent and seemingly 
totalizing technocratic solutionism. Yet, if our rush to 
assume control of uncertain futures requires the 
transcendence of the human body via high-tech design, then 
one might question just what it is that is being 
transcended. 
                     
9 The difference, perhaps, is evident in anxieties around the pace of 
technological evolution outstripping that of biophysical evolution 
(Stiegler 1998). 
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I argue that if we too willingly cast bodies as 
vulnerabilities to be overcome, we risk disavowing the 
inheritances that reach back into cultural and evolutionary 
pasts. These pasts may prove pivotal in the future.  
Inasmuch as there is a mandate to fearlessly face the 
future and prepare for novel technologized bodies, doing so 
ought not to involve the sacrifice of the past. Indeed, if 
we must boldly face the future, let us not do so as the 
futurist F.T. Marinetti proposed, “on the last promontory 
of the centuries” (1909: 21). 
Thus, as prelude to the challenges I take up 
throughout this chapter, I wish to write against a 
transhumanist vision of the future. Yet, I do not write 
against technology. Rather, I wish to acknowledge how past 
technologies bring the body, in its enduring negotiation 
with matter, into (re)new(ed) relief relative to the 
environmental challenges of the Anthropocene. In doing so, 
it is my aim to recognize and reaffirm the body’s potencies 
and potentials so that we might face uncertain futures, and 
to carry a little of ourselves along the way. But, getting 
there requires a circuitous path that must come to terms 
with some problems involved in looking toward past 
relations among bodies, technologies, and environments. 
These are problems, I argue, that must be dealt with in 
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order to thoughtfully address the question of the future. 
And, so, I now pivot in what might seem like the opposite 
direction from transhumanism, and toward eco-survivalism 
and neo-primitivism.  
 
3.3 The lure of past bodies, technologies, and environments 
Despite a predisposition to reject idealistic notions 
of Nature, I admit that conditions in the eco-survivalist 
community are relatively ideal. Situated on approximately 
150 acres atop a ridgeline in Vermont’s modest mountains, 
the land is a vibrant patchwork of mixed deciduous and 
coniferous forests, fields heavy with grasses, quick forest 
streams, and freshwater springs that persist through 
drought. Winters are less vibrant, but this is to be 
expected around the 44th parallel north.  
Deer, coyote, fisher cat, raccoon, and the occasional 
moose and bear trace their lives there, as does a small 
group of suburban outcasts who don’t find much value in 
yielding to the dictates of a so-called civilized life. As 
one member, Sarah, put it: “This is kind of like the land 
of misfit toys who don’t fit in elsewhere” (S., personal 
communication, 2011). For them, there is more to be 
discovered in a hemlock grove than a strip mall. This 
common sentiment lends the community a counter-cultural 
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vibe attractive to a range of individuals. Accordingly, in 
addition to the core group of five members, the community 
is frequented by punks, travelers, new-agers, hippies, 
preppers, and a generally motley assortment of characters 
who visit and often take instructional classes to gain 
insight into a slightly different manner of surviving in 
what they believe to be a world run amuck. 
Thus, underneath this idyllic veneer is a darker 
orientation to the world. It is one based on a desire to 
(re)discover modes of life that might prove adequate for 
enduring 21st century environmental crisis. Much of what 
brings together the community is an interest in ‘primitive 
survival skills’. ‘Survival’ is a key word that speaks to 
notions of bodies-at-risk. For the eco-survivalists, the 
concept of survival spans a broad contextual spectrum. It 
might refer to a situation like being lost in unfamiliar 
woods. In such circumstances, knowledge of shelter, water, 
and fire skills would serve one well and increase the 
chance of survival. Survival could also refer to 
hypothetical collapses of socioeconomic systems––a 
narrative often prompted by, “What will you do when the 
trucks stop running?” In this scenario, where conventional 
pathways to consumer goods are cut off and supermarkets lay 
ransacked, questions of how to find food, manage life-
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sustaining resources, and implement security precautions 
take center stage. But, the solemnest sense of survival 
looming in the background is not hypothetical (it is 
perhaps abstract, but it is also lived): How might one best 
survive a post-Holocene unknown?  
For the eco-survivalists, survival ultimately concerns 
the body’s relation to technology. However, in contrast to 
the massive scales invoked by techno-futurism, the eco-
survivalists seek solutions at the smaller scale of 
embodied practice of technologies commonly relegated to a 
pre-civilizational past––like hunting and gathering, fire 
by friction, stone tool making, and wild-crafting medicines 
from local flora. For them, facing the future involves a 
turn to the past. This rearward orientation lends the 
community a ‘neo-primitivist’ outlook, which looks 
primarily to past practices (as well as past bodies) as 
holding possible solutions for future challenges. Thus, for 
the community, survival is not entirely a chance affair. It 
is also a set of learned skills. And, it is through 
practice of skills that the eco-survivalists not only aim 
to achieve a degree of liberation from modern technological 
systems and their associated risks, but to also acquire 
traction in the face of environmental crises.  
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3.3.1 Eco-survivalism and technology 
Acquiring traction involves a measure of faith that 
what served the pre-civilizational human well in its 
negotiation with various environments is also likely to 
serve the future human well. Put differently, solutions for 
the future are sought within bodies and technologies that 
are seemingly archaic, but which nevertheless remain 
relevant to contemporary circumstances. As one eco-
survivalist, Brad, remarked while fashioning an obsidian 
point to the tip of an ash wood fishing spear:  
As humans, we’re built with a lot of innate skill and 
innate bodily wiring that has served us pretty well 
for a million years. Humans have lived for a long time 
without all this high-tech garbage we’re surrounded by 
today (B., personal communication, 2011). 
 
On the surface, this seems like an obvious statement. 
Our species’ lot on this planet far eclipses an era of 
reality television and smart phones, and we have managed to 
carve out niches independent of these accoutrements. Yet, 
the statement makes two allusions that require further 
attention. First is the implication that technologies 
falling under ‘modernity’ are superfluous, if not exterior, 
to an essential sense of what it means to be human. Note: 
this is not a denunciation of technology in general, but 
rather a claim that certain modes of technology integrate 
well with the human body, whereas other modes place that 
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body at risk. A second related claim posits a baseline 
‘humanness’ that is compromised by modern technology. Here, 
the body is presented as durable yet vulnerable. It 
persists biologically over millennia, but it can be quickly 
thrown off track by novel technological regimes.  
To hold modern technology accountable for present ills 
is an old trope. And, as I argue, it is one that risks a 
reactionary politics predicated on notions of authenticity. 
This trope is generally derivative of the ‘Narrative of the 
Fall’, wherein ‘our’ fall into history and technology 
signifies the deterioration of an ideal form, whether it be 
Nature (as reified Eden) or Human (as prelapsarian body). 
As William Cronon observes, such quasi-religious values are 
common in contemporary environmentalism, wherein:  
Wilderness is the natural unfallen antithesis of an 
unnatural civilization that has lost its soul. It is a 
place of freedom in which we can recover the true 
selves we have lost to the corrupting influences of 
our artificial lives. Most of all, it is the ultimate 
landscape of authenticity (1996: 80). 
 
It is important to consider the work ‘authenticity’ 
performs in this trope. When a deep suspicion of emergent 
technological systems is filtered through neo-primitivist 
perspectives, there is a tendency to posit an ideal body 
and an imperfect one relative to technological systems. 
Witness, for example, the following exchange: 
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Harlan Morehouse: Technology, as you suggest, is 
hardly a new thing. It’s been with humans for a very 
long time. But I wonder if another way to frame this 
is that technology has always had a social component, 
and it’s never existed outside social formations in a 
broad sense. So, why can’t one look at what’s 
happening now in the modern era and say...  
 
Brad: It’s just different technology? 
 
HM: Right. It’s just a different degree of technology. 
It’s a different sense of the social, and both are 
issuing forth a different sense of what it means to be 
human. 
 
B: Yeah, I guess I would say that I don’t want to be 
that kind of human, and that I’m not happy with this 
society’s choices for that new human. Besides, I don’t 
think we are necessarily a new human, at least in a 
biological sense. [The decision to use certain 
technologies] is just a cultural choice. That’s a 
decision we all get to make. And, I guess my goal is 
to inspire people to use an older technology––a 
technology that’s more inherently grounded in the 
earth and in where things come from. So, if I go out 
with this spear right here that I made from an ash 
sapling––that I harvested from the forest where I 
live––and I kill a fish with it, then I’m infinitely 
more connected to that fish and to that land. I’m way 
more likely to protect it and care about it and treat 
it with the respect it deserves, all because I’ve done 
it first-hand. It’s very different than if I were to 
go to a supermarket and buy these things. It’s very, 
very different (B., personal communication, 2011).  
 
3.3.2 Eco-survivalism against the human 
There is a lot to unpack here, some of which I will 
return to in later sections. For now, I wish to work 
through some thorny issues in this exchange. To begin: What 
does it mean to express the desire against being a certain 
kind of human? Here, the issue does not concern undesirable 
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character traits like dishonesty, brutality, etc. Instead, 
that which is undesirable appears as something quotidian 
yet immense, and arguably essentialized: the modern human. 
The adjective is crucial, since the issue does not involve 
‘the human’ as much as it involves a particular techno-
biological manifestation of the human. If we are, as Brad 
suggests, essentially the same as far as our bodies go, 
then where do things go awry? At what point does the human 
lose its authentic place in the world? At first glance the 
issue would seem to involve how bodies fall into regimes of 
modern technology that allegedly impoverish one’s 
experience of the world. A GPS device might be able to tell 
you where you are, but it doesn’t offer much help in 
explaining why you are.  
Yet, there is more to unpack here since the question 
of authenticity only generates deeper questions. What is 
being advocated in the rejection of the modern human? A 
return to an Edenic terrain and its ostensibly harmonious 
life-worlds? This would not be an unusual sentiment, as 
longing for pre-civilizational ideals is another enduring 
trope. From Rousseau’s “free, healthy, good and happy” 
savage (1754: n.p.), to Freud’s diagnosis of civilization 
as “largely responsible for our misery” (2005: 68), to 
contemporary neo-primitivist thinkers like Derrick Jensen, 
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for whom civilization is a force that “will continue to 
immiserate the vast majority of humans and to degrade the 
planet until it (civilization, and probably the planet) 
collapses” (2006: ix-x), there seems an ever-present desire 
to do away with modern life, to clean the proverbial slate, 
and to simply and intimately give oneself over to being in 
its most romanticized and immediate sense.  
 However, like Cronon suggests, “The trouble with 
wilderness is that it quietly expresses and reproduces the 
very values its devotees seek to escape” (1996: 80), the 
trouble with longing for an authentic primitiveness is that 
it too would seem to emerge from the very conditions it 
seeks to escape. Despite the eco-survivalists’ efforts to 
craft modes of being that are contrary to modernity, such 
efforts are nevertheless conditioned by modernity. This is 
a point Victor Li stresses: “Modern nostalgia’s paradoxical 
longing for a lost something it must at the same time 
preserve as an absence suggests that neo-primitivism is not 
so much modernity’s antithesis as its product” (2006: 71).  
 This is no minor paradox. Nor does nostalgia come 
without risk. First, the desire for a clean slate that 
requires civilizational collapse suggests a longing for a 
life free of politics. This is evident, for example, in the 
following from Jensen: “When eventually the earth and 
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humans on the earth...find some sort of new dynamic 
equilibrium, there will no longer be any history” (2006: 
41). Such statements defer the complexities that underpin 
modern social existence to an idyllic capital-N Nature and 
thus work to empty the past, present, and future of their 
sociopolitical content. Moreover, they carry the 
implication that it is wrong for humans to be subject to 
modernity, but it is right for humans to be subject to 
Natural Law. Yet, as Mick Smith asks in his critical take 
on neo-primitivism, “In what sense and to what extent is 
being subject to the laws (or cycles) of nature actually 
compatible with any kind of freedom, especially when this 
freedom is defined in terms of an absence of politics?” 
(2011: 79). Certainly, one might ask what kind of future it 
will be if it can only emerge in reference to archaic 
natures and an idealized primitive body. 
 
3.3.3 Politics of the transhistorical body  
 Second, there is an issue in how the body is sometimes 
taken up in neo-primitivist discourses. If it is the case 
that neo-primitivism is a product of modernity, do we not 
accordingly witness a paradoxical standardization of modern 
conceptions of subjectivity that get mapped onto the body 
of an ostensibly authentic human? What I mean here is that 
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conceptions of selfhood that are forged in discourses of 
modernity––ones predicated on liberal subjectivity and 
individualism––become endowed with a peculiar immutability 
that seems to exist independent of technological and 
environmental contexts. Immutability grants modern 
conceptions of selfhood an absolute quality, permitting 
them to be transported back in time as representative of 
pre-civilizational selfhood. That is, immutability 
possesses a transhistorical dimension that gets inscribed 
on bodies and relations strewn across vast stretches of 
time.  
In such an arrangement, it is not that we descend from 
the primitive body; rather, the primitive body is dislodged 
from its contexts and is made to reflect ‘us’. Indeed, if 
‘the primitive’ is produced in such a manner as to 
exemplify better versions of ourselves––versions capable of 
withstanding conditions of collapse––it is produced in such 
a way as to always reinforce our existing desires. There is 
no short leap of faith involved in this. It also involves 
no small measure of conceptual violence, since, as Li 
argues, “primitives [come to] represent an empty alterity 
and are made to fit what Michel-Rolph Troullo has called 
‘the savage slot,’ a prefigured category awaiting 
occupation” (2005: 65).  
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 In the eco-survivalist community, this projection of 
desire onto a transhistorical body occasionally served to 
justify expressions of masculinity and gendered divisions 
of labor. Moreover, whiteness is a problem that lurks at 
the edges of eco-survivalist discourse, and one to which I 
give more attention in this dissertation’s conclusion. For 
the moment, however, it is important to flag how these 
issues around gender, masculinity, and whiteness have a way 
of being bracketed off through a higher-level abstraction 
of Homo sapiens. That is, conjuring an essential sense of 
the species and marshalling it as cohesive construct 
assumes, as Eddie Yuen puts it, “a potential unity that has 
yet to be realized” (Yuen in Lilley et. al. 2012: 26). And, 
much like the mythic figure of the frontier individualist, 
as Cronon suggests, “was almost always masculine in gender” 
(1996: 78), so too is the figure of the pre-civilizational 
primitive similarly invested, especially with qualities 
like ruggedness, self-sufficiency, pragmatic knowhow, etc. 
Yet, again, such projections say more about present 
desires––for ourselves, for alternative social 
arrangements, et cetera––than they do about the presumed 
qualities of pre-civilizational life. For example, as one 
eco-survivalist remarked: 
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I grew up in a household that said, “Women can do it 
too.” And, I completely agree with that. I’ll also say 
that when I look at the division of labor in most 
native tribes––that makes a whole lot of sense to 
me.... A tribe wouldn’t have the ability to be, like, 
“You know what, we’re going to send all the women 
hunting, and we’re going to have all the men take care 
of the children.” It didn’t work well. That was the 
reason: it was based off of pragmatically how it 
worked or didn’t work, on who had natural proclivities 
towards what (F., personal communication, 2011).  
 
Despite sincere acknowledgement of gender equality’s 
validity, equality is nevertheless framed as particular to 
modernity. Its validity only goes so far. Desires for 
different, perhaps more segregated, social arrangements are 
transported into the past and inscribed upon ancestral 
bodies and their presumed behaviors.10 The methods through 
which contemporary politics are inscribed and naturalized 
upon the figure of an authentic body are as problematic as 
they are powerful. Indeed, to posit a neo-primitivist, 
transhistorical body would seem to require the erasure of 
cultural difference, wherein difference is bracketed off in 
the creation of an ideal subject that maintains its 
essential subjectivity through time. One might take it one 
step further and argue that the difference that gets 
bracketed off tends to render the ideal body a 
                     
10 This is done so despite whether anthropological evidence indicates a 
general, but not exclusive, inclination toward gendered divisions of 
labor in many pre-civilizational cultures (see Conkey and Giro 1991; 
Conkey and Spector 1984; Gilchrist 2012; Waguespack 2005). 
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predominantly white body, in addition to a masculine one, 
that stands in as a referent for all ideal bodies.  
As Li puts it, what matters most is “not the actual 
existence of primitives, but [rather] their discursive 
presence, their function as theoretical place-holders, as 
abstract differend in conflict with Western universalism” 
(2005: 65). Such erasure provides an illusion of an archaic 
foundation that can be used to justify the emergence of 
particular (if not taboo) sociopolitical arrangements in 
the future, as if such arrangements were inevitable by 
virtue of their alleged transhistoricity. This is why the 
figure of the primitive is so compelling and rhetorically 
potent: it acts on the future in particular ways, for 
better or worse.  
The upshot of an alleged primitive transhistoricity is 
that if modern social conventions come to pass––after, say, 
a hypothetical socioeconomic collapse––it follows that ‘the 
social’ would also revert to an allegedly ‘natural’ and 
‘pragmatic’ state. Bodies, too, would be relegated to their 
proper place in accordance with a so-called natural order. 
Collapse is a crucial variable in this narrative, for a 
suspension and subsequent erasure of hard-fought 
sociopolitical gains can only come about via a catastrophic 
state of exception. This provides a distinctly Schmittian 
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tenor, for if it is the case that “the exception reveals 
most clearly the essence of the state’s authority” (Schmitt 
1985: 13), then, in the case of eco-survivalism, it can be 
argued that desire for hypothetical collapse reveals the 
regressive political motives of its adherents. 
There are thus troubling undercurrents––not limited to 
those discussed above––to neo-primitivist/eco-survivalist 
idealizations of primitive bodies, which are put to work 
for present and future needs. The problems that crop up in 
neo-primitivism are the inverse of those in transhumanism. 
Where the latter seeks to transcend the burden of the body, 
the former appears to idealize its ostensible purity. Put 
differently, where techno-futurism expresses a desire to 
transcend the body on account of a global environmental 
rupture, neo-primitivism expresses a desire to entrench the 
body as the very ground upon which humans might survive 
global environmental collapse. Such idealization runs the 
risk of harboring a reactionary politics. This is a line 
the eco-survivalist community skirts. Masculinist and neo-
reactionary elements occasionally crop up in the community. 
However, I use the word “risk” strategically here, for the 
community in question cannot so easily be written off as 
purely problematic. For all its reactionary, regressive, 
and gendered aspects, there are also expressions of 
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liberation, solidarity amongst diverse bodies disturbed 
across vast stretches of space and time, radical openness 
to what a body can do, and a willingness to imagine ways of 
‘being otherwise’ in the 21st century (Malabou 2012; 
Povinelli 2012). These are issues to which I now turn. My 
aim hereafter, however, is not to sweep troubling aspects 
under a rug. They are important. They need to be attended 
to, and I take them up once more in the conclusion. But, 
this is not quite the end of the story. 
 
3.4 Desire without authenticity: the body, technology, and 
time 
At this juncture, the operative question is as 
follows: Is it possible to harbor neo-primitivist desires––
ones broadly defined against modernity––in a manner that 
does not reinforce reactionary idealism and authenticity? 
In what follows, I put forward a different way of 
interpreting the expressed desire to not be “that kind of 
human”. However, before proceeding, a note is in order. The 
argument that follows is one I make uneasily. My unease 
stems from the recognition that I am making an argument 
from empirical engagements that draw primarily (but not 
exclusively) on white bodies situated at a comfortable 
remove from the scenarios for which they are preparing. The 
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fact that they have the space and time to prepare makes all 
the difference in the world, for the futures they fear are 
the realities for a significant portion of humanity. 
Indeed, as The Invisible Committee puts it, “The 
catastrophe is not coming, it is here” (2009: n.p.). And, 
the catastrophe, most certainly, is unevenly distributed 
(Davis and Todd 2018; Hoffman et. al. 2002; Last and 
Kanngieser 2016; Lilley et. al. 2008; Malm and Hornborg 
2015; Whyte 2016).  
So, some fair questions might be posed at this 
juncture: Why look to those who have the privilege to 
prepare, instead of those are presently facing the need to 
adapt? Does not the relative comfort of preparation suggest 
that the tragedies that others experience are being 
appropriated by those who share similar fears, but face 
neither the risks nor the sacrifices inherent in 
catastrophic circumstances? While I have a number of 
responses to these questions, which I will work through in 
the following pages, admittedly I have yet to find one that 
is satisfactory.  
Still, though, I persist even if from an imperfect, if 
not shaky, foundation. The reason I do so is that I feel 
there is a story to tell here that, while not ignoring the 
privilege of those of whom I write, can nevertheless offer 
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insight into different modes of inhabiting the world. 
Making this argument requires a number of careful moves, 
especially in light of the risks addressed above. For 
guidance, I turn to the earlier set of questions posed by 
Grosz, which will serve as organizing themes for the next 
four sections. For convenience, I present Grosz’s questions 
once more in bulleted format: 
• What must a body, a ‘subject,’ be to make, inhabit, 
and transform its social and natural environment?  
 
• What is this “external” environment, context, 
surrounding that excites and transforms the bodies, 
individual and collective, that inhabit it?  
 
• And what might their relations become in the future? 
(2005: 146). 
 
3.4.1. The body as open-ended  
To address Grosz’s first question, I provide brief 
remarks on the human as an open-ended system.11 These 
remarks are intended to serve as a counter-point to 
transhumanism’s framing of the body as a defiency to be 
transcended. The body’s interrelationship with the 
environment has long been a subject of debate in social and 
cultural geography (Cf. Abrahamsson and Simpson 2011; 
Bissel 2008; Callard 1998; Harrison 2008; Longhurst 1994; 
                     
11 Here, I draw on Grosz’s challenge to “understand the body, not as an 
organism or entity in itself, but as a system, or a series of open-
ended systems, functioning within other huge systems that it cannot 
control through which it can access and acquire its abilities and 
capacities” (2004: 3). 
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Nast and Pile 1998; Whatmore 2002). For geographers, the 
body provides an ideal site for mapping the human’s co-
evolutionary and co-productive relationship to space and 
time. As Abrahamsson and Simpson suggest, “[the body] is 
what constantly changes and still endures; it is part of 
what we have and part of what we are; it is worked upon 
from an outside and worked with from an inside” (2011: 
332).  
Moreover, recent debates in geography have extended 
the focus on the body through critical engagements with 
posthumanism (Badmington 2004; Braun 2004; Castree and Nash 
2006; Clark 2011; Murdoch 2004; Picken and Ferguson 2014; 
Whatmore 2002, 2004). Drawing on broad counter-
anthropocentric discourses (Haraway 1985, 1992; Hayles 
1999; Latour 1993; Whatmore 2002; Wolfe 2010), critical 
posthumanist thought in geography, though far from settled, 
has emphasized the untenable quality of rigid dichotomies 
like ‘human-nonhuman’ and ‘nature-society’. These debates 
offer insight into how the body’s presumed boundaries are 
open to include that which it is not, and thereby challenge 
more conventional perspectives on the body. As Stacy Alaimo 
suggests: “The biological body is better thought of as 
interconnected and interactive rather than as some sort of 
determining core” (2010: 391; see also Gibson et. al. 2015; 
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Ingold 2004; Tsing et. al. 2017). Thus, rather than a 
clearly delineated entity unto itself, the body is 
complexly entangled with other bodies and processes 
conventionally considered exterior to the human.  
If there is little sense in thinking the human as an 
entity unto itself, where does this leave us with regard to 
the aforementioned ‘that human’? Would this figure not 
require an essential sense of the contemporary human that 
stands in contrast to its ostensibly authentic non-modern 
counterpart? Not necessarily. What if, instead, the figure 
of “that human” does not so much represent an inauthentic 
human, but rather signifies modernity’s attempt to cleave 
the world in two, between that which is human and that 
which is not? Put differently, what if ‘to be that human’ 
is to be the kind of human that subscribes to the notion 
that humans are independent from the material conditions of 
their existence? Latour’s (1993) assessment of modernity is 
relevant here, since it is the “modern Constitution’s” 
practice of ‘purification’ that creates two distinct 
ontological zones: the human and the nonhuman (1993; see 
also Shotwell 2016: 16 for a critique of ‘the metaphysics 
of purity’). 
Inasmuch as the coupling of purity and separability is 
characteristic of modernity, the possibility for being 
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otherwise and thus contrary to the dictates of modernity 
must address the notion of the human as a purified category 
unto itself. And, it must do so, as the aforementioned 
literatures suggest, by addressing the ontological and 
epistemological gulf between human and nonhuman, or society 
and nature (Barad 2007). This gets to the heart of Grosz’s 
first question: To be a body requires ongoing engagements 
with the world, which permit a body, as such, to exist. 
Indeed, to be a body would involve forging alliances 
amongst humans and nonhumans––alliances that would be 
unrealizable if the world were cleaved in two. For the eco-
survivalists, then, the problem of modernity is not 
reducible to modern technology and its concomitant risks. 
Rather, the problem concerns modernity’s claim that places 
the human in a privileged site separate from, and unsullied 
by, nature.  
 
3.4.2 The body and world 
This might be a charitable read, which risks eliding 
some of the problematic positions discussed above. Yet, it 
is nevertheless consistent with the community’s overarching 
anti-anthropocentric perspective. Moreover, this reading 
allows us to address Grosz’s second question regarding the 
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‘external’ environment. Witness, for example, one member’s 
framing of the environment: 
The perspective we take comes not just from a human 
sense of community. We’re all looking at the forest as 
a part of the community. The ocean as part of the 
community. All the creatures that live on the land, in 
the ocean, and in the sky. Not in a cheesy, modern 
new-age sort of way. But in a very realistic ‘these 
things need to be healthy for me to be healthy’ sort 
of way (S., personal communication, 2011).  
 
For the eco-survivalists, the notion of survival is 
essentially eco-centric. This is evident not just in their 
words but also in the way they situate their bodies to the 
world via technology. For them, bodies come into being not 
by virtue of an essential humanness, but rather are made 
manifest through practices like gathering, harvesting, 
caretaking, sharing, making, and building. They spend hours 
daily doing these things so as to be with the world in a 
slightly different manner. In other words, their bodies 
(like all bodies) emerge in and through their ongoing 
technical negotiations with a milieu, and through forging 
relationship with the various forms of matter that compose 
that milieu. This central fact not only speaks to Grosz’s 
second question, it also brings us to the work of Gilbert 
Simondon.  
Simondon’s perspective on the individual draws 
attention to the important role a milieu plays in the 
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emergence of a living being. Rather than conceiving the 
individual as a fully-formed locus of meaning, as 
conventional Western politico-philosophical discourses tend 
to do, Simondon displaces an alleged fixity of the 
individual onto a notion of ‘individuation’, whereby an 
individual is constituted as individual out of a pre-
individual field of singularities or potentialities (1992). 
In Simondon’s formulation, the past––including past bodies, 
materials, assemblages––has a constitutive role in the 
emergence (individuation) of any given present, or a given 
form of life. “Individuation,” according to Mark Hansen’s 
interpretation, “always occurs in conjunction with a ‘pre-
individual’ domain, a domain of excess or alterity, which 
Simondon defines as ‘a certain inheritance’ of the 
individual ‘animated by all the potentials that 
characterize it’” (2009: 133). Hansen continues: “The pre-
individual domain furnishes a source of excess or alterity 
that doesn’t simply perpetuate processes of individuation 
but that...ensures their almost continuous self-
modification, their ongoing emergence, or continuous 
creativity” (2009: 133).12 
                     
12 Emergence and creativity are crucial for thinking through 
individuation. These, however, do not emerge from within the 
individual. The individual in individuation is not an expressive 
entity. Rather, the individual is an expressed entity; it emerges by 
virtue of that which precedes it. This might seem an obvious point, yet 
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In tending to nonhuman matter through specific 
practices commonly relegated to pre-civilizational modes of 
existence, the eco-survivalists are not only experimenting 
with different ways in which their bodies might interact 
with the world, but also actively addressing the 
possibility for telling different stories about how our 
bodies are materially entangled with the world. Indeed, for 
them, the very possibility of survival seems contingent 
upon other ways of relating with the world. Yet, survival 
is not simply given. It takes work. And for the eco-
survivalists, remaining open to other-than-human milieus is 
ultimately a question concerning technological practice, 
but not of a Promethean variety. Interest, rather, is 
placed on practices that offer strategies for forging 
relationships that pose minimal risks to environmental 
health and well-being. Strategies for the future emerge in 
and through different ways of engaging the materiality of 
                                                             
it serves to remind that we do not exist independent of the 
cosmological, genealogical, and maternal elements to which Grosz 
refers. Moreover, it reminds how such pasts are commonly disavowed by 
designating the individual as a fully formed entity standing not only 
apart from its pasts, but also apart from the world. Indeed, 
maintaining such separation works to undermine the potential of bodies 
to produce new worlds and new ways of inhabiting those worlds. As Grosz 
notes: “Every individual is more than itself. This means that every 
individual is open to becoming more... The biological individual 
contains the potential, a charge from the preindividual, that makes 
both material and ideal possible not only for bodily but also for 
psychic and collective existence, for a life of concepts and 
inventions” (2016: 186) 
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the environment. What might the future be, for example, if 
we foster intimate engagements with rock, wood, water, 
etc., rather than silicone, plastics, gold, etc.? What 
types of social and environmental futures might take hold 
by shifting focus on what types of matter we value? Such 
questions around matter and practice are central to the 
community, shaping its understanding of the future.  
For example, we might return to the end of the 
previous exchange concerning “that human”. Once again, as 
Brad remarks, “if I go out with this spear...and I kill a 
fish with it, then I’m more intimately connected to that 
fish and to that land” (B., personal communication, 2011). 
Here, one might discern a residual authenticity in 
expressions of ‘connectivity’ and ‘intimacy’. As discussed, 
such narratives can be problematic in their invocation of 
masculinity, as well as idyllic spaces and authentic bodies 
to inhabit them. But, they need not be dismissed as 
inherently retroactive or regressive. Such stories also 
refer to more open, interactive, relational, and intimate 
engagements with the world. Again, I think back to Le Guin, 
Haraway, and Barad’s shared focus on how stories matter. 
How they become physically manifest in the world. Moreover, 
such stories bring about different relationships not only 
to space, but also with time.  
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3.4.3 The body in time, the body in memory 
 Clearly, for the eco-survivalists survival strategies 
are not only concerns for the future, but are drawn from 
the past. So, what of time and the deep pasts from which 
the eco-survivalists seek solutions? In this section, I 
approach the question of time via embodied memory, but of a 
sort that exceeds the boundaries of an individual thinking 
subject.   
 One afternoon, while talking over cups of holy basil 
tea, I posed the following question: 
HM: What is your overarching goal in this? You 
obviously have a motivation behind learning, 
practicing, and teaching these skills. Where is it 
that you see this going? 
 
B: I think these are important skills. They need to be 
preserved with some pretty serious integrity, because 
I feel like they’re an important part of the human 
lineage. It’s information that is silly for us not to 
know. [Laughs] Like, how to just survive. Just knowing 
how to shit in the woods. How to meet your basic 
needs. What your body has and what the earth has. It 
just makes sense to me to be able to have that, to be 
able to draw on that essential information (B., 
personal communication, 2011).  
 
It’s information that’s silly for us not to know. This 
statement carries the suggestion that information, which is 
central to what we are, is being somehow forgotten. I 
resist the inclination to frame forgetting as the loss of 
pre-civilizational innocence. It is easy to direct critique 
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there––to pathologize the eco-survivalists as melancholics, 
“riveted” as Kristeva writes, “to the past, regressing to 
the paradise or inferno of an unsurpassable experience” 
(1989: 60). Instead, I have in mind a sense of forgetting 
in line with Grosz. “We have forgotten were we come from,” 
writes Grosz (2004: 2).  
This is a double forgetting: of the elements through 
which all living things are born and live, a 
cosmological element; and of the specific body, indeed 
a chain of bodies, from which we come, a genealogical 
or maternal element (2004: 2).13  
 
Simplistically put, what is being forgotten (or 
ignored) are the relations that make a body possible. Here 
one might hold modernity’s nature-society division 
partially responsible for this forgetting, for it works to 
sever the connective threads that tie us to the world. We 
might know that we live in a world, but it is increasingly 
unclear as to where our bodies fit in with it. Or, put 
differently, modernity’s principal dualism succeeds to the 
extent that it continuously produces a material and 
conceptual gulf between (human) self and world. 
If, however, we seem be forgetting a basic sense of 
what a body can do, then through what means might we 
                     
13 Grosz continues: “[That which is forgotten is] not just the body, but 
that which makes it possible and limits its actions: the precarious, 
accidental, contingent, expedient, striving, dynamic status of life in 
a messy, complicated, resistant, brute world of materiality” (2004: 2). 
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reclaim, relearn, or rediscover this sense? Must we seek 
knowledge out? Or, are there ways in which old knowledges 
and practices work through our bodies in the present? 
Posing these questions somewhat differently and with 
reference to eco-survivalism, when one practices a 
technology that has been with our species for many 
thousands of years, but has only recently fallen into 
general disuse, what is recalled in that act? The answer is 
not straightforward and perhaps inherently speculative, but 
the following exchange provides a starting point: 
HM: There are interesting ways that knowledge is 
working in and through your practice of skills. Do you 
see your efforts here as a reclamation of forms of 
knowledge that are disappearing? Do you see this as a 
salvage operation? 
 
B: Personally, for me, it feels like remembering, 
especially with skills like flint-knapping. You know, 
when I learn something new it feels like it was 
already in my hand. I just had to remember how to do 
it.  
 
HM: So, it’s like a body memory? 
 
B: Exactly. It was there all along. I just didn’t know 
it until skills became a part of my life (B., personal 
communication, 2012).  
 
 This is a curious invocation of memory. It is not 
memory as the recall of a particular event in an 
individual’s life. Rather, this sense of memory is 
irreducible to an individual life, wherein processes 
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greater than the individual alone dislodge individuality as 
such.  
 This conception of memory brings us to Henri Bergson, 
who, like Simondon, provides a sense of how technological 
practice is central to what it means to be human (or alive, 
for that matter). Yet, beyond Simondon, Bergson provides a 
curious, albeit complex, theory of how time and memory 
factor into the emergence and duration of the human. For 
Bergson, “Memory...imports the past into the present” 
(1991: 33). Simple as it may appear, this is an important 
point nonetheless. It carries the suggestion that we do not 
access the past via the present, but rather the opposite. 
As Deleuze puts it: “We move from the past to the present, 
from recollection to perception” (1991: 33). Indeed, for 
Bergson, there is no such thing as present perception that 
is not full of memories. “With the immediate and present 
data of our senses,” argues Bergson, “we mingle a thousand 
details out of our past experiences” (1991: 33).14 
 For Bergson, memory is not solely a function of the 
mind. Memory, rather, emerges through a body’s interaction 
with matter. This gives memory an ontological dimension, 
                     
14 Bergson: “However brief we suppose any perception to be, it always 
occupies a certain duration, and involves, consequently, an effort of 
memory which prolongs, one into another, a plurality of moments” (1991: 
34).  
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which brings to mind the work of Karen Barad (2005), for 
whom ontology and epistemology, and discourse and 
materiality, are neither oppositional nor separable but 
constitutive of each other. Following Bergson, we can say 
the same about matter and memory. Moreover, through Bergson 
we get a sense that the very possibility of life (mind, 
memory, consciousness) is precisely contingent upon ongoing 
relationships with matter. As Bergson states: 
Memory, laden with the whole of the past, responds to 
the appeal of the present state by two simultaneous 
movements, one of translation, by which it moves in 
its entirety to meet experience, thus contracting more 
or less, though without dividing, with a view to 
action; and the other of rotation upon itself, by 
which it turns toward the situation of the moment, 
presenting to it that side of itself which may prove 
to be the most useful (1991: 168-169).  
 
There are a few significant points to distill from 
Bergson’s contribution. First, it is through the 
entanglement of matter and memory that life coheres. That 
is, the possibility of life is contingent upon the 
utilization and transformation of matter in a way that 
serves life’s aim to flourish, to become.15 Second, the vast 
                     
15 This is a point Grosz makes accordingly: “It is because the non-
living contains in itself the virtualities required to undertake the 
becomings its external transformation (by the living) entails, that 
life carries becoming as its core. It is because life is parasitic on 
matter that life carries within itself the whole that matter also 
expresses. It is because life is contingent on harnessing materiality 
that it is forced to encounter what opposes it and is capable of 
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weight of memory is loaded into the present with the aim of 
action. Memory, in other words, does not hover above the 
world. Nor is memory, as mentioned, locked away as an 
immaterial artefact of an individual mind. Rather, memory 
engages with matter in order that a given future might 
unfold. (This is a point relevant to the previous section’s 
discussion of the politics of material engagement.) Third, 
Bergson gives us a sense of complex temporalities, wherein 
the manner in which the past bears on the present to open 
up the future is not reducible to simplistic linearity. 
Time, rather, is out-of-joint. 
This sense of disjointed temporality is central to 
Dana Seitler’s re-reading of atavism, which helps to draw 
out the relationship among Simondon, Bergson and the 
question of modernity.16 For Seitler, the concept of atavism 
has critical application: “Atavism is not a symptom but an 
operation, an epistemological strategy for understanding 
and experiencing the modern world” (2008: 10). In contrast 
to modernity’s framing of time as a continuous forward 
movement, Seitler maintains, “Atavism offers up a notion of 
                                                             
undoing what it has been and is in order to become more and other” 
(2005: 11). 
16 Atavism typically denotes a “condition of resemblance to...more 
remote ancestors than to parents. Secondary definitions include a 
‘tendency to reproduce the ancestral type’ and the ‘recurrence of the 
disease or constitutional symptoms of an ancestor after the 
intermission of one or more generations” (Seitler 2008: 2). 
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time as multi-directional and of the body as 
polytemporal...[It] pushes the past onto the present, 
materializing the pressing force of history on our lives” 
(2008: 7). 
As a strategy for understanding nonlinear time, 
atavism provides an alternative approach to the question of 
how the body is taken up in time. Returning to the knotty 
connotations of “that human”, with neo-primitivism comes a 
tendency to posit the body as a transhistorical entity––one 
that is carried through the vicissitudes of time while 
maintaining an essential form. Biophysically this might be 
the case in a very general sense. However, with 
transhistoricity comes the tendency to map socio-political 
and cultural desires onto that body. Such desires, I have 
argued, are problematically granted an enduring if not 
universal applicability.  
But how do we account for the things that do persist, 
those evolutionary inheritances to which our own bodies 
remain indebted (Clark 2011)? A possible answer might be 
found be in the distinction between the transhistorical 
body and the atavistic body. The transhistorical body is 
idealized, romanticized, static, and resistant to change. 
It is, in other words, an ostensibly authentic body that 
all other bodies (including our own bodies) fall short of. 
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In contrast, the atavistic body is conditioned by 
creativity, experimentation, and marked by ceaseless 
modification to changing environmental conditions. It is, 
in other words, a body as an open-ended system. 
Though aspects of the atavistic body are preserved in 
time, the manner in which these aspects return is never 
quite identical. As Seitler suggests, “Atavism is a 
relentless recurrence. It is a corporeal recognition that 
the past has never passed, has not ceased to shape and form 
our sense of self in both psychic and material ways” (2008: 
229). This brings to mind Bergson’s discussion of matter 
and memory and how the fullness of the past fills the 
present. Moreover, it recalls Grosz’s suggestion that, 
“What recycles is never time itself but what exists in 
time: things, processes, events, formations, 
constellations, in short, matter in all its permutations” 
(2004: 142). The archaic and its bodies do not emerge in 
the present unchanged for the simple reason that the world 
changes. In response, bodies and their affects ceaselessly 
adapt to new worldly circumstances. And, in doing so, prior 
modes of existence take hold, thrive again, and help to 
remake the future.  
Atavism provides a different sense of how eco-
survivalism locates bodies across and within different 
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temporalities. The persistence of a body––any body––
involves creative patchwork that “connects the fibers of 
time: past (prehistory), present (the body now), and future 
(the bodies it will affect)” (Seitler 2008: 33). This is 
significant, for what such ‘polytemporality’ effectively 
forbids is the trope of return to an idealized past. Such 
return is precluded since the past, present, and future are 
inextricably linked. And, if there is no possibility of 
returning to the past, it follows that there is neither an 
authentic body nor an ideal milieu to which one might 
return.  
 
3.5 Toward an open future via the past 
 Now, to address Grosz’s last question regarding the 
future. “The task,” writes Grosz, “is to make elements of 
this past live again, to be reenergized through their 
untimely or anachronistic recall in the present” (2004: 
117). Such a task requires bodies of all sorts gathered 
into assemblages greater than the sum of their parts. Such 
collectivities draw together aspects of the past, present, 
and possible futures. Certainly, human bodies have always 
been involved in relations reaching far beyond their 
perceived spatial and temporal limits. However, there are 
nevertheless relations to which we must strive. That is, 
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that we inevitably fall into a vast complex of relations 
greater than us alone does not preclude the possibility of 
strategically crafting new relations with matter and novel 
modes of existence in the world.   
 As I have discussed, the eco-survivalists’ task not 
only looks to deep pasts for solutions to contemporary 
challenges, but also remains open to those pasts in order 
that they might take hold in unanticipated ways. And, 
despite their desires for lost intimacies, they do not 
dwell in those pasts with a blind eye toward the future. 
Indeed, after spending two years with them, the sense I get 
is not a rearward striving for lost worlds and the 
idealisms contained therein. Rather, I get a sense of 
people at odds with this given present, and with the 
choices available to be a human in the present. In 
response, they seek out solutions amongst different bodies 
and technologies, expressing solidarity with other times. 
Yet, I am aware of the risks involved in putting a 
positive spin on these stories of low-technological 
liberation, or ostensible autonomy from modern 
technological systems. Such impulses often seem to hinge on 
idealism and authenticity, which do not make for a good 
politics as far as liberation is concerned. Stengers 
expresses similar reservation in her discussion of 
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reclaiming ‘palavers’ (2017: 391).17 Stengers notes: “I am 
quite conscious that associating autonomy with the 
“regeneration” of an ancient, destroyed practice like 
palaver is a risky move...as if something like a ‘genuine’, 
‘authentic’ past could be recovered” (2017: 391). Yet, for 
Stengers, such objections must be posed from within the 
contemporary environmental condition, the intensity of 
which ought to modulate our willingness to take up risky 
ideas. Drawing together themes of regeneration and 
struggle, Stengers argues: “To ‘reclaim’ is not only to 
struggle against the identification of anybody or anything 
as a potential resource. The word reclaim points to the 
need to heal, to recover from devastation” (2017: 392).  
Stengers reminds us that when past bodies are conjured 
as exemplars of other ways of being in the world, it is not 
solely in reference to the body, but rather how those 
bodies engage the world via practices that afford some 
measure of intimacy with, if not respect for, the world. In 
this light, we might rethink the community’s attraction to 
so-called “primitive survival skills”. Such attraction has 
less to do with striving toward primitive authenticity 
(though this desire does appear in various guises, as 
                     
17 Stengers: “[Palavers are] ancient practices that gathered explicitly 
situated, attached people, but which have been destroyed by 
colonialism” (2017: 391). 
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discussed). Instead, the aim is to attend to different ways 
of persisting amidst environmental uncertainty by engaging 
practices conventionally relegated to a time before 
modernity. However, “modernity” need not be understood as a 
historical designation commencing with continental 
philosophical thought or with the Industrial Revolution. It 
can be, and perhaps ought to be, understood as an untenable 
ontological designation that isolates, distinguishes, and 
purifies the human body from that which is not human.  
Yet, despite its efforts to articulate other futures, 
this is still a community situated at great distance from 
utopia. In fact, there is a discernible dystopian thread, 
which is perhaps inevitable given the emphasis on 
survivalism. As Grosz writes: “[The present] remains 
fractured and refracted through reminiscence and 
anticipation, the murmurs of the past and the potential of 
the future” (2004: 251). Perhaps this fractured and 
refracted quality is what distributes a hint of nostalgia 
among community members. Though earlier I cautioned against 
the trope of melancholia, there are still elements of it in 
the community, most notably in its latent idealism. Yet, 
maybe melancholia is a reasonable coping mechanism in the 
face of seemingly insurmountable planetary circumstances. 
And maybe it is not such a terrible thing, for as Morton 
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suggests, “Melancholy has a ‘sickly quality’ of excessive 
devotion, excessive fidelity to the darkness of the present 
moment. Yet, isn’t this excessive fidelity exactly what we 
need right now?” (2011: 95).   
Still, excessive though it might be, fidelity to the 
present involves a measure of faith in the possibility of 
being other than what happens ‘to be’ at this moment. This 
touches on Grosz’s discussion of ‘the virtual’:  
The resonance of potential that ladens the present as 
more than itself, that disrupts the continuity of the 
present, to open up a nick or crack, the untimely, the 
unexpected, that welcomes the new, whether a new 
organism, organ, or function, a new strategy, a new 
sensation, or a new technological invention (2004: 
252).  
 
 And, it is from within a fractured present that eco-
survivalism dares to cut a path toward the future via the 
past. Though this circuitous and disjointed trajectory does 
not come without its own risks, it is nevertheless 
creative, if not daring, in its own right. That is, it 
dares to move forward in such a manner that refuses to 
disavow the past. The same cannot be said about techno-
futurism, which like F.T. Marinetti’s infamous manifesto 
(1909), seems all too willing to sacrifice the past.  
Does eco-survivalism, then, offer a political strategy 
adequate to the contemporary environmental condition? Does 
it set into motion a process that would allow for the 
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planet to heal? While the answer remains to be seen, my 
sense is that pre-civilizational technologies are not 
likely to save the world. Indeed, the manner in which 
environmental crises are massively distributed in space and 
time more or less precludes the likelihood that localized, 
low-technology practices are capable of scaling up to 
address global issues. Indeed, one cannot expect to flint-
knap their way back to relative comfort of the Holocene.  
In this vein, I am somewhat sympathetic with Srnicek 
and Williams’ leftist techno-futurist critique of “neo-
primitivist localism” and the “ephemeral authenticity of 
communal immediacy” (2013: n.p.). Limiting political 
interventions to local spaces tends to disavow the 
necessary work of staging interventions at larger scales. 
When it comes to a lifestyle politics such as eco-
survivalism and neo-primitivism, it is hard to shake the 
impression that small, and no doubt privileged, bodies are 
working hard to shore up the possibility of their own 
survival. As for the survival of others? It often seems 
this does not significantly factor into the debate. Such a 
tendency risks re-inscribing a reactionary perspective 
despite ostensibly progressive and environmentally-
conscious discourses.   
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 Yet, Srnicek and Williams’ call for a “Promethean 
politics of maximal mastery” to counter localist and 
communal politics does not strike me as a viable solution. 
While the daringness and scale of such a program is 
admirable, it nevertheless tends to gloss over two issues 
that have been central to this chapter. First, intimacy 
matters. Gaining knowledge of one’s relations relative to 
proximate ecosystems, and then experimenting with 
techniques through which worldly relations might take hold 
differently and equitably is important. This search for 
intimate meaning compels one to locate the cracks and 
fissures through which the possibility of being otherwise 
might emerge. Certainly, the delicate nature of such a task 
is likely to be obliterated by ‘a politics of maximal 
mastery’.  
Second, a demand for a maximal mastery not only 
glosses over the site of the body, but also risks 
abandoning the body’s political and transformative 
potentials. Granted, the body might appear fragile when 
facing the sheer immensity of the world. But, as discussed, 
we might think of the body as stretched out over space and 
time. The body, as Seitler suggests, “does not coincide 
with its present” (2008: 94). Rather, it remains open not 
only to that which is not human, but also that which is not 
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now. In a word, the body is persistent, malleable, and a 
site for potentially transformative politics.  
Yet, such a politics for the future cannot emerge from 
the body alone. Rather, it must emerge from the body-in-
world. That is, via experimentation with matter and with 
other times. These other times are likely to be times past, 
and we would do well to look to them for practices that 
might prove adequate to our present challenges. As Stengers 
states, “Reviving a destroyed practice is not resurrecting 
the past ‘as it was’; it is reviving a past that is neither 
authentic nor imaginary because it is now related to the 
struggle or the need to resist what we all know only too 
well” (2017: 391).  
Indeed, as we rush headlong into a post-Holocene 
unknown, relations with deep pasts ought not to be cast 
aside, for in doing so we risk disavowing an important 
sense of what it means to be human, no matter how ambiguous 
or fluid the meaning might be. Again, the suggestion here 
is not that we should look to eco-survivalism and neo-
primitivism to lead the way into the future. As a 
prescriptive project, it is tenuous and perhaps inherently 
problematic. Yet, despite these issues, that strange 
assembly of bodies amidst Vermont’s mountains nevertheless 
raises important and timely questions: Can indebtedness to 
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the past help us imagine the possibility of life in the 
ruins? Might this even yield joyous futures?  
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Chapter 4: Tracking and the ‘Arts of Noticing’ 
 
 
There is a whole novel in an owl’s pellet.  
(Rezendes 1999: 16) 
 
 
4.1 Introduction: beyond the backyard 
 
It has been four years since I lived in the 
countryside. Work has brought me to the city, no matter how 
small this particular one––Burlington, VT––happens to be. 
But still, size notwithstanding, I might as well be in a 
sprawling metropolis. Like the lives of many others, much 
of my time is spent between two points: home and work. I 
shuttle back and forth, often by bike but lately by car on 
account of the books I’ve been carrying. This gives my 
sense of movement a two-dimensional impression. Moreover, 
my movement along these routes tends to be determined by 
velocity and then destination, which is to say, stasis. It 
is for this reason that I have been struggling to write 
this chapter on animal tracking. It ought to be a simple 
essay on what it means to follow the tracks of animals, and 
how, in following them, we might learn a few valuable 
things along the way. About animals. About ourselves. About 
entanglement. And about care. 
Part of the struggle lies in finding time to break 
from this two-dimensional rut. I tell myself that writing 
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about animal tracking requires seeking out the wilder parts 
outside Burlington proper. That it is not enough to read 
through animal tracking guides and my tracking notes from 
the comfort of my desk. I must, instead, head deeper 
outside, beyond the limits of the city. Yet, as Cronon 
reminds, “by imagining that our true home is in the 
wilderness, we forgive ourselves the homes we actually 
inhabit” (1996: 81).  
It is not, however, my aim to invoke idealized natures 
in which I’d rather be, or to posit untenable rural-urban 
or nature-society divides. Following Cronon (1996) and 
Harvey (2008), I’m aware that one can find aspects of ‘the 
wild’ in the most domesticated of spaces. I do not 
disagree. At this time of the year my backyard is abundant 
with wild activity. Towering locust and maple trees offer 
refuge to crows, robins, cardinals, sparrows, and jays. 
Their sprawling branches provide a circuitous 
infrastructure for the squirrels that clatter and chatter 
about, and then drop to take all the apples from the apple 
tree. There are baby rabbits under the porch. Cute as they 
may be, I suspect it is they who laid waste to my 
spilanthes, tulsi, and chamomile. Or, it could be the slugs 
as well. Whatever it is, so be it. I figure I’m not the 
only one who deserves good medicine.  
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This flurry of backyard activity is all well and good, 
but I’m looking for something different. I’ve grown 
accustomed to these backyard scenes. This is not to say 
that I’ve become bored with them. Rather, it is to say that 
the patterns have become quotidian. (I often watch these 
activities unfold while I brush my teeth, and what could be 
more quotidian than that?) Instead, I wish to happen across 
hidden lives that lurk in the edges and beyond. Beaver, 
deer, bear, moose. I do not need to see them, just their 
track or sign is good enough. I seek these out because I am 
interested in how the movements and paths of myriad and 
often unseen bodies become entangled. I am interested in 
how lifelines cross, and what it means to allow one’s own 
movements to become threadlike and slack, open to being 
pulled in unanticipated directions. Around things. Between 
things. With things. I take inspiration from Ingold, who 
writes,  
Proceeding along a path, every inhabitant lays a 
trail. Where inhabitants meet, trails are entwined, as 
the life of each becomes bound up with the other. 
Every entwining is a knot, and the more that lifelines 
are entwined, the greater the density of the knot 
(2011b: 148).  
 
To cross where an animal once crossed is uncanny. 
Crossings conjure alterity, for in them is a spectral trace 
of other lives that spend much of their time avoiding the 
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lives of humans. Where lines cross and become entangled: 
these are the kinds of encounters I desire, for they make 
compelling stories, which we need. We need them especially 
in an era of deep environmental uncertainty, for in 
becoming entangled with the lives of others, we uncover new 
(or very old) ways of relating to the world. Thom van 
Dooren expresses this sentiment by calling for “stories 
that ask their audiences to be curious about and to care 
about the many relationships, the many ways of being, the 
many worlds that are disappearing in bright bursts of pain 
in this time of escalating extinctions” (Van Dooren in 
Gibson et. al. 2015: 55).  
So, I head into the wild(er) spaces for at least two 
reasons. First, since I intend to write about animal 
tracking and the ‘arts of noticing’ (Tsing 2015), it is 
easier to locate wild animal track and sign outside the 
city’s sphere of disturbance. This is not, as mentioned, to 
suggest that there is no ‘nature’ to be found within city 
limits. But if I am looking for fox, moose, or bear track 
and sign, I must head into the woods for these beings are 
not immediate neighbors. I seek out the wilder spaces 
because they offer additional points to my standard two of 
work and home. “We do not have to be long in the woods”, 
reminds Bachelard, “to experience the always rather anxious 
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impression of ‘going deeper and deeper’ into a limitless 
world” (1994: 185). Besides, it is good for me out there. 
Getting a little lost brings a measure of peace. Yet, I do 
not wish to invoke a work/non-work dichotomy. The challenge 
lies in integration. That is, to follow exploratory 
pathways regardless of circumstances and settings. To 
bring, as it were, a bit of the woods into work, and a bit 
of work into the woods.  
 
4.2 Literature review 
 
The principle aim for this chapter is to write of 
animal tracking. I am interested in the question of how 
animal tracking––the ability to identify and interpret 
animal track and sign (e.g., discarded food, scat, 
disturbances)––can foster points of contact and modes of 
care that reach across the human-nonhuman divide (Tsing 
2015; Pratt 1991; Haraway 2008, 2016; Puig de la Bellacasa 
2017). I pursue this by suggesting that tending to nonhuman 
others requires rethinking how we engage the world through 
movement and perception. I aim to show how ways of moving 
and seeing can open us up to new entanglements, influence 
how environmental relations cohere, and thus provide new 
ways of weaving stories about the world. Yet, I wish to 
take the notion of entanglement beyond the conceptual to 
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address how approaching bodily movement and perception with 
deliberate care can bring other worlds into better view.  
Some questions that guide me are as follows: If one 
moved with greater care, with a lighter step, with 
environments instead of through them, what kinds of 
encounters lie in wait? And, if one relinquished 
destination-oriented path-making to the circuitous paths 
and rhythms of animals, what might we learn about the 
world? 
To pursue these lines of thought I take cues from an 
array of thinkers and writers who I do not intend to reduce 
to a mere background for thinking, but rather as 
interlocutors with whom I find it generative to think. I 
strive to view their works as more than words. In them I 
find insights that not only open unto the kinds of embodied 
intimacies I write of in the pages to follow, but also 
lessons in how thinking/writing/doing might unfold 
collaboratively and across longstanding divides.  
These thinkers teach me how thinking/writing/doing 
might take hold in a manner that draws on various, 
entangled, and sometimes contradictory perspectives. This 
is not merely an interest, but also a strategy. As van 
Dooren notes, “Narratives allow us to weave diverse 
material––scientific research, ethnography, history and 
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philosophy––into a single account” (Van Dooren in Gibson 
et. al. 2015: 31). He continues, “These stories allow us to 
develop ‘thick’ accounts of the species we are 
describing...that draw in diverse voices in a way that 
might enable an audience to develop a sense of curiosity 
about them and concern for their futures” (Van Dooren in 
Gibson et. al. 2015: 31).  
I thus think with animal behaviorist Francoise 
Wemelsfelder, who suggests “When we take the time to 
closely observe animals and the quality of their 
expressions, we can develop greater insight into their 
welfare and quality of life” (2007: 29). I write, as I 
often do, in the company of van Dooren, who advocates for 
“the closure of human-centric narratives, narratives 
that...all too often cover over nonhuman needs and voices” 
(2015: 79). Donna Haraway’s ‘becoming-with’ (2008) and Anna 
Tsing’s ‘collaboration across difference’ (2015) are 
present throughout this chapter. So too are animal tracking 
guides, which go beyond simple classification and claim, as 
Paul Rezendes does, “the more intimate we become with other 
lives, the more aware we are of how those lives connect 
with and affect our own” (1999: 15).  
I also couch these human-nonhuman connections in 
broader contexts, ones greater than an encounter between 
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two forms of life that might happen to cross paths in an 
open, at an edge, or in a tangle. I wish to consider the 
meaning of corporeal intimacy in view of the biological 
annihilation of the ongoing sixth extinction (Ceballos et. 
al. 2017; Haraway 2016; Heise 2016; Kolbert 2014; van 
Dooren 2014). In view of this annihilatory background 
noise, I pose the following questions: What do the ‘arts of 
noticing’, as Tsing refers to techniques for collapsing 
distances between humans and nonhumans, mean at a time of 
great environmental uncertainty (Tsing 2015)? What does it 
mean to seek intimacy when the conditions of life, in 
general, are rather precarious? Is it possible to extend an 
ethic of care to nonhuman others whose lives we might never 
behold? Can this be done, as Puig de la Bellacasa asks, in 
a manner that is not “yet another anthropomorphic delusion, 
and even another form of anthropocentrism” (2017: 218)?  
These concerns shuttle between brief excursions into 
the woods and evolutionary trajectories that get tangled up 
in industrialized capitalism situated at the core of 
annihilation (Moore 2015; Tsing 2015; van Dooren 2014). The 
scales I work with are both miniscule and immense, ranging 
from a single print left on the muddy banks of a stream to 
an entire species. It is difficult to locate a solid 
foothold in this conceptual expanse. Yet, a foothold is 
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precisely my point of departure: a modest, single step 
toward something. As Tsing asks: “What do you do when your 
world starts to fall apart?” She answers: “I go for a walk” 
(2015: 1). Maybe this is why I am drawn to walking in the 
woods. Walking, thinking, and writing are good 
acquaintances.  
 
4.3 On writing and walking 
 
First, some thoughts on walking and writing. Rebecca 
Solnit notes, “Walking shares with making and working that 
crucial element of engagement of the body and the mind with 
the world, of knowing the world through the body and the 
body through the world” (2000: 29). I admit, I have long 
suffered from restlessness. It is not a nervous or anxious 
condition. Rather, I often catch myself looking toward 
horizons or into deep woods. Unknown elsewheres call to me. 
Not unlike Bartleby’s “I prefer not to...” (Melville 1999), 
I often prefer to be somewhere else. This disquietude often 
renders the sedentary life of academia challenging. I’ve 
been a pacer for much of my writing life. I frequently get 
up from my desk to ‘walk’ an idea out of my head, not 
trusting my mind alone to hold the contours of a thought. 
Maybe this is why real progress in writing often eludes me. 
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For these reasons, I write alone. Also, for these reasons, 
it is not easy to sit still and write about walking.  
Yet, following Solnit’s observation, particular 
writing styles succeed in providing sensations not unlike 
walking. Jorge Luis Borges’ (1999) labyrinthine form and 
W.G. Sebald’s (1998) peripatetic prose come to mind. Robert 
MacFarlane (2012) and Rebecca Solnit (2000), too, write as 
if journeying by way of words. These writers carry their 
readers through close tangles and onto open expanses, 
providing just enough metaphorical benches along the way to 
rest and reflect. Tim Ingold’s work offers a similar 
meandering impression, which, I suspect, is why he writes 
so insightfully about the relationship between walking and 
knowledge. “Knowledge,” suggests Ingold:  
is grown along myriad paths we take as we make our 
ways through the world in the course of everyday 
activities, rather than assembled from information 
obtained from numerous fixed locations. Thus, it is by 
walking along from place to place, and not by building 
up from local particulars, that we come to know what 
we do (2010: 121).  
 
Rather than focusing on the brute bio-mechanics of a 
walking body, Ingold provides insight into how movement 
plays a pivotal role in how we come to know the world, and 
by extension, understand our positions within it. Body and 
landscape are complexly interconnected, such that it 
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becomes difficult to delineate their boundaries. As a body 
moves through the world it becomes entangled with the stuff 
of the world––light, air, water, leaves, critters, etc. 
This lends movement a relational quality, suggests Ingold, 
wherein “landscapes are woven into life, and lives are 
woven into landscapes” (2004: 333). To quote Ingold at 
length:  
[Forms] of the landscape––like the identities and 
capacities of its human inhabitants––are not imposed 
upon a material substrate but rather emerge as 
condensations or crystallizations of activity within a 
relational field. As people, in the course of their 
everyday lives, make their way by foot and around a 
familiar terrain, so its paths, textures and contours, 
variable through the seasons, are incorporated into 
their own embodied capacities of movement, awareness 
and response (2004: 333).  
 
This close relationship between walking and experience 
of the world has an enduring place in the discipline of 
geography (see Nash 2016 for detailed discussion). Wylie 
(2005, 2017), for example, draws attention to “the 
differential configurations of self and landscape emergent 
within the performative milieu of coastal walking” (2005: 
236). In weaving personal reflection with landscape, Wylie 
shows how knowledge arises through embodied interactions 
with the environment. Similarly, Instone suggests walking 
“can help us not just experience things differently but can 
help to build different knowledges” (2015: 135). Sidaway’s 
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(2009) account of an evening’s walk along Britain’s South 
West Coast Path gathers disparate threads pertaining to 
geopolitics, natural history, and urban studies, which come 
into focus as he makes his way down the path. Edensor 
(2000; 2010), strolling through the British countryside, 
suggests that walking promotes reflexivity and awareness of 
the finer textures of a given environment. “The walking 
body,” writes Edensor richly, “treads across rocky ground, 
springy forest floor, marsh and bog, rough tracks, heathery 
moorland, long grass, mud, root-lined surfaces, pasture, 
tarmac, and autumnal leafy carpets” (2000: 101).  
These ways of walking speak to wandering rather than 
straightforward movement. In contrast to my own common 
transit between home and work, wherein the journey is 
bookended by two specific destinations, approaches to 
movement that emphasize walking’s relational qualities 
grant space for contingency and derivation. In turn, this 
allows for the element of surprise, novel experiences, and 
new ways of relating. The manner of walking I address below 
draws on this manner of movement. It concerns sites and 
contexts where straight lines give way to circuitous 
passages, often without clear destination.    
In this direction, Ingold makes a useful distinction 
between ‘transport’ and ‘wayfaring’. Transport is “tied to 
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specific locations” and primarily concerned with 
“relocating persons and their effects” from one place to 
another (2016: 81). Here we might think of a traveler 
hauling luggage from Los Angeles to Tokyo. Or, we might 
think of an overworked academic carrying books from home to 
campus and back. Whatever the case, as Ingold suggests, in 
transport “the traveler who departs from one location and 
arrives at another is, in between, nowhere at all” (2016: 
84; See also Auge 1995). In contrast, Ingold suggests that 
the path of wayfarer “wends hither and thither, and may 
even pause here and there before moving on” (2016: 81). 
Elsewhere, Ingold suggests “the wayfarer is a being who, in 
following a path of life, negotiates or improvises a 
passage as he [sic] goes along. In his movement as in life, 
his concern is to seek a way through: not to reach a 
specific definition or terminus but to keep going” (2010: 
126).  
Admittedly, to ‘keep going’ by moving through life 
without destinations might not be pragmatic or even 
desirable. Personally, I do not wish to be always at the 
edge of the unknown. I haven’t the energy to always be 
mobilized for it. Yet, it strikes me that to move through 
life only from destination to destination risks sacrificing 
a measure of the unexpected that sometimes flashes up when 
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we find ourselves amidst unfamiliar landscapes, or when we 
are a little lost in the world. To be without destinations 
allows for a certain experiential richness, liberated from 
the burden of having to be some place. I take seriously 
Haraway’s advice to “go visiting, to venture off the beaten 
path to meet unexpected, non-natal kin, and to strike up 
conversations, to pose and respond to interesting 
questions, to propose together something unanticipated, to 
take up the unasked-for obligations of having met” (2016: 
130). 
In this vein, Lesley Instone proposes that a more 
fluid and expansive manner of movement can open us to being 
moved emotionally. Drawing on Ingold’s notion of wayfaring, 
Instone suggests, “wayfinding [is] an always unfinished, 
rhythmic, open and creative mode of being-in-the-world that 
embraces the twin entanglements of movement and being 
moved” (2015: 135). For Instone, wayfinding serves as a 
basis for ethical practices capable of collapsing distances 
between human and nonhumans. Instone writes, “[wayfinding] 
endorses a performance of respectfulness toward otherness 
that invokes ‘myriad expressions’ of difference and sense 
of wonder that moves us” (2015: 136). Framing the ethical 
dimension of wayfinding as ‘walking-with’, Instone 
continues: “’Walking-with’ highlights mutuality, respect, 
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plurality, and engenders a respectful ‘being-for’ in the 
sense of kindling practices of movement and engagement that 
not only acknowledge the place and presence of others, but 
that contribute to, and allow for, their flourishing” 
(2015: 137).  
Instone’s notion of ‘walking-with’ situates walking 
ethically amidst myriad others and the patterns they 
inscribe in the world. This relational approach contrasts 
with the more common trope of the solitary and 
introspective walker. In the latter, we are given a figure 
who journeys across the landscape in a manner that, while 
not always domineering, is nevertheless commanding with a 
contemplative gaze that subsumes the outside into the 
intellect. Ralph Waldo Emerson comes to mind as exemplar of 
a mode of walking that privileges the intellect over the 
body, and certainly the bodies of others. He writes: 
In the woods, we return to reason and faith. There I 
feel nothing can befall me in life––no disgrace, no 
calamity (leaving me my eyes), which nature cannot 
repair. Standing on bare ground––my head bathed by the 
blithe air and uplifted into infinite space,––all 
egotism vanishes. I become a transparent eyeball. I am 
nothing. I see all (1836: np).  
 
Despite the promising notion of ego-death, the self is 
nevertheless reconstituted by an omnipotent gaze. ‘Nature’, 
as if always available to the human gaze, is rendered an 
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object of contemplation, as if it were meaningful only to 
the extent that it has meaning for ‘us’.  
I confess to being drawn in by the lure of an 
Emersonian view of nature. I am not sure if I’ll ever shake 
my attraction to such a view––a product, perhaps, of 
introversion. Naively, I sometimes find myself hoping for a 
distinct encounter to write about. Some kind of 
crystallizing moment when I cross paths with the animal 
Other. We lock gazes; and, in that fleeting moment, co-
being is laid bare and rendered a single shared point in 
space and time.... But, this is a misplaced and erroneous 
sentiment. Who am I to cast myself the observant hero? Even 
if I am walking alone (which is never quite ‘alone’ as I 
suggest), who am I to reduce vast and myriad natures to a 
single point for examination? There are better ways to go 
about this. Ways that do not ask for nature to reveal 
itself as an object of contemplation or desire. In seeking 
animal encounters, I do not wish to retrace the missteps of 
Derrida (2008), who, as Haraway notes, “did not become 
curious about what the cat might actually be doing, 
feeling, thinking, or perhaps making available to him in 
looking back at him that morning” (2008: 20). 
Much like Derrida’s failure to consider the emotional 
depths of his cat, an Emersonian view of ‘nature’ is 
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curiously unanimated. It suggests flat pastiche, not 
complex processes. Static tranquility, not generative 
tension. I think of how such renderings of ‘nature’ say 
more about us than they do about the world. This is not 
good enough, for the purpose of wayfaring, it strikes me, 
is not to fall in love with ourselves. Rather, it is to 
learn how to orient ourselves to the things of this world––
things often overlooked by a sweeping gaze––in order that 
we might acknowledge them, if not practice novel forms of 
care for them. Or, as Instone puts it, “A respectful 
movement that puts emphasis on sensory, contingent and 
fragile encounters conjured through making our way, 
alongside others through time and space, here and now” 
(2015: 137).  
 
4.4 More-than-human methods 
 
With the notion of movement-alongside-others we turn 
to the animal to further flesh out the concept of ‘walking-
with’. In recent years there has been resurgence of 
scholarly interest in the animal. In many respects, this 
renewed interest is in keeping with a general shift in the 
environmental social sciences away from anthropocentrism 
and toward ‘relational ontologies’ that seek to collapse 
longstanding divisions between nature and society (See 
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Alaimo 2016; Braun 2008; Buller 2004; Davies 2012; Haraway 
2008, 2017; Hodgetts and Lorimer 2015; Ingold 2000; Kirksey 
and Helmreich 2010; Kohn 2013; Lorimer 2012; Morton 2010; 
Plumwood 2007; Schrader 2015; Whatmore 2002, Wolfe 2003). 
For too long, the nonhuman animal has occupied a marginal 
role in social thought and practice, having long been 
jettisoned outside the realm of the social into the “mute 
and stable background” of nature (Hinchcliffe 2008: 89). 
Marginalizing the nonhuman other, however, ignores the 
constitutive role nonhuman natures play in the emergence of 
worlds.  
Bringing the nonhuman back into modes of inquiry and 
practice is a welcome step toward a more relational 
approach to understanding the world (see Buller 2015; 
Ingold 2004). However, such efforts risk rendering the 
nonhuman an object of contemplation in a manner not 
dissimilar from Emerson’s transparent eyeball. As Buller 
suggests, “Philosophical engagement with the nonhuman has 
been predominantly autobiographical, the animal acting as 
foil to human exceptionalism and witness to our ontological 
distinctness, [wherein] the animal remains only ‘good to 
think with’” (2012: 140). Put differently, while much 
nonhuman scholarship takes conceptual risks in bringing the 
nonhuman to bear on environmental thought, the figure of 
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the nonhuman often remains at a remove. (Arguably, even the 
term “nonhuman” is indicative of this remove.) It might be 
theoretically daring to reach across longstanding divides, 
but the question remains as to whether we have the skills 
to establish a measure of intimacy with wilder nonhuman 
others who trace their lives beyond the boundaries of 
backyards. It is perhaps for this reason that Hodgetts and 
Lorimer identify a lack of adequate tools, arguing:  
 
When we try, we still tend to deploy human-centered 
methods to examine nonhuman phenomena. We currently 
lack the field skills, instruments, textbooks and 
training programs for doing this type of research. 
This deficit, we would argue, is impeding progress in 
animals’ geographies (2015: 2). 
 
Their point is well taken. Often animal geographies do 
not go far enough to engage with the specific lives of 
nonhuman others because they do not have the requisite 
tools. Yet, I want to suggest that this lack might be a 
result of simply not looking in some obvious places. 
Indeed, there are many resources available to address this 
lack––resources that only need to be carefully stitched to 
the methods and discourses upon which academics often rely. 
If one wishes to examine nonhuman phenomena, to get near 
enough so that an encounter might happen, animal tracking 
guides make for a generative point of departure (Elbroch 
2003; Halfpenny 1986; Rezendes 1999).  
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One guide in particular captures my attention. Paul 
Rezendes’ Tracking and the Art of Seeing: How to Read 
Animal Tracks and Sign (1999) is a beautiful book. It is 
valuable to read alongside the aforementioned debates in 
the environmental social sciences. As a guidebook, Tracking 
and the Art of Seeing offers detailed accounts of specific 
animal track and sign. Whole chapters, for example, are 
dedicated to rodents, weasel, bear, and hoofed animals. 
Each chapter provides rich contextual detail, glossy images 
of animals, photographs and drawings of animal prints, 
detailed pictures of various sign (chewed nuts, debarked 
branches, scat, etc.). In reading Rezendes’ book, one 
happens across the finer features of the lives of animals. 
The bobcat, for example: 
Bobcats hunt by stealth, by ambush, and by slow, 
careful stalking.... Their usual hunting method is to 
sit patiently beside a rabbit run waiting for a rabbit 
to race by. Sometimes they will crouch in one spot, 
called a hunting bed, for hours on end, turning every 
so often to observe a new avenue of approach. In 
winter, they wait so long that bobcat hair will be 
frozen into the perimeters of the circle and the bed 
will have paw prints all around the edge (1999: 220). 
 
Or, looking to a less charismatic animal, the white-footed 
deer mouse: 
These mice also eat acorns, which they open at the 
top. Sometimes they remove the top uniformly, but 
often the mouse will work from the top, continuing off 
to one side. It may make more than one entrance hole. 
The incisor work is very fine. With the aid of a 
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magnifying glass, you can see tiny incisor marks along 
the edges of the cuts, which appear as tiny dots 
(1999: 37). 
 
Such details, no matter how mundane, offer glimpses 
into the lives and habits of animals. Yet, rather than 
being written in a dry categorizing tone, Rezendes’ 
descriptions are full of admiration and wonder. There are 
simple enchantments to be found in the habits of animals, 
whether common like the white-footed mouse, or less so like 
the bobcat. For Rezendes, however, familiarity with animal 
habits and patterns holds value beyond mere identification. 
Rezendes writes, “Tracking and reading sign help us to 
learn not only about the animals that walk in the forest—–
what they are doing and where they are going––but also 
about ourselves” (1999: 16). In failing to notice the lives 
of others, we risk losing possibilities for attachment that 
emerge from acknowledging our entanglements with their 
lives. 
Still, the question remains: How to establish nearness 
with nonhuman others? First, a note is in order. Nearness 
need not imply immediate proximity. Animals often withdraw 
from us, and for good reason. To insist on immediate 
proximity as a necessary condition for ethical relating is 
problematic, for it does not take into account either fear 
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or consent. Perhaps “recognition” or “familiarity” are 
better terms. They do not explicitly suggest spatial 
nearness, though nearness can play a role. The point, 
however, is that nearness, respectful proximity, 
recognition, or familiarity with others allow for 
expressions of intimate care––a point I develop below.  
Returning to Hodgetts and Lorimer’s observation, one 
possible solution for addressing the lack of skill is to 
rethink the ways in which we move in the world. Movement, 
indeed, has considerable impact on the likelihood of an 
encounter. As Lulka suggests, “Movement provides a physical 
mechanism to bridge the theoretical gap that separates 
human from nonhuman, and suggests a means to link together 
ethical and evolutionary concerns regarding nonhumans” 
(2004: 439). With Lulka’s observation on movement, and 
Instone’s invocation of ‘walking-with’ nonhuman others, we 
now turn to the skill of animal tracking. 
 
4.5 Tracking and movement 
First and foremost, tracking and walking are not quite 
the same. This was a crucial lesson received in a Tracking 
and Awareness class I attended in 2010 at the Roots 
Wilderness Survival School in central Vermont. This 
weeklong course focused on tracking instruction, basic 
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animal print and sign identification, and awareness 
techniques. It also asked that students reassess the 
mechanics of walking and movement. 
 On a midsummer morning, I gathered with ten other 
students in a mixed hardwood forest to practice basic body 
mechanics. Essentially, we were being taught how to walk 
again. The implication here is that somehow, along the way, 
we forgot how to walk. According to the lead instructor, 
Brad, the modern built environment has something to do with 
this. “When you walk on city sidewalks,” says Brad, “you’re 
basically moving forward in a controlled fall, catching 
yourself at the last instant.” If it is one’s goal to get 
close to a wild animal, city-walking will not work. To 
clomp about in a controlled fall will send waves of 
disturbance through the forest and spook most things with a 
100-yard radius. This is why, when walking clumsily through 
the woods, one often hears bird alarm calls. These calls 
signal the presence of a threat and will further drive away 
other animals for whom discerning such warnings is a matter 
of survival. When we move this way, suggest Brad, much of 
the world hides from us.  
Thus, a central workshop lesson concerned how moving 
through the woods while tracking animals requires a 
fundamentally different style of movement––one that blends 
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with the subtle textures of an environment. This came with 
the suggestion that learning how to walk differently 
requires learning how to inhabit one’s body differently. 
This is no easy task, given that it involves rewiring 
culturally-inflected habits and patterns of movement. 
Ingold’s discussion of culture and walking is relevant 
here. As Ingold points out, the manner in which one walks 
suggests a manner of orientation to the world: 
It is not only the morphology of the booted European 
foot that is peculiar...equally peculiar is the so-
called ‘striding gate’ with which the walkers of 
western civilization (especially men) have been 
enjoined since Antiquity to sally forth into the 
world, asserting as they go their superiority over 
subject peoples and animals (2004: 334). 
 
Thus, instead of provoking the disruptive consequences 
of a striding gait, we are taught to “fox-walk”. To walk as 
a fox. In fox-walking, forward momentum occurs from the 
waist down. A knee comes up and down in a fluid motion. A 
foot only commits to ground after feeling for a solid hold, 
so that one never has to look down. (It is best if one does 
this barefoot.) Above the waist, the torso swivels slightly 
in a side-to-side motion. The head pivots left and right 
upon the neck, scanning surroundings for movement. Later 
that day, we learn how to take a sixty-second step in a 
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single fluid motion. “Moving like this, people have managed 
to touch the backs of deer,” claims Brad. 
But fox-walking concerns matters beyond basic 
physicality. If the goal is to establish familiarity with 
nonhuman others, then this requires that we modify 
movements and integrate them, as best we can, with 
proximate environmental patterns and textures. The play of 
light and dark. Wetness and dryness. Compression and loft. 
Smells and sounds. This is not about achieving harmony, per 
se. Nor does it require the mimetic power of ‘becoming-
animal’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987). Rather, it is about 
minimizing one’s sphere of disturbance so as to avoid 
troubling or displacing nonhuman modes of habitation. 
Moreover, it asks that we move with a light touch with the 
things of this world, rather than trample brazenly through, 
or upon, them.  
As Ingold suggests, we are not generally used to 
moving in a way that makes space for other patterns and 
modes of inhabitation. This failure to account for the 
coexistence of others arguably factors into a general lack 
of care extended to other forms of life. If care, or love, 
benefits from closeness and familiarity, then that which 
creates distance ought to be critically examined. As I have 
been arguing, some ways of moving can create distances, 
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whereas others close them. By closing distances––no matter 
how great or small––the ways we are entangled with the 
things of this world become more apparent, because things 
often stop hiding from us. There are thus important lessons 
to be gleaned through quiet, careful movement. As Rezendes 
notes, “Tracking is opening a door to the life of that 
animal.... The longer you follow the animal, the deeper you 
enter into a perceptual relationship with its life” (1999: 
15). This brings up the important matter of perception, to 
which I briefly turn before addressing an ethics of care.  
 
4.6 Tracking and perception 
Just as it is difficult to sit still and write about 
walking and tracking, it is also difficult to write about 
the techniques of perception that are central to animal 
tracking. An academic life, at least as I experience it, 
tends to be narrowly focused perceptually speaking. That 
is, it is marked by visual constriction to pages and 
screens, with little attention given to peripheries. And 
similar to how one ought to avoid walking as if on a 
sidewalk while tracking, it is best to avoid focus-lock 
and, instead, tend to the visual peripheries. This is where 
life often flashes up unexpectedly.  
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Accordingly, ‘techniques of perception’ was another 
core element of the Tracking and Awareness workshop. A 
frequent point of instruction concerned the importance of 
“wide angle vision” as a way of maintaining awareness. 
Reader: Stand up and fully extend your arms in front of 
your body. Wiggle your fingers. See them? Now, keep 
wiggling your fingers and rotate your arms ninety degrees 
as if extending from your ears. Still see them? Rotate 
again with one arm reaching skyward, and the other toward 
the ground at your feet. Still see the wriggling? Now, 
hands back on the table.  
With decent peripheral vision, you should be able to 
see your fingers wiggle across the whole arc of movement, 
even to the peripheral terminus at the edge of your vision. 
The key to wide-angle vision is maintaining peripheral 
awareness while maintaining central focus. Put differently, 
in wide-angle vision all objects within your visual field 
are immanent to perception. When I do this, I find I must 
relax the muscles around my eyes, hence, the phrase “soft 
eyes”, which is interchangeable with “wide angle vision”.   
In tracking, movement and perception complement each 
other. Yet, just as walking is not quite the same as 
tracking, looking is not quite the same as perceiving. Or, 
as Marvin puts it: “Seeing is not the same as observing” 
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(2005: 4). Maintaining wide-angle vision takes work, as our 
eyes are used to darting from object to object. We revert 
to tunnel-vision, and in doing so, often fail to notice the 
nuanced connections and contexts of the surroundings. As 
when tracking, the body moves deliberately with a light 
touch, so too do the eyes move with the texture of the 
landscape. However, in contrast to an Emersonian gaze that 
sees all, a tracking gaze does not aim to take in the 
entirety of the landscape. Rather, it seeks to discern 
patterns and sign that stand out from the baseline texture 
of an environment. It is interesting to note that in 
tracking, one is not looking for animals, or even for their 
tracks. Instead, one is looking for animal sign––scat, 
markings on trees, discarded foot, etc. As Rezendes 
suggests,  
We don’t need tracks to track an animal. For much of 
the year, the forest is far richer in sign than it is 
in tracks. Sometimes there are no tracks at all, but 
there is never a square yard in the forest that does 
not tell us something about the wildlife within it. 
The forest is speaking to us all the time (1999: 16).  
 
It is thus through awareness of subtle patterns that, 
according to Rezendes, we might discern the traces of other 
lives that inhabit the world differently. The complexities 
of nonhuman lives become more legible the better we are 
able to discern and interpret the subtle traces of their 
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lives. This, as mentioned, not only requires modifications 
to movement and perception; it also requires a willingness 
to be drawn in unanticipated directions without 
destination. To track, then, is to give oneself over to the 
Other. Or, put differently, to track is not to follow, but 
rather to be pulled.  
Once more I heed Haraway’s advice to ‘venture off the 
beaten path’. In making my way through the off-trail 
tangle, spider webs test my awareness. I pick their 
invisibility from my face, no doubt looking the fool. I 
happen across evidence of a grisly story: a bird kill site, 
with yellow finch feathers scattered on the western slope 
of Vermont’s Mount Mansfield. Happening upon such a scene 
brings to mind the tension between living fragility and 
deathly necessity. Of a major event in one being’s life 
that goes unreported, which need not, for reasons I am not 
entirely sure, be reported. I make my way to a shallow 
stream within earshot of Highway 189 south of Burlington, 
VT, and spot striped skunk prints along the water’s edge, 
its burrow likely close by, for a skunk never lives more 
than two miles from a source of water. I walk the edges of 
Turtlehead Pond in Marshfield, VT during a late fall dusk, 
and to my left comes the unmistakable and aggressive slap 
of a beavertail on the pond’s surface. I admit, it scared 
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the hell out of me, which is of course the intended effect. 
A beaver’s aggressive slap is meant to startle its 
potential predator, giving it a few precious moments to 
escape by slipping underwater. I trudge through deep snow 
in East Calais, VT to a quick-running forest stream, from 
which a red squirrel had taken a drink not too long before 
I arrived. Its tracks were so fresh, and so apparent in the 
snow. In early springtime, I sit quietly watching color 
gradually return to a fen, and then worryingly sense my 
heart quicken. What seems an approaching heart attack is, 
instead, the wingbeat of a male grouse’s mating routine. 
Its deep, thumping sound begins slowly and builds to a 
crescendo as the bird rotates his wings back and forth. The 
frequency of its flutter resounds in my chest, which I 
confuse for my heart.  
The lessons such encounters impart are far from 
profound, at least in the sense of deriving some central 
insight about my place in the world. Indeed, if anything, 
these encounters suggest a world that unfolds independent 
of me. I feel the center of myself dislodged by these 
mundane and impermanent terrestrial inscriptions that mark 
an event or an encounter. Granted, I suppose there is some 
measure of significance in this feeling itself. Yet, I tell 
myself that a particular skunk drinking from a particular 
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stream need not be recorded and filed away to have 
significance. It has meaning of its own, no matter how 
desperate the anthropocentric struggle over whether it is, 
or is not, deserving of meaning as such.  
 
4.7 On technique and the body 
 
 I admit, I feel as if I remain in the orbit of 
Emerson. I worry that I have not created enough distance 
from the trope of the solitary observer. (Maybe the issue 
is that I prefer to go on walks without the company of 
other humans.) Indeed, even if I have gone to lengths to 
discuss the ways in which we can discern entanglements 
through intimate encounter, much of what I have written of 
concerns techniques of a body singular. Of the techniques 
of a body’s movement. Of a body’s perception. I acknowledge 
the risks here of arguing for an ideal method of inhabiting 
the world. Surely, I believe that there are better ways of 
inhabiting the world that do not give way to environmental 
violence. Yet, I must also acknowledge such beliefs are 
often mapped onto a particular body in a normative fashion. 
As Plumwood (1993) suggests, such idealized conceptions are 
mapped onto an exclusively masculine body. One that is 
properly trained so as to know how to calmly and expertly 
discern and manage the contingencies of ‘nature’.  
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I do not advocate for a strict training of bodies so 
as to conjure an ideal body. As I have discussed in Chapter 
3, ideal bodies are often rooted in un-ideal ideologies. 
Rather, what I have in mind is how, through cultivating 
techniques, a body might attune itself to multiple others. 
A mode of discipline, but not in a strict pejorative, or 
normative, sense. I think of Foucault’s ‘care of the self’–
–“an exercise of the self by which one attempts to develop 
and transform oneself, and to attain to a certain mode of 
being” (1997: 282). I see delicate points of contact with 
Tsing’s ‘arts of noticing’. The arts, of course, require 
practice, dedication, and skill. In a word: technique. In a 
sense, one might direct the arts of noticing inwardly, 
using them to cultivate inner worldliness. Yet, the aim is 
to not enclose the arts of noticing in a clearly delineated 
subject that stands apart from the world. Doing so would 
reinscribe a human-nonhuman dualism. Rather, the aim is to 
render the boundaries of the subject porous so as to move 
with the world, and to do so with great care.   
Put differently, the body alone offers no viable path 
out of environmental crisis. This neither suggests that the 
body does not matter, nor that the body does not offer an 
entry point for engaging the world. Yet, a body alone is 
not enough. At a time when environmental crises ramify, we 
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need to understand the risks experienced by bodies plural, 
human and nonhuman alike. And we need to understand the way 
in which these bodies are interconnected. Thus, if there is 
a subject to posit in the Anthropocene, it is not the 
solitary observer, but the entangled masses, assemblages of 
bodies (plural) pulled into complex knots of relation 
(Haraway 2016). Alaimo provides guidance here through the 
concept of trans-corporeality. “Trans-corporeality”, writes 
Alaimo, “suggests that humans are interconnected not only 
with one another but also with the material interchanges 
between body, substance, and place” (2016: 77). And, in 
tending to this vast entanglement of bodies, we would do 
well to understand bodies not necessarily delimited in 
space and time, but rather as open-ended processes 
stretched across space and time (see Grosz 2004; Seitler 
2008). 
In this vein, Tsing poses a question: “What if our 
indeterminate life was not the shape of our bodies but 
rather the shape of our motions over time?” (2015: 47). 
Following this, what if we think of the encounter as 
something more than a fleeting crossing at a specific place 
and time? That is, what if we think of encounters as 
knotted pathways threaded through space and time? Where 
different ways of inhabiting space intersect with different 
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durations. And, what if we strive to understand encounters 
as events thick with multiple bodies pulled into complex 
relations? Such approaches can help us to understand how 
particular modes of engagement are capable of transcending 
the individual. It can help us to rethink how techniques of 
movement and observation have relevance beyond individual 
lives and subjectivities. And, it can help us express novel 
forms of care adequate to the environmental challenges in 
this century and beyond. So, let us momentarily leave the 
body behind so as to venture into a dispersed subjectivity, 
and in doing so, tend to the matter of ethics and care. 
 
4.8 Sensing precarity, practicing ethics 
In this section, I return to a set of questions I 
posed earlier: What do the ‘arts of noticing’ mean at a 
time of great environmental uncertainty? What does it mean 
to seek intimacy when the conditions of life, in general, 
are rather precarious? Is it possible to extend an ethic of 
care to nonhuman others whose lives we might never behold?  
 To begin: In drawing on the work of Val Plumwood, 
Deborah Bird Rose identifies two primary tasks for the 
contemporary environmental condition. The first is to 
“resituate the human in ecological terms” (in Gibson et. 
al. 2015: 3). This entails, Rose suggests, “[overcoming] 
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the idea that humans are outside of nature...[by] working 
to undermine the boundaries that have been deployed to hold 
humans separate from other animals” (2015: 3). The second 
task, according to Rose, is “to resituate the non-human in 
ethical terms” (2015: 3). This involves “[overcoming] the 
idea that the non-human world is devoid of meaning, values, 
and ethics” (2015: 4).  
 As I have discussed, situating the human in ecological 
terms has been a subject of frequent debate and 
theorization in the environmental social sciences. It comes 
with the recognition that it makes little sense to consider 
the human as an entity independent of the environment. 
Indeed, Haraway goes so far as to argue that an idea of the 
human apart from the world is ‘unthinkable’ (2016: 30). If 
this is the case, it would follow that whatever concepts, 
systems, cosmologies, etc. ‘we’ conventionally employ to 
make sense of our relationship to the world must shift to 
accommodate the complex ways in which our lives are 
entangled with the world. And since relational ontologies 
refuse the separation of the world into discrete 
categories, longstanding anthropocentric and dualistic 
foundations appear untenable (see Ingold 2011: 106).  
Yet, the collapse of old and stubborn orders offers 
opportunities to rethink the meaning and practice of 
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ethics. This is a necessary task, for ethics can no longer 
be considered an exclusively human concern. Rather, 
following Rose and Plumwood, ethics must be open to the 
influences of nonhuman natures. This does not entail, 
however, simply extending ethics to the nonhuman other. As 
Wolfe notes with regard animal rights, rights cannot simply 
be extended to animals without significantly altering their 
fundamental assumptions, for the very founding of the 
discourse of rights is predicated on an originary exclusion 
of the animal (2013: 8-9). The same applies for ethics. If 
our understanding of ethics remains preoccupied with 
interactions and exchanges only among humans, then it will 
remain ill-equipped to account for, or provide for, 
entanglement with nonhuman bodies.  
Still, situating the nonhuman in ethical terms does 
not require doing away with ethics entirely and starting 
from scratch. Rather, it requires careful reconsideration 
and reconfiguration of its core attributes in order to 
stitch the world together rather than cleaving it into two 
camps: what is worthy of care, and what is not. Indeed, for 
Rose, “Care is an ethical response involving tenderness, 
generosity, and compassion, and care is an ongoing 
assumption of responsibility in the face of continuing 
violence and peril (in Tsing et. al. 2017: G58). For Puig 
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de la Bellacasa the ethics of care has an open-ended 
intent. “The ‘ethics’ in an ethics of care”, writes Puig de 
la Bellacasa, “cannot be about a realm of normative moral 
obligations but rather about thick, impure, involvement in 
a world where the question of how to care needs to be 
posed” (2017: 6). 
Such approaches to ethics and care fall in line with 
Haraway’s ‘response-ability’, wherein “questions of species 
difference are always conjugated with attentions to affect, 
entanglement, and rupture” (2008: 106; see also Haraway 
2016; Tsing 2015).18 The ability to be able to respond to 
the other, whether human or not, is a skill that requires 
cultivation. Indeed, it is precisely in cultivating 
response-ability that we might respond to others and to 
recognize our entanglements with them. Yet, it should be 
noted that these ethical concerns are not utopian. The aim 
is not to recreate Edenic conditions. Rather, questions of 
care must be posed in full view of environmental 
devastation and extinction. That is, care must be 
articulated against histories and practices of persistent 
harm. Yet, that devastation enters the picture does not 
mean that these concerns are somehow dystopian. While blind 
                     
18 For Hustak and Myers, response-ability is a crucial mode of 
ecological thinking required “in order to do more effective work in 
challenging the status quo of ecological irresponsibility” (2012: 106). 
 	 139 
optimism might appear almost obscene in view of planetary 
crises, so too does absolute pessimism. The challenge lies 
in striking a critical balance between the two. As Tsing 
et. al. suggest: 
[In] the midst of ruins, we must maintain enough 
curiosity to notice the strange and wonderful as well 
as the terrible and terrifying... Living in a time of 
planetary catastrophe thus begins with a practice that 
is humble and difficult: noticing the world around us 
(2017: M7).  
 
I wish to spend some time unpacking this short 
excerpt, since it puts forth three concerns regarding an 
ethics of care in the 21st century. The first issue concerns 
the assumption of planetary catastrophe. The extinction 
crisis is real and ongoing. Current rates of extinction are 
upwards of ten thousand times the background rate (see 
Ceballos et. al. 2017; Chivian et. al. 2008; Kolbert 2014; 
Thomas et. al. 2004). “From the perspective of geological 
time, Earth’s richest biota ever is already well into a 
sixth mass extinction episode” (Ceballos et. al. 2017: 1). 
Yet, it is not always apparent that this is even occurring. 
The current extinction unfolds gradually over spatial and 
temporal registers that outstrip human experiences of space 
and time. “A rate of two vertebrate species extinctions per 
year does not generate enough public concern, especially 
because many of those species were obscure and had limited 
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ranges” (Ceballos et. al. 2017: 1). Perhaps this is why van 
Dooren poses the question: “What does it mean that, in this 
time of incredible loss, there is so little public mourning 
for extinctions?” (2014: 140). For van Dooren, this lacuna 
stems from “our inability to really get––to comprehend at 
any meaningful level––the multiple connections and 
dependencies between ourselves and these disappearing 
others: a failure to appreciate all the ways in which we 
are at stake in one another, all the ways in which we share 
a world” (2014: 140). 
Thus, the matter of extinction concerns more than the 
loss of forms of life. As Rose suggests, in the sixth 
extinction “relationships unravel, mutualities falter, 
dependence becomes a peril rather than a blessing, and 
whole worlds of knowledge and practice diminish” (Rose in 
Tsing et. al. 2017: G58). Similarly, for van Dooren, 
extinction marks not just the loss of the last member of a 
species (the ‘endling’), but also marks the loss of ways of 
inhabiting the world. “Species,” maintains van Dooren, 
“must be understood as something like a ‘line of movement’ 
through evolutionary time.... Each species lineage embodies 
a particular way of life (2014: 27). To tend to this loss, 
or the potential for further loss, is to find oneself 
tending to different modes of life. It is to bear witness 
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to the slow violence of biological annihilation, even if 
the collapse of lifelines eclipses the immediacy of our 
perceptions (see Nixon 2011). 
Indeed, if we were able to inhabit other 
temporalities––to assume a long-term evolutionary vantage 
point––we would be aghast at the rapidity and severity of 
biotic change over the past 200 years. But, perhaps this is 
precisely what needs to be done: To engage in creative 
speculation in order to transcend our comparatively 
diminutive experiences of time. To do so in order to 
establish care for, and solidarity with, a future we will 
never inhabit. This task is important even if expressions 
of care and solidarity fail to stem the tide of extinction, 
as is likely to be the case. If there is a central task for 
the Anthropocene, it is one that surely must tend not only 
to existing bodies caught up in the annihilatory logic of 
global industrialized capitalism, it must also tend to the 
otherness of nonhuman temporalities, whether ecological, 
evolutionary, geological, or cosmological. 
A second insight from the above excerpt concerns how 
entanglement is not always positive. This is an important 
detail, especially in view of extinction. Though I have 
primarily written affirmatively about entanglement, 
entanglement can also pose serious risks. I do not, for 
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example, wish to be entangled with hornets. Nor do I wish 
to be entangled with lead-laced water. But more than this, 
to inhabit the contemporary environmental condition is to 
assume that life is tasked with taking hold in settings 
that are far from ideal.19 Thus, to theorize entanglement 
means to acknowledge the likelihood of crossing paths with 
industrial detritus.20 This is the stuff of the viscid 
residues coating post-Harvey Houston. The stuff that takes 
up residence in the flesh of fish and the bellies of birds. 
The stuff that courses through the veins of citizens of 
Flint. The stuff that accumulates in the bodies of native 
Greenlanders to such an extent that their bodies “can be 
classified as toxic waste when they die” (Liboiron 2013: 
134). On account of these far reaching toxic legacies there 
is little to be gained in conjuring a purified notion of 
nature (Povinelli 2017; Shotwell 2016). 
Moreover, to theorize entanglement is to acknowledge 
the precarious conditions of life in general. Tsing asks, 
                     
19 Kim Fortun’s notion of ‘late industrialism’ provides insight into the 
kinds of landscapes one can expect to inhabit, whether on or off the 
beaten path. Fortun writes, “In late industrialism...the levee has 
broken, retention walls failed. The sludge runs over homes and lives, 
eventually hardening into a kind of gray matter that will be 
‘remediated’ by moving it to another, more marginal place, out of sight 
and out of mind” (2014: 310).  
20 Though it should be noted that socially, economically, and culturally 
marginalized populations are more likely to be subject to the ravages 
of pollution than wealthier, socioeconomically secure populations. (See 
Adger and Brown 2009; Bullard and Wright 2009; Holifield 2001; Kurtz 
2009; Newell 2005; Hoffman and Oliver-Smith 2002; Smith 2006; Walker 
2009.) 
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“What if...precarity is the condition of our time––or, to 
put it another way, what if our time is ripe for sensing 
precarity?” (2015: 20). Thus, practicing modes of care must 
necessarily account for inevitable encounters with risk. 
Yet, this ought not to hinder expressions of intimacy. 
Indeed, for Instone, with risk comes opportunity: “Risky 
attachments are not so much about danger, but about 
possibility; the possibilities that emerge from 
acknowledging our entanglements in and with things” (2015: 
31).21  
Thus, via precarity and indeterminacy, possibilities 
emerge for new ways of relating. This ought not to be taken 
as putting a positive spin on tragic circumstances. Rather, 
it suggests that we have little choice but to make do with 
circumstances that are far from ideal. Moreover, it 
suggests a strategy for pursuing possible futures without 
succumbing to the fatal trap of nihilism or the blind hope 
of utopianism. Rather, the challenge, as Haraway (2016) 
puts it, is to “stay with the trouble” (2016). Or, as Tsing 
suggests, “ruins are now our gardens” (2014: 87). Such 
                     
21 Instone’s position parallels Tsing’s, who writes: “Precarity is the 
condition of being vulnerable to others. Unpredictable encounters 
transform us; we are not in control, even of ourselves... Thinking 
through precarity changes social analysis. A precarious world is a 
world without teleology. Indeterminacy, the unplanned nature of time, 
is frightening, but thinking through precarity makes it evident that 
indeterminacy also makes life possible” (2015: 20).  
 
 	 144 
perspectives cannot but help alter the modes through which 
we express care for the world. Again, in view of 
extinction, the global proliferation of pollution, and the 
impacts these have on individual lives, the task we face is 
not one of purification, but rather of making-do. Or, as 
Puig de la Bellacasa insists, an ethics of care is “a 
hands-on, ongoing process of relation of ‘as well as 
possible’ relations” (2017: 6).   
Third, with Tsing’s entreaty to “notice the world 
around us” we are given a sense of how coping with the 
immensity of planetary crisis begins with simple gestures. 
I find comfort in this. Not because it proffers hope. It 
doesn’t. Rather, it suggests that it is okay to start 
small. And that, by starting small and tending to the 
margins we discover possibilities for new kinds of 
relationships.  
Throughout these pages, I have sought to do precisely 
that. To begin with a single step and meander among various 
scales and matters of concern. And, I have tried to do so 
in a manner that stays with the world, rather than simply 
reporting on its tragic condition from a safe distance. 
Yet, I do not believe that the ‘arts of noticing’, animal 
tracking, or movement and perception will save the world. 
But, then, this is not the aim. The aim, rather, is to take 
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notice of, and extend care to, the things around us. To get 
close and see, listen, smell, taste, and touch. To 
understand that even in our most mundane moments, life 
takes hold all around us.  
As Tsing et. al. suggest, “Our continued survival 
demands that we learn something about how to best live and 
die within the entanglements we have” (2017: M4). As 
discussed, entanglements can be good, bad, or a mixture of 
both. But, we should not assume that localized 
entanglements are capable of scaling up to a kind of 
planetary holism. Some things don’t scale well at all, but 
this does not mean that they are therefore ineffective. 
Some things, as Tsing suggests, are just not meant to scale 
(2015: 42). 
Still, despite the immensities of the problems we 
confront, it is important to not leave our corporeal 
capacities behind. They are what we have, no matter how 
imperfect impure they might be. Perhaps, it is even okay to 
dwell in the interiority of an Emersonian world. Yet, as 
discussed, the problem with Emerson concerns the conceit of 
perception. The omnipotent gaze has a way of reasserting 
the ostensible sanctity of the human body. It is important 
to recognize that the body is not as bounded as we assume 
it to be. Rather, it is porous and conditioned by myriad 
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material interchanges that extend far beyond a body’s 
corporeal boundaries. 
Yet, equally important is to recognize the need to go 
outside so as to move with the world. The ‘arts of 
noticing’ are not to be relegated to museums. They are, 
instead, best practiced at some distance from the air-
conditioned nightmare of progress. They are best cultivated 
in the company of nonhumans, in the margins and unruly 
edgelands. The potential for an encounter increases the 
farther off the beaten path one finds oneself, for it is 
within more unfamiliar realms that the senses are 
heightened. We are prone to noticing differently because we 
are no longer granted the comforts of familiar patterns. 
For, with familiarity comes routine, which is to say, 
habit. To get lost is to cede a measure of control over how 
we move, the directions in which we move, and how we 
perceive along the way.  
I cannot think of a more appropriate mode of engaging 
with the world, for does not the immense tragedy of 
extinction confirm that we are not in control? That we are 
not capable of securing the conditions for life in general? 
This is not to suggest that chaos is the order of the 
world. Rather, I believe, it addresses the crux of what 
Tsing means when she proposes that “our time is ripe for 
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sensing precarity” (2015: 20). She continues: “What if 
precarity, indeterminacy, and what we imagine as trivial 
are the center of the systematicity we seek?” (2015: 20). 
It follows that if we abandon control and (re)discover 
entanglement with the world, there might come better 
opportunities to express care for it. Even if it proves too 
little, too late. At the very least it strikes me as a 
needed strategy at a time of great uncertainty. Again: 
“What do you do when your world starts to fall apart?” 
Tsing’s response: “I go for a walk.” (2015: 1). I always 
come back to this humble, yet nevertheless difficult 
gesture. It’s a good place to start.  
 
4.9 On telling stories with the world  
In bringing this chapter to a close, I want to return 
to the matter of storytelling. As I had written earlier, we 
need new kinds of stories for an era of deep environmental 
uncertainty. The implication here is that a story is much 
more than a story. And, the protagonists we choose for 
stories speak volumes about the values we hold with regard 
to the world. Strangely, however, the things of the world 
are often pushed to the margins in the stories we tell.22  
                     
22 Michel Serres: “Nothing ever interests us but spilled blood, the 
manhunt, crime stories, the point at which politics turns into 
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Looking to Haraway, we are given an approach to 
storytelling in the context of ‘string figures’––a 
“practice and process” that entails “[following] threads 
where they lead in order to track them and find their 
tangles and patterns” (2016: 3). With Haraway’s steadfast 
commitment to relational knots, I come back to Ingold’s 
reflections on lines (2016). For Ingold, one who inhabits 
the world “participates from within the very process of the 
world’s continual coming into being and who, in laying a 
trail of life, contributes to its weave and texture” (81). 
For Ingold, tracing the lines that create weave and texture 
is not unlike telling a story. “To tell a story,” writes 
Ingold, “is to relate, in narrative, the occurrences of the 
past, retracing a path through the world that others, 
recursively picking up the threads of past lives, can 
follow in the process of spinning out their own” (2016: 
90)[See Figure 1].  
 
Fig. 1: From Ingold’s Lines: A Brief History (2016: 90). 
                                                             
murder.... Take away the world around the battles, keep only the 
conflicts or debates, thick with humanity and purified of things, and 
you obtain stage theater, most of our narratives and philosophies, 
history, and all of social science: the interesting spectacle they call 
cultural: Does anyone ever say where the master and slave fight it out” 
(1995: 2-3)? 
 
 	 149 
To write in this manner is no easy task. Indeed, I 
have struggled throughout this chapter to write with the 
world as opposed to about the world. I suspect that the 
most significant challenge lies in ceding territory to the 
nonhuman other in the way we write. To be sure, an animal 
is not likely to answer the call for new modes of 
storytelling by sitting at a desk with pen in paw. Yet, to 
strictly focus on language as a necessary prerequisite for 
telling stories is to miss the point. The refusal of the 
capacity to linguistic communication betrays a fundamental 
fear at the heart of anthropocentrism: the fear of 
acknowledging the independent existence of other minds that 
remain unknown or indecipherable to us (see Wolfe 2003). 
Or, to put it somewhat differently, the refusal of such 
capacities suggests anthropocentrism’s unwillingness to 
extend subjectivity to nonhumans, and thereby acknowledge 
the uniqueness and idiosyncrasy of specific animals (see 
Lulka 2009: 384). However, as Haraway notes, placing too 
much emphasis on the capacity for language is a trap. 
“People always end up better at language than animals, no 
matter how latitudinarian the framework for thinking about 
the matter,” writes Haraway (2008: 234). 
Yet, nonhumans do tell us things all the time. We just 
need to listen better. This is a challenge Tsing’s ‘arts of 
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noticing’ seek to address. Also relevant is Rose’s 
discussion of “tellers”. Rose describes tellers as “those 
who provide information: they give news of what is 
happening in the world” (2013: 103). Some examples might 
include swirling vultures indicating something is injured 
or dead, or dogs who panic before an earthquake. Rose 
provides the following: “When the march flies bite the 
crocodiles are laying their eggs”; “When the cicadas sing, 
the figs are ripe and the turtles are far”; “When the 
fireflies come, the conckerberries are ripe” (2013: 103).  
The tellers, in other words, tell us not only of 
themselves, but also about broader events happening in the 
world. As Rose notes: “This communicative system depends on 
knowledge, and is highly localized.... The system opens the 
human sensorium, extending it through attentiveness to 
others” (2013: 103). For us to gain knowledge from the 
tellers, we have to pay attention. In this, we would do 
well to move and perceive differently and with openness. 
Moreover, we must find ourselves in places where nonhuman 
lives openly communicate. This might require that we 
approach such places with skillful subtlety and with care 
in order that their stories can proceed uninterrupted. And, 
it is by way of such efforts and explorations that we might 
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begin to tell other stories that have less to do with us 
and our heroic pretenses, and more to do with the world.  
Toward this end, I wish to bring this chapter to a 
close by giving Paul Rezendes the last word. For Rezendes, 
the arts of tracking are less concerned with the animal, 
and more so with the broader contexts that support life. 
Thus, for Rezendes, it is not just the animal that tells 
its story, the setting, or the milieu, communicates. It 
holds the myriad traces of events that bring to mind 
Ingold’s history of lines and Haraway’s string figures. 
And, to riff on the title of Kohn’s How Forests Think 
(2013), in view of Rezendes we might pose the notion of how 
forests speak. Rezendes:  
Sometimes sign speaks in a whisper––a bent twig 
indicating that a deer has stopped to browse; at other 
times, it’s a loud scream at the top of its lungs: 
massive hemlock dieback––porcupine! We can ask the 
bobcat where the snowshoe hare is, and he will leave 
us a trail to it. But we can just as easily ask the 
blueberry bush; its nibbled branches will say 
“snowshoe hare” just as assuredly.... Corn in a 
raccoon’s scat will tell your where he has been. There 
is a whole novel in an owl’s pellet (1999: 16).  
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Chapter 5: On the Poison Path: Writing with Atropa 
belladonna 
 
It was all very well to say ‘Drink me,' but the wise little 
Alice was not going to do that in a hurry. ‘No, I'll look 
first,' she said, ‘and see whether it's marked "poison" or 
not'; for she had read several nice little histories about 
children who had got burnt, and eaten up by wild beasts and 
other unpleasant things, all because they would not 
remember the simple rules their friends had taught them: 
such as, that a red-hot poker will burn you if you hold it 
too long; and that if you cut your finger very deeply with 
a knife, it usually bleeds; and she had never forgotten 
that, if you drink much from a bottle marked ‘poison,' it 
is almost certain to disagree with you, sooner or later 
(Carroll 2011: 12). 
 
The smoke of the burned witches still hangs in our nostrils 
(Starhawk 1988: 219). 
 
5.1 Entanglement in the marsh 
While driving down the dirt backroads of Vermont with 
my friend, Sarah, it was not uncommon to pull to the side 
to gather plants in the fields, forests and marshes. 
Punctuating easy-going conversation, Sarah would excitedly 
point out roadside flora. “Bloodroot [Sanguinaria 
canadensis]! Stop here!” she would exclaim. Or, “The 
elderberries [Sambucus canadensis] are ready! Let’s gather 
some.” And, we would.  
Such gathering forays were common during the two years 
I lived with a small eco-survivalist community in central 
Vermont, whose central aim is to (re)discover modes of 
‘living otherwise’ amidst an uncertain 21st century 
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environmental condition. Living otherwise generally 
involves practicing ‘wilderness survival skills’ like 
lithic tool making, fire-by-friction, hunting, and folk 
herbalism. Thus, during Vermont’s warmer months, we would 
grow herbs and medicinals in sweet garden soils, as well as 
venture off the beaten path to gather, process, taste, eat, 
tincture, and then ‘put up’ medicines in the apothecary.  
Most of our medicines were of a beneficial variety, 
derived and distilled to ease use through sprains, fevers, 
toothaches, and a host of other maladies. Put differently, 
we would seek out the ‘good’ in plants. These plants stay 
with me. I know, for example, the ineffable bitterness of 
boneset [Eupatorium perfoliatum], which once helped me 
break fever one late fall evening. And the warming 
qualities of hawthorn [Crataegus sp.], that carries me 
through Vermont’s winters. The uplifting effects of St. 
John’s wort [Hypericum perforatum] that bring light to the 
darker times of the year. The sedating merits of valerian 
[Valeriana officinalis], which sends me to sleep each 
night. The subtle healing properties of calendula 
[Calendula officinalis], whose petals I drop into tea 
blends. The salivation-inducing wonders of spilanthes 
[Acmella oleracea], which I use to maintain oral health. 
The list of medicines goes on. 
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Granted, when stocking an apothecary it is pragmatic 
to seek out ‘friendly’ plants. We were, after all, making 
remedies and our aim was to heal. There exists, however, a 
great diversity of plants that would not qualify as 
remedies and thus not take up residence on the apothecary 
shelves. Put differently, our decision to value flora in 
terms of a particular ‘good’ they perform for us rendered a 
wide range of plants and their constituent properties 
either illegible or without obvious practical value. Thus, 
in seeking only the good in plants, we bracketed off whole 
worlds of other plants, and by extension possibilities for 
relating to plants in different and potentially riskier 
ways.  
Yet, we knew of these other worlds that do not submit 
to our own values and desires. Occasionally, while 
gathering in the countryside, we would encounter the other 
end of the spectrum: the ostensibly bad. The dangerous and 
sometimes deadly. And we began to pose the question, is 
there not value on this end of the spectrum as well? 
One encounter with danger lingers with me. In a marsh 
just off a dirt road in the appropriately named Marshfield, 
VT, Sarah and I wriggled our way through a dense tangle of 
flora striving sunward above soggy ground. We were looking 
for cleavers [Galium aparine], an annual with creeping and 
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straggling stems that grow betwixt and between, over and 
above other plants. Their tiny hairs grasp and climb, 
enabling cleavers to trace circuitous pathways through a 
tangle of flora. Our aim was to harvest and tincture the 
cleavers. Their clingy properties manifest in the human 
body and alleviate stomach and intestinal inflammation. 
Cleavers, in other words, clean you out.  
As I disentangled a reach of cleavers by chasing its 
route, a little way off I hear a gasp. “Come over here! 
Now!” Making my way through the tangle, with cleavers in 
tow, I arrive at Sarah’s side and in front of a slender 
plant with clusters of small white flowers. “What is it?” I 
ask. “It’s deadly,” Sarah gravely replies. “It’s bulb-
bearing water-hemlock. If you eat just a bit of the root, 
you’ll die. Violent vomiting. Convulsions. Frothing at the 
mouth. It’s a terrible death,” she says.  
Bulb-bearing water-hemlock [Cicuta bulbifera] of the 
Apiaceae family, which includes carrots, celery, and 
parsley. This unassuming plant nudged the day toward 
something sinister. In its slender form was a reminder of 
another side of plants: a darker one that stands in stark 
contrast to the reason we entered the marsh in the first 
place, for the ‘good’ cleavers. Bulb-bearing water-hemlock 
stood there, but not alone. Though Sarah and I were drawn 
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in by its subtle gravity, we also stood amidst a tangle of 
growth sprawled across the marsh. The setting itself is 
crucial context for this encounter. A marsh has a rich and 
deep weight, a dense tangle of interrelating and competing 
knots of flora striving above a muddy foundation. A kind of 
swirling commotion of vital health and certain death 
converging just off the beaten path.  A marsh resists order 
and induces aversion, perhaps because we cannot be sure 
what we will encounter there. After all, there’s a lot that 
gets hidden in a tangle. 
In the pages that follow, I wish to tell the story of 
how I came to admire particular plants that are often 
considered dangerous––sometimes for good reason, sometimes 
not. My central aim is to attend to the risks involved in 
collaboration. I take my cue from Lesley Instone’s framing 
of “risky attachments [as not being] so much about danger, 
but about possibility; the possibilities that emerge from 
acknowledging our entanglements in and with things” (2015: 
31). Toward this end, I approach the interplay of risk and 
possibility by way of humans’ complex entanglement with 
plants. Specifically, this paper addresses risky 
attachments with plant poisons, focusing primarily on 
Atropa belladonna, common name “deadly nightshade.” I argue 
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that such attachments, though risky, might also be seen as 
welcome, strategic, and powerful attachments.  
 
5.2 On plants, poisons, and methods 
My interest in plant poisons is broadly situated in 
recent debates in the environmental social sciences and 
humanities that seek to account for how humans are 
interconnected with plants (see Head and Atchison 2009; 
Franklin in Kitchin and Thrift 2009; Hitchings and Jones 
2004; Jones and Cloke 2002; Ogden et. al. 2013; Pitt 2015). 
Michael Marder (2011, 2013, 2014, 2016), for example, 
questions originary divides among human, animal, and plant 
in western philosophy stretching back to the early Greeks. 
Jeffrey Nealon, in Plant Theory: Biopower and Vegetal Life 
(2016) turns to 20th century continental philosophy and 
critical theory to question how and why recent scholarly 
interests in ‘animal life’ tend to bracket off plant life, 
the latter of which is a “form of life forgotten and 
abjected within a dominant regime of humanist biopower” 
(2016: x). Natasha Myers has drawn important attention to 
“the mimetic entanglement among scientists and their 
plants” (2015: 60) to simultaneously elucidate and clarify 
notions of plant sentience. And, together with Carla 
Hustak, Myers lays out the terms for an “affective 
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ecology”––shaped by pleasure, play, and experimentation 
among plants, insects, and human researchers––that creates 
“openings for an ecology of interspecies intimacies and 
subtle propositions...that takes seriously organisms as 
inventive practitioners who experiment as they craft 
interspecies lives and worlds” (2012: 106).  
Yet, given the focus on poisons, I find existing plant 
studies literatures to be rather quiet, if not mute, with 
regard to risky encounters with plants. For this reason, I 
find myself pulled into another area of focus: the 
labyrinthine corridors of esoteric plant literatures, 
ranging from clinical Materia medica detailing plant 
chemical constituents, to obscure texts on witches’ recipes 
and ‘flying ointments’. I turn to Hardin and Arena’s Human 
Poisoning from Native and Cultivated Plants (1969), which 
cautions, “In our modern civilization, and particularly in 
view of our eagerness to return to nature, we should 
remember that we are seldom out of easy reach of some 
poisonous plant” (1969: 3). Or, take Cunningham’s 
Encyclopedia of Magical Herbs (1985), which offers advice 
on using herbs for protection, love, exorcism, or hex-
breaking, amongst other intentions. Ricutti’s The Devil’s 
Garden (1978) looks to more sinister intentions, reminding 
us that “the plant kingdom...has a dual aspect––one of 
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death as well as life, of evil as well as good” (1978: 1). 
Dale Pendell’s remarkable and generally confounding 
‘Phamarko trilogy’––Phamarko/poeia (1995), Phamarko/dynamis 
(2002), and Phamarko/gnosis (2010)––offers insight into the 
darker corridors of ingestion of poisons, Pendell himself 
as one who partakes and writes of his journey with plants 
of varying varieties and toxicities. Or, in the darkest of 
my queries, I look to Daniel Schulke’s weighty Viridarium 
Umbris: The Pleasure Garden of Shadow (2005) and 
Veneficium: Magic, Witchcraft and the Poison Path (2017), 
the latter of which states, “Poison is a glyph for magical 
power itself: complex, concentrated, liberated in the hands 
of the elect, and disastrous in the hands of the fool” 
(2017: 10). 
These are the literatures that don’t often make it 
into scholarly bibliographies. Their data are often murky. 
Their claims are often fantastical. They conjure ideas that 
make discerning academics nervous and thus push them to 
more sober resources. Yet, still, lurking among the 
esoterica are invaluable insights about the close 
relationships humans have with plants and plant poisons. 
And, in the case of the more daring approaches, such 
insights are often derived through ingestion.  
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Toward this end, in his Pharmako trilogy (1995; 2002; 
2010) Dale Pendell lays out a basis for ‘pharmacognosy’ as 
the study of poisons and remedies. “The emphasis,” writes 
Pendell, “on gnosis over logos connotes an experiential 
tradition, based more on sampling than on theory” (2006: 
3). Pendell continues: “Pharmako/Gnosis, then, is poison 
knowledge, drug knowledge. In the sense of knowledge from 
drugs, rather than of drugs, it is the forbidden knowledge, 
but knowledge with the power to heal” (2006: 3). For 
Pendell, such an experiential and experimental method 
allows for a risky collaboration to take hold and, 
importantly, evolve along unanticipated trajectories. When 
Pendell writes, he writes with. As so, whether writing with 
the morning glory seed, the mescal bean, or deadly 
nightshade, he is under their influence and thus sharing 
the page with nonhuman others. Plants, in this way, become 
teachers, authors, and traveling companions. Yet, Pendell 
is no fool in the sense that Schulke mentions. Before 
partaking of poisons, Pendell advises accordingly: “Do not 
go into our art blindly. If you, O alchemist, wish to live 
a whole life––neither ended abruptly by lethal toxins, or 
shortened by slow toxins, nor mutated by carcinogens––most 
certainly, before you experiment, KNOW THE POISONS!” (1995: 
26). 
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This, too, is my approach. Instead of writing of 
poisons, I write with them. I write heretofore with my 
poison of choice, deadly nightshade [Atropa Belladonna]. I 
do so in the company of an Atropa belladonna var. lutea 
that grows in my office. It is a rare varietal with pale 
yellow fruits, in contrast to the more common variety with 
dark purple berries. I write, also, with Atropa belladonna 
coursing through my body, taken in the form of a glycerin-
based tincture made with wild-harvested dried leaves. I 
start with 20-30 drops. If I need to call upon it a bit 
more, I take the same again.23  
 
A small dose of Atropa belladonna [deadly nightshade]: 
The immediate sensation is not unlike floating. A kind 
of light touch at the mind’s stranger fringes. It 
pulls one to these edges, but in a way that feels 
comfortable. Warm. (At least at these dosages.) After 
a little while, it settles in the head with a gentle 
weight. 
 
The longer I sit with Atropa belladonna––both in my 
body and in my view––the more it feels like I’m being 
visited by an old memory, which is not entirely mine. 
It has a thousand voices, which all seem to express 
the same sentiment: “You thought we had gone away. No, 
still here. Still here.” Sometimes this is a 
comforting voice. Other times, not so much. 
 
 
 
                     
23 In the interest of full disclosure, while my initial attempts at 
writing this chapter were done ‘under the spell’ of Atropa belladonna, 
subsequent edits were carried out in a state of sobriety. The reasons 
will soon be clear enough.   
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5.3 The Nightshades: A materia medica 
That day with Sarah and the bulb-bearing water-hemlock 
set into motion an enduring interest in plant poisons––not 
for wicked purposes, but for reasons of reverence and 
respect. It has sent me down what Dale Pendell refers to as 
“the poison path”: a branching passage in which knowledge 
from poisons, through ingestion, outstrips knowledge of 
poisons (2010). This is not to suggest that I make routine 
habit out of poisoning myself––though there is insight to 
be distilled from this. Rather, as mentioned, it speaks to 
an interest in thinking along with plants. On writing with 
them instead of writing of them. Of building alliances with 
their consent and, in doing so, ceding territory to them.  
There are many routes one can take on the poison path, 
which is to say, the path ramifies. Some routes lead toward 
enlightenment, whereas others lead toward darkness or 
death. I do not consider myself an adept in these matters. 
I admit to being an infrequent traveler along these paths. 
Yet, I know enough to respect plant poisons and take some 
caution with dosage. I call on some of them not for fun, 
but rather to check in the more mischievous end of the 
spectrum and to hear their stories. As Pendell says, 
“within the poison, a gift” (2010: 7). 
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 Somehow, among the many routes I might take along the 
poison path, I often find myself in close company with the 
Solanaceae family, also known as ‘the nightshades’. I 
suppose it could have been another family that took me in, 
but Solanaceae feels like kin. Some members of Solanaceae 
are upstanding and generally accepted, like tomatoes, 
potatoes, eggplant, and red and green peppers. Some, 
however, are the quiet ones with dark histories, like 
datura, henbane, mandrake, and deadly nightshade.  
In what follows, I provide a materia medica24 of 
Solanaceae member Atropa belladonna, wherein I discuss 
plant properties, chemical constituents, biophysical 
effects of ingestion, and general historical contexts. I do 
so in view of discourses around entanglement and ‘vibrant 
matter’, which seek to map out the complex and myriad ways 
we are entangled with the ‘stuff’ of the world (see Barad 
2007; Bennett 2009; Clark 2011; Grosz 2011; Haraway 2015; 
Hird 2010; Johnson 2015; Lorimer 2015; Tsing 2015; Yusoff 
2013). It is my contention that understanding entanglement 
requires an understanding of what we happen to be entangled 
with. This, in turn, requires research and discussion of 
physical properties as well as the broader social, 
                     
24 From the Latin, meteria medica [medical material] is a term for the 
body of collected knowledge about the therapeutic properties of any 
substance used for healing. 
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historical, and, indeed, political contexts of material 
entanglement. So, bear with me as I assume the role of 
botanist for the next few pages.  
Of the various members of Solanaceae, deadly 
nightshade [Atropa belladonna] is perhaps the most infamous 
[See figure 2]. Atropa belladonna is commonly found 
throughout Central and Southern Europe, reaching as far 
east as the foothills of the Himalayas (Lee 2007; Lilley 
2004). The plant has simple typical alternate leaves and 
bell shaped five-lobed flowers, and commonly features a 
dark purple berry. Atropa belladonna is generally confined 
to chalky or calcareous soils. As Lilley notes, “the 
nightshades...thrive best where there is human garbage and 
refuse, on rubbish dumps and compost heaps. Belladonna 
loves waste areas, old quarries and ruins––places forsaken 
by man” (2004: 12). (Indeed, by some measure Atropa 
belladonna’s affinity for disturbance suggests that it is 
one of those lucky forms of life that seem to prosper the 
more humans disrupt the world.) 
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 Atropa belladonna tends to prefer partial to full 
shade, where it grows vigorously upwards of six feet. 
Specimens exposed to the sun are, by comparison, smaller 
and appear weaker. However, as Lilley notes, “the more sun 
and light a plant is exposed to the more poisonous it 
becomes, due to the increased concentration of toxins 
(alkaloids) it contains” (2004: 12). That which appears 
weak, then, is comparatively more potent. 
The primary active agents in Atropa belladonna are the 
tropane alkaloids: atropine, hyoscine (scopolamine), and 
hyoscyamine (Lee 2007). The roots carry the highest 
concentrations of these alkaloids, followed by the leaves, 
stalks, flowers, berries, and then the seeds. Tropane 
alkaloids show a binding affinity for nicotinic and 
Fig. 2: Illustration from Köhler's Medicinal Plants (1887) 
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muscarinic acetylcholine receptors and exert pleiotropic 
[producing more than one effect] physiological effects in 
humans and animals (Grynkiewicz and Gadzikowska 2008; 
Schmeller et. al. 1995). The effects, as I discuss below, 
are wide ranging and derive from the potency of the plant’s 
constituents, which have served as a basis for medicines 
since ancient times (McCreath and Delgoda 2017). The 
tropane alkaloids have often been administered to treat 
depression, various psychoses, and as an analgesic pain 
relief. Modern medicine, too, derives a number of 
spasmolytics, local anesthetics, and mydriatics from the 
plant. Atropine, which was isolated from the roots of 
belladonna in 1831 by the German pharmacist Heinrich F. G. 
Mein, is still used to treat certain inflammatory 
conditions of the eye as well as for dilating pupils in the 
offices of ophthalmologists (Lee 2007).   
Much can be learned from its Linnaean taxonomy, Atropa 
belladonna. The species name ‘belladonna’ is 
straightforward enough, though not without its own curious 
history. Literally translated from the Italian as 
“beautiful lady”, belladonna refers to the custom of 
Italian women of the Renaissance dilating their pupils by 
instilling a drop of the deadly nightshade berry juice into 
their eyes (Lilley 2004: 13). Doing so renders the eye 
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darker and more brilliant, thereby suggesting sexual 
arousal and thus enhancing attractiveness. To be sure, 
pursuing beauty via poison involved some risk. As is 
consistent with tropane alkaloids, transdermal applications 
produce increased heart rates. Prolonged use of belladonna 
in this manner is reported to have led to prolonged blurred 
vision and even permanent blindness (see Wood 1868: 792).  
 
Fig. 3: The Greek Fates (Morai). L-R: Lachesis, Atropos, Clotho 
 
The genus name ‘Atropa’ also has a curious history, albeit 
one more sinister. Atropa refers to Atropos, the eldest 
sister of the three Fates of Greek mythology, also known as 
the Morai [See Fig. 3]. Often described as ugly, severe, 
inflexible and stern, the Fates, according to Hesiod’s 
Theogony, were the daughters of Erebus (Darkness) and Nyx 
(Night) (Evelyn-White 1920: 904). Taken together, the Fates 
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assigned to each person his or her fate or share in the 
scheme of life. The first of the three sisters, Clotho (the 
spinner), spins the thread of life. With this came the 
power to determine when a person would be born, but also 
when they were to be saved or put to death. The second 
sister, Lachesis (the allotter), measured out the thread 
spun on Clotho’s spindle, and apportioned the length of an 
individual’s life. The third sister of the Fates, Atropos 
(the inevitable), determined the mechanism of death and 
with her ‘abhorrent shears’ ended life by cutting the 
thread spun by Clotho and measured by Lachesis. Atropos’ 
power, thus, remains absolute and it is reported that the 
Fates controlled not just the lives of mortals, but of gods 
as well.  
The severity of Atropos the Fate is fitting for Atropa 
belladonna the plant. Whether her ‘abhorred shears’ come 
into play depends, of course, on dosage. Despite being good 
medicine that has long served to alleviate various elements 
(see Rätsch 2005: 105), it is clear that ingesting Atropa 
belladonna involves risk. The line between safe and 
dangerous is not clearly defined.  
For example, lethal doses of Atropa belladonna set into 
motion a peculiar set of symptoms which, can be summarized 
accordingly: “Hot as a hare, blind as a bat, dry as a bone, 
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red as a beet and mad as a hen” (Lee 2007: 80). Large doses 
of Atropa belladonna impact the body’s temperature 
regulation systems, hence hotness. Blindness, as mentioned, 
can result from direct application to the eye due to 
debilitating effects on the eye’s sphincter muscle. An 
early sign of overdose in the suppression of salivation, 
hence dryness. The face becomes flush, hence redness. As I 
discuss below, Atropa belladonna, can inspire bizarre 
mental states resembling mania, hence ‘mad as a hen’ (Lee 
2007: 80-81). After running the gamut of hares, bats, 
bones, beets and hens, the final blow is often struck by 
respiratory paralysis. At this point, the line has 
certainly been crossed. Or, with reference to the Fate 
Atropos and her shears, it is more precise to write that 
the thread of life has been cut.   
When it comes to nonlethal doses, the effects of 
nightshade ingestion take hold after approximately fifteen 
minutes. Ingesting one or two fresh berries will produce 
mild perceptual shifts, whereas three or four is considered 
an assertive psychoactive aphrodisiac. As one surpasses 
four, the psychoactive effects take on a more extreme 
tenor. It is interesting to note the wide range of reported 
effects, which suggests that the mindset of the subject 
prior to intoxication is likely to produce varying results 
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in the experience of intoxication, amongst other factors. 
Pendell’s account of Atropa belladonna ingestion suggests a 
measure of absurdity. “The first alert is a tingling of the 
lips”, begins Pendell (2006: 243). He continues: 
The characteristic signature of intoxication is that 
there is no connection made between the general weirdness 
and that one has taken a drug. It’s like a dream that is 
experienced as real. If you see a strange apparition, 
maybe a big telepathic sea lion creature with pustules 
all over its body you think ‘wow, I’ve never seen one of 
those before,’ and then go on doing whatever you were 
doing, which is probably picking bugs off yourself (2006: 
261).25 
 
Such a range of effects is festive, fantastical, if not 
subtly hellish. As Rätsch notes, “Many users have compared 
the effect to those of a ‘Hieronymus Bosch trip’ and have 
indicated that they have no intention of repeating the 
experiment” (2005: 106). Indeed, there is something of a 
turbulent crowd invoked through the ingestion of tropane 
alkaloids––an effect, perhaps, that reinforced the claims 
made by those who sought to characterize herbal knowledge 
as a satanic art. In my own experiments with Atropa 
                     
25 For a more ‘clinical’ description of Atropa belladonna ingestion, 
Roth et. al. (1998) report, “Within a quarter of an hour, the following 
toxic symptoms appear: psychomotor disquiet and general arousal, not 
infrequently of an erotic nature, urge to speak, great euphoria, but 
also fits of crying, strong desire for movement, which may be 
manifested in an urge to dance, disturbances of intention, manneristic 
and stereotypic movements, choreatic states, ataxia, disturbances of 
thought, sensations of befuddlement, confused speech, screaming, 
hallucinations of a diverse nature, increasing states of excitation 
culminating in frenzy, rage, madness, with complete lack of ability to 
recognize surroundings” (from Rätsch 2005: 106).  
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belladonna, I sense the murmur of that strange crowd at the 
edges of my mind. The higher the dosage, the more audible 
it is. Sometimes it is welcoming, but on two occasions when 
I took approximately 150-200 drops of tincture, there was 
something malevolent lurking about the edges. I knew well 
enough to back away. (But, then, perhaps this was a test I 
had failed.) 
 
 
One such moment is right now. Let’s write through this 
and see where it goes. At least I have a crowd 
cheering me on. 
 
 
 What is this crowd trying to say? What, in other 
words, is involved in attempting to extract a measure of 
insight from this feverish instability gathering at the 
edges of my mind? (This entanglement seems an intrusion, 
even though I willfully entered into it.) It’s not entirely 
clear what it says, but I get the curious sense of welcome 
and warning. Of healing and harm––“We’re here to help, but 
we can still fuck you up.” Speculatively speaking, I also 
sense the dark histories from which these voices resonate. 
This leads me to think that when we ingest medicines, we 
also ingest its histories. Its stories.  
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Indeed, there’s a formidable power at play. This would 
be consistent with the powers of the tropane alkaloids, 
which are among the oldest medicines known to humans, and 
whose extracts have long been used as poisons and magic 
potions of various assignments. The nightshades, it is 
reported, have long been the preferred by so-called 
witches. As Ott notes: “The most widespread and widely-used 
class of vision-inducing plants belong to the family 
Solanaceae” (1993: 363). The infamous witches’ salves, for 
example, reportedly contained henbane [Hyoscyamus niger], 
jimsomweed [Datura stramonium], mandrake [Mandragora 
officinarum], and deadly nightshade [Atropa belladonna], 
all pounded into an ointment mixed with bear grease (see 
Lee 2007; Ott 1993; Pendell 2006). When applied to the skin 
and genitals, the tropane alkaloid-rich mixture would 
course through the body and produce delusions, 
hallucinations, sexual arousal, and the sensation of 
flying. As Schultes and Hoffman note, the salve was thought 
to enable witches to “perform feats of occult wonder and 
prophecy, to hex through hallucinogenic communication with 
the supernatural, and transport themselves to far-off 
places for the practice of their nefarious skills” (1992: 
86). 
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5.4 Dark histories and plant knowledge 
As fantastical as these histories are, however, it is 
important to note that possessing such knowledge came with 
real risks. Put differently, it is easy to exoticize these 
plants and their stories, but doing so can marginalize the 
severity of their pasts. Indeed, knowledge of plants and 
plant properties was heavily repressed at different points 
in history, especially during the Great Witch-hunt in 
Europe from approximately 1450 to 1750. Plant knowledge was 
often viewed as evidence of the dark arts, black magic, 
evil dealings, and most significantly as a threat to an 
emerging modern status quo.  
As Schulke reports, during the witch-hunts, knowledge 
of plants and plant properties could be considered an 
indicium [indication or evidence] of witchcraft.26 Schulke 
suggests, “While such plant-related indicia were rarely 
sufficient on their own to secure conviction, they formed 
an important component of the corpus of charges against the 
accused” (2005, n.p.). One such indicium was typified by 
the act of ritually gathering herbs. Witness, for example, 
the following ‘proof of sorcery and witchcraft’ from Peter 
                     
26 For further discussion of historical documentation of the perceived 
threats assumed in practicing particular forms of plant knowledge, see 
Bailey 2001; Bloch 2009; Estes 1983; and Russell 1972. 
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Binsfeld’s Commentarius en Titulum Codocies lib. IX de 
Maleficis Mathetimaticis Et Cetera: 
A most urgent indicium which suffices for torture is 
two persons seeing a woman standing in water and 
throwing it back into the air, or a man in summer 
striking a stone when a tempest is threatened, or a 
woman gathering flowers from various trees and putting 
them into a pot (1622: n.p.) 
 
The repression of healing arts added, Schulke notes, 
further dimension to the systemic attack on plant 
knowledge. In other words, the general practices associated 
with plant knowledge––like the simple act of gathering–– 
were often considered suspicious by those in power. 
(Indeed, I wonder what suspicions would have been raised, 
just a mere 300 years ago, by the scene of me and Sarah 
standing in the marshland, gazing upon a plant well-known 
to cause death.) To be sure, this repression was enacted 
most severely, and with great violence, upon women. As 
Silvia Federici argues, “Though the witch-hunt targeted a 
wide variety of female practices, it was above all in this 
capacity––as sorcerers, healers, performers of incantations 
and divinations––that women were persecuted” (2005: 174).  
As Federici suggests, the violence enacted upon women 
during the European Witch-hunt was not about plants 
entirely. That is, repression was only partly predicated on 
the knowledge required to turn plants into medicine. 
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Indeed, knowledge of plants and concomitant medical 
practices were just one of many proxies for a more pressing 
concern for an emergent political power: how to clear the 
way for new forms of social, political, and economic 
control. The primary target was women in general, not just 
folk healers. For Federici, “the witch-hunt...was a war 
against women; it was a concerted attempt to degrade them, 
demonize them, and destroy their social power” (2005: 186).  
 Thus, during the 16th and 17th centuries, various 
aspects and capacities of women’s bodies were considered 
threats to an ascendant capitalist order. In order to 
realize this social and economic order, feminine 
‘unruliness’ needed to be repressed, controlled, and 
eventually domesticated. This repression, consequently, was 
directed toward particular bodies and toward vaguely 
defined practices of magic. Indeed, stigmatized as unruly 
and likely too much of nature, women’s bodies and their 
powers were increasingly aligned with the caricature of the 
witch. The witch served as the antithesis of a learned, 
sober, and predominantly male practitioner.27 This selective 
targeting, Federici argues, led to women being 
                     
27 According to Federici, “The witch was the living symbol of ‘the world 
turned upside down,’ a recurrent image in the literature of the Middle 
Ages, tied to millenarian aspirations of subversion of the social 
order” (2005: 177). 
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“[expropriated] from a patrimony of empirical knowledge, 
regarding herbs and healing remedies...paving the way for a 
new form of enclosure [the rise of a male-dominated 
professional medicine] (2005: 201).28 In other words, the 
primary concern revolved around who was permitted to hold 
practical and powerful knowledge.29  
At this point, and in view of the discussion around 
violent histories, I wish to pose a rhetorical question: 
What does the unruly crowd still at the edges of my mind 
claim with regard to its own legacy, which pushes from past 
into present? While my interpretations are inherently 
speculative––deriving from the personal challenge of 
thinking and writing with Atropa belladonna––there are 
nevertheless important and general insights to be gleaned. 
Once more I think of Pendell’s ‘pharmcognosy’, which 
privileges gnosis over logos. And, I think of how these 
                     
28 This is an issue Ehrenreich and English (2010) also address, albeit 
in a slightly different manner, arguing: “The Church saw its attack on 
peasant healers as an attack on magic, not medicine. The devil was 
believed to have real power on earth, and the use of that power by 
peasant women...was frightening to the Church and State” (2010: 46). 
29 As far as magic was concerned, as Federici notes, magic was 
considered “an obstacle to the rationalization of the work process, and 
a threat to the establishment of the principle of individual 
responsibility” (2005: 174). Federici continues, arguing “magic seemed 
a form of refusal of work, of insubordination, and an instrument of 
grassroots resistance to power” (2005: 174). It is tempting to read 
this process, one which was carried out with great violence “in the 
torture chambers and on the stakes on which the witches perished” 
(2005: 186) not only as a systemic effort to disenchant the world by 
rendering it orderable, but also, as Federici notes, as an effort to 
consolidate the “bourgeois ideals of womanhood and domesticity” 
(Federici 2005: 186). 
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dark pasts come into different relief when ingesting the 
same poisons that were situated at the center of these 
histories. In other words, the history of the witch-hunt 
has a slightly different purchase when experienced though 
deliberate encounters with its material referents. 
Yet, the question of how these poisons arrived at my 
fingertips (and, by extension, how this crowd arrived in my 
mind) is hardly speculative. This is a concrete matter 
concerning herbcraft, which is as much a feature of the 
present as it was of the past (albeit with obvious 
differences in political context). Indeed, in my time spent 
with Sarah, I was fortunate to acquire the knowledge and 
skill to make medicines. To know what plants are 
appropriate for a given condition. To know how, where, and 
when to gather them. To know through which processes one 
might modulate potency to produce better medicine. And how, 
in building an apothecary, one is not only bottling 
medicine, but also keeping histories alive and preserving 
the stories the plants themselves tell. Indeed, the 
practices associated with herbalism are still emancipatory, 
as they were a few hundred years ago, for they provide a 
measure of autonomy from a modernized and industrialized 
pharmacological system. There is great power in knowing how 
to make medicine, and by extension knowing how to care for 
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oneself and others. Developing the skillsets required for 
this allows for us to tap into long-held knowledges that 
were, indeed, considered a great threat.  
 
5.5 On the promises of the pharmakon 
 Following this discussion of poisons, potions, and 
practitioners we arrive at the pharmakon––that which 
signifies either poison or cure. In one sense, and with 
regard to the nightshades, we can take the pharmakon at its 
literal meaning. The nightshades, as mentioned, have long 
been used as powerful medicines. The power to cure, 
however, was never far away from the power to harm. The 
fuzzy line between cure and poison, as discussed, 
ultimately comes down to dosage. (Remember: two to four 
berries of Atropa belladonna is fine, but it would be 
unwise to push it much farther beyond that.) 
 Yet, I wish to draw attention to another sense of the 
pharmakon, one invoked by Isabelle Stengers. For Stengers, 
the pharmakon is much more than a diagnostic concept. 
Certainly, for Stengers the pharmakon comes with material 
risk; but, it also offers opportunity and strategy. 
Opportunity and strategy inhere in the challenge the 
pharmakon poses to order and certainty. For Stengers:  
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The lack of a stable and well determined attribute is 
the problem posed by any pharmakon, by any drug whose 
effect can mutate into its opposite, depending on the 
dose, the circumstances, or the context (2010: 29). 
 
 Stengers provides further context to Federici’s 
discussion of the production and subsequent repression of 
the figure of the witch. Indeed, the practices associated 
with witchcraft were deemed threatening precisely because 
they ran counter to an emerging social and political order 
based on rationality. For Stengers, the instability of the 
pharmakon, which “defines no fixed point of reference that 
would allow us to recognize and understand its effects with 
some assurance” (2010: 29), is not the source of the 
repression. The source, rather, is “the intolerance of our 
tradition in the face of this type of ambiguity, the 
anxiety it arouses” (2010: 29). In other words, repression 
stemmed from fear of unruliness. Indeed, what this emerging 
rational order required, suggests Stengers, was “a stable 
distinction between the beneficial medicament and the 
harmful drug, between rational pedagogy and suggestive 
influence, between reason and opinion” (2010: 29). Such 
assurances and clarity, by definition, are not to be found 
within the pharmakon.  
 Yet, the pervasive anxiety that brought about systemic 
repression misunderstands, deeply, the levels of caution 
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and care involved in herbcraft. When it comes to the potent 
tropane alkaloids, for example, fatal overdose is a present 
risk; but, it is a relatively small one, provided the 
practitioner both knows and respects the power of the 
pharmakon. One has to be quite deliberate to push those 
edges to fatality. There is a valuable lesson here: the 
line between cure and poison is crossed often only to the 
extent that a lack of care and caution is present. Such a 
lack is not representative of healers. As Stengers notes, 
“[The witches] are pragmatic, radically pragmatic, 
experimenting with effects and consequences of a 
‘realization’ that...involves care, protection, and 
experience” (2012: 9-10). Rather than committing the error 
of dangerous inattention, their crime was simply that they 
were women with power. 
It would be a mistake, however, to situate the 
repression of witches and magic entirely in history. The 
claim here is not necessarily that herbalism and 
poisoncraft radically subvert the constituted order. Nor is 
it my claim that these practices are actively repressed as 
they were in the past.31 Rather, my resistance to situating 
this purely in history is more in line with Starhawk’s 
                     
31 Federici: “Once the subversive potential of witchcraft was destroyed, 
the practice of magic could even be allowed to continue” (2005: 205). 
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statement, “The smoke of the burned witches still hangs in 
our nostrils” (1988: 219). That this repression lingers 
suggests it is a residual feature of the present. And, in 
reference to Stengers’ discussion of the pharmakon, this 
lingering smoke is exemplified by the persistence of a 
status quo requirement for fixed points, foundations, and 
guarantees. Or, put differently, the smoke still lingers 
due to persistent anxiety around unruliness.  
Thus, the legacy of the burned witches that haunts the 
present brings with it a challenge to a stubborn demand for 
purity. In the next section, I argue this challenge is one 
that takes us beyond herbcraft, offering itself up as a 
strategy for navigating present social, political, and 
environmental conditions. Toward this end, I think with 
Alexis Shotwell, who insists, “An ethical approach aiming 
for...purity is inadequate in the face of the complex and 
entangled situation in which we in fact live” (2016: 17)  
 
5.6 On risky entanglement 
In view of the promise and persistence of the 
pharmakon, I turn to entanglement. Entanglement offers a 
generative strategy for ‘thinking the world’. It summons 
worlds made up of connective threads and knots that place 
the human in direct cohabitation with nonhuman others. 
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Recognition of, and response to, these knots of relating 
provide, as Kathryn Yusoff puts it, insight about how to 
“relate, to write, to sense, and to make intelligible that 
which is beyond me” (2013: 209). In a nearby vein, 
entanglement is central to Haraway’s (2016) discussion of 
Cat’s Cradle and ‘string figures’, which are models for 
worlding, for actively producing new patterns for relating 
to the world [See Fig. 4].  
 
       Fig 4: Illustration of Cat’s cradle 
As Haraway writes, “Cat’s cradle is about patterns and 
knots... [It] invites a sense of collective work, of one 
person not being able to make all the patterns alone (1994: 
69). Moreover, entanglement’s emphasis on interrelation 
works to dispel notions of human exceptionalism and 
methodological individualism. It speaks to collaborations 
that are not––indeed, cannot––be reduced purely to humans 
alone. As Anna Tsing puts it: “Collaboration means working 
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across difference, which leads to contamination. Without 
collaborations, we all die” (Tsing 2015: 28). The 
possibilities of living, in other words, emerge only 
through complex relations among many forms of life. To 
isolate forms of life––to purify them––risks bracketing off 
the vital contexts that bring life into being. Here, Stacey 
Alaimo’s notions of transcorporeality and entanglement come 
to mind. Alaimo writes:  
To analyze, theorize, critique, create, revolt and 
transform as someone whose corporeality cannot be 
distinct from biopolitical systems and biochemical 
flows is to think as the stuff of the world (2016: 
185).  
 
Customarily, entanglement is framed in positive terms, 
wherein recognition of our entanglement with nonhuman 
natures lends itself to a richer, more connected, and 
counter-anthropocentric understanding of life. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, entanglement carries the 
possibility of extending ethical care beyond the human (see 
Bennett 2009; Plumwood 1993; Puig de la Bellacasa 2017; 
Rose 2013; van Dooren 2014). Yet, as others have pointed 
out, entanglement does not come without risk (see Haraway 
2016; Instone 2015; Sacco and Agro 2018; Tsing 2015). There 
are some entanglements that are unwelcome. This is evident 
in the case of Atropa belladonna. That Atropa belladonna 
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spans both beauty and death, and remedy and poison, 
exemplifies the risks that sometimes take root when we find 
ourselves entangled with the unruly and untamable things of 
this world.  
Here, I am reminded of Shapiro’s work on the 
chemosphere (2015), Fortun’s discussion of late 
industrialism (2012, 2014), and Liboiron’s research on 
plasticizers (2013), to name a few. Each of these works 
addresses entanglement with risk. Each articulates a need 
to develop practices adequate for a world that is far from 
ideal, and to make do with what we have in full knowledge 
of the impossibilities for pure and uncontaminated modes of 
existence. Anna Tsing’s comment “purity is not an option” 
(2015: 27) also comes to mind, as does Shotwell’s critique 
of purity (2016). For Shotwell, a longstanding fixation on 
purity––of the sort that underpinned much of the witch-
hunt––is closely stitched to longstanding systems of 
violence. “A great deal of harm,” argues Shotwell, “is done 
based on a metaphysics of purity; since it is false and 
because it is harmful, we do better to pursue metaphysics 
that do not aim to preserve fictions of integrity (2016: 
16).33  
                     
33 For Shotwell, “to be against purity is...not to be for pollution, 
harm, sickness, or premature death. It is to be against the rhetorical 
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It is toward the impure, the unruly, and the untamable 
that Haraway directs her attention in Staying with the 
Trouble (2016). Drawing on the game of cat’s cradle and the 
concept of string figures, Haraway introduces ‘the 
tentacular ones’. “The tentacular ones,” writes Haraway, 
“make attachments and detachments; they weave paths and 
consequences but not determinisms; they are both open and 
knotted in some ways and not others” (2016: 31). For 
Haraway, it is another dreadful Greek sisterhood (not the 
Morai) that exemplifies an unruly challenge to order and 
purity: the Gorgons, especially the only mortal among them, 
Medusa. As Haraway states:  
The Gorgons are powerful winged chthonic [of, in, or 
under the earth and the seas] entities without a 
proper genealogy; their reach is lateral and 
tentacular; they have no settled lineage and no 
reliable kind (genre, gender), although they are 
figured and storied as female” (2016: 53-54). 
  
For Haraway, the Gorgons pose a challenge to 
patriarchal orderings of the world. Indeed, they serve as a 
counterpoint to the ‘Anthropo’ of the Anthropocene, a 
collective figure that is often fashioned in the image of 
Man. Haraway notes:  
The Gorgons turned men who looked into their living, 
venomous, snake-encrusted faces into stone. I wonder 
what might have happened if those men had known how to 
                                                             
or conceptual attempt to delineate and delimit the world into something 
separable, disentangled, and homogenous” (2016: 15). 
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politely greet the dreadful chthonic ones. I wonder if 
such manners can still be learned, if there is time to 
learn now, or if the stratigraphy of the rocks will 
only register the ends and end of a stony Anthropos” 
(2016: 54).   
 
Running the risk of offending discerning 
classicalists, I wish to suggest an alliance between the 
two sisterhoods, the Morai (Fates) and the Gorgons. And, I 
wish to do so on the basis of the power they hold over 
ordered and masculinist states of affair. For in this 
writhing sisterhood, I see strength and intransigence. I 
see entanglement in Clotho’s thread and finality in 
Atropos’ shears. I glimpse flashes of the alchemical in the 
Gorgon’s transformation of flesh into stone, an expression 
of an enduring materiality emerging out of death. And much 
like Atropa belladonna rises out of the places forsaken by 
man, in this alliance I see the possibility for a 
generative subversion that refuses a clean, purified, and 
orderly framing of the world that privileges separability 
over entanglement. One which would drain the marshes out of 
fear what the entanglement hides. One which, out of a 
desire to reduce the world to discrete categories, refuses 
the multiple, messy, wondrous, and risky attachments that 
cut across longstanding divisions between nature and 
society, and human and nonhuman. I also sense ways in which 
old intransigencies are made anew via skillful practices 
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like herbcraft and poisoncraft. Though a proliferation of 
apothecaries is unlikely to upend the existing 
socioeconomic order, a well-stocked apothecary nevertheless 
still requires practices that often occur outside, if not 
occasionally against, that order. Indeed, no matter how 
hard those in a position of power try, we no longer live in 
a world that can be organized in such a pure and orderly 
fashion.  
In other words, I want to suggest that the unruliness 
that is at the core of the pharmakon and some of its 
practitioners––herbalists, poisoncrafters, witches, etc.––
offers a strategy for engaging some orders and (re)creating 
others. Indeed, a refusal to delineate and delimit the 
stuff of the world provides openings for collaboration and 
entanglement. Following previous discussions around 
Stengers, Tsing, and Haraway, this seems an appropriate 
strategy for the contemporary environmental condition. In 
many respects, it seems the most viable strategy as far as 
recognizing that, in our precarious condition, we would do 
well to acknowledge the complex ways in which we are 
entangled with the stuff of this world. After all, do not 
entanglement and unruliness inherently pose direct 
challenges to established orders? Do they not indicate that 
the world cannot be carved up into separable and discrete 
 	 188 
categories that only seem to serve human hubris? And, with 
their ghostly presences, cannot the legacies of repressed 
knowledges and practices offer some guidance in crafting 
new relations in an uncertain world?  
 
5.7 One last go with the nightshades 
 The witches who applied the infamous flying salve did 
not, of course, actually take flight. (Though, that they 
did not fly does not mean we should not take their claims 
of power seriously, a point that I take up in the next 
chapter.) Rather, as Duerr notes: 
It is not so much that we fly. What happens is that 
our ordinary ‘ego boundaries’ evaporate and so it is 
entirely possible that we suddenly encounter ourselves 
at places where our ‘everyday body’, whose boundaries 
are no longer identical with our person, is not to be 
found (1985: 87).  
 
The power of the witch’s salve, in other words, is not 
to be found in the violation of the laws of physics. 
Rather, the power is located in the transgression of 
boundaries. To cut across, through, and underneath a 
boundary is to refuse the status quo. Moreover, to 
transgress a boundary is to pursue collaboration and thus 
attachment, no matter how risky it might be (see Instone in 
Gibson et. al. 2015: 31).  
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With this I return to the marsh just off the beaten 
path. A marsh brings to mind Anna Tsing’s notion of ‘unruly 
edges’, liminal zones shot through with “various webs of 
interspecies dependence” (2012: 144). And, in this marsh in 
Marshfield (and certainly beyond) amidst the tangled 
flourishing of life, Atropos lies in wait, shears at the 
ready. She also waits in some of the amber bottles that 
line the shelves of my apothecary. Most of her neighbors 
are of a less threatening variety, and each has their story 
to tell. (We would do well to listen to them.) But, still, 
there she looms amid the safer kin with a heavy gravity, 
well aware of her power to cut.  
I write with a dark tone not to inspire fear, however. 
(I am not, as mentioned, interested in that particular 
style of ghost story.) Rather, it has everything to do with 
respect for the unruly, the weird, and the eerie. I write 
with the good ghosts and the allegedly bad ones.35 I am 
inspired by Yusoff’s call to “shift our focus to think 
between natures...to think the space between...as a spacing 
where life and death are made possible” (2013: 216). Within 
in-between-ness, one might discern an important reminder 
that when theorizing webs of interspecies dependence and 
                     
35 Reader: I do not recommend writing on Atropa belladonna. It is 
exhausting. Completely exhausting.  
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entanglement, we ought not to focus on relations that only 
reinforce anthropocentric notions of health and well-being. 
To do so would be to bracket off the ostensibly sinister 
and untamable, which nevertheless persist and thus have 
their place in the world. It is just as important to 
acknowledge the risks involved in inhabiting entanglement. 
For within these entanglements, it is possible to brush 
against death, no matter how slight it might appear, as it 
did that day with Sarah in the form of a slender bulb-
bearing water-hemlock. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
 
What kind of utopia can come out of these margins, 
negations, and obscurities? Who will even recognize it as 
utopia? It won’t look the way it ought to (Le Guin 1989: 
88). 
 
 
6.1 Upon reflection 
Ghosts. Ancient bodies. Archaic technologies. 
Obsidian. Beaver slaps. Grouse flutters. Scat. Poisons. 
Apothecaries. Deadly nightshade berries. Witches. How is it 
that these seemingly random things are entangled? Indeed, 
just listing them alone makes me anxious about the entirety 
of this research. Certainly, it is a strange collection of 
things couched within an equally strange set of theories. 
But, still, these things are related nonetheless.  
I could say that they are characters in a story I tell 
myself to make sense of the last six years of my life. This 
is partly true. I could also say that they are drawn 
together through experiences in the eco-survivalist 
community. And while this, too, is true, I hesitate to 
delimit the relations among these things as deriving either 
from myself or from that community alone. I feel it is 
important to situate these things in broader contexts, out 
in the world beyond the boundaries of a small community 
nestled in Vermont’s Green Mountains. Indeed, it is perhaps 
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best to view them as elements drawn together by efforts to 
live otherwise. That is, to live against the dictates of 
progress and toward possible futures, no matter how 
uncertain they might be.  
Yet, the ways of living that cohere around these 
things require some skill to bring about. Put differently, 
if one wishes to attend to the vast and diverse ‘stuff’ of 
the world, listing seemingly random things is not enough. 
What is required is some effort or strategy to choose what 
it is we might wish to entangle with, to understand the 
risks or rewards of these entanglements, and then to put 
them to work in forging new relationship with matter so 
that other futures might unfold.  
This basic, three-step process underpins the whole of 
what has transpired over the course of my research and this 
dissertation. As I discussed in Chapter 2, if one wishes to 
write with the world, one might find it worthwhile to 
attend to how writing is not a mere projection onto the 
world, but an act of collaboration with it. What follows, 
with a measure of luck and skill, are new kinds of stories 
that take hold, become manifest. In Chapter 3, I addressed 
how proceeding too hastily into the future can run the risk 
of sacrificing not only the past, but also neglecting past 
bodies, practices, and relations. As I argued, these things 
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might prove to be instrumental in figuring out how to live 
in the future. In Chapter 4, I argued that tending to 
nonhuman natures is an important step in expanding notions 
of ethics and care, especially in a time of biodiversity 
loss. Yet, ‘tending to’ ought not to remain abstract; 
rather, ‘tending to’ has physical bearing. It asks we think 
differently about movement and perception so that we might 
become more entangled with the world––a necessary 
precondition for extending ethics to the world. And, in 
Chapter 5 I turned to human-plant relations as a way of 
reframing understandings of purity and risk. Yet, this too 
required sustained engagement with the materiality of 
poisons, whether in the form of a Materia medica, medicine 
making, or ingestion. 
In the same vein as Pendell’s command to “KNOW THE 
POISONS!” (1995: 26), we would do well to KNOW THE STRATEGIES! 
Which is to say, if one wants to forge new kinds of 
relations to bring about better futures, get busy building 
the skills to make those relations manifest.  
 
6.2 On limitations 
Such advice, however, must also contend with issues 
around power––like accessibility, uneven distribution of 
risk, histories of colonial and gendered violence, etc. Any 
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strategy for the future that fails to take into account 
these deeply entrenched inequalities is doomed to repeat 
them. Given this, I am not so sure that the eco-survivalist 
community offers a realistic political strategy for the 
future. Indeed, throughout this dissertation I have stated 
that flintknapping, animal tracking, or medicine-making is 
not likely to carry us through this moment. Truly, I wish 
it were that simple. I wish we could solve the problem of 
massively distributed environmental degradation by making 
ever-so-slight changes in our behavior, or by learning a 
new skill. But this is not the case. If eco-survivalism 
offers a strategy, it is one that looks toward ways of 
living otherwise. Yet, in this, its political contribution 
does not seem to go far beyond a lifestyle politics. 
Indeed, if you were hoping for radical solutions to the 
present environmental condition, then I am afraid that I 
have likely disappointed. 
Contributing to this limitation, no doubt, are various 
social, political, and ideological problems that underpin 
not only eco-survivalism, but which also crop up on 
occasion in the Vermont-based eco-survivalist community. 
These are problems that primarily concern catastrophism, 
idealism, and cultural appropriation. Though I have 
addressed these issues throughout the body of this 
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dissertation, I feel it is important to confront them once 
again.  
First, with regard to catastrophism, in the eco-
survivalist community there is a tendency to fetishize a 
catastrophe-to-come. The form that a catastrophe might take 
is varied. It might refer to sociopolitical collapse, 
economic havoc, or environmental crisis. Yet, regardless of 
its hypothetical nature, such fetishization can render a 
community dependent on collapse so that the community might 
be fully realized. As discussed in Chapter 3, this 
dependency suggests a desire for a blank slate upon which 
to inscribe a new and ideal form of community. It evokes an 
idea of community liberated from social constraints. The 
desire to be liberated from some social constraints, like 
the police, is understandable, even revolutionary. Yet the 
desire to be liberated from other social constraints, like 
those that work to ensure some measure of gender and racial 
equality, are far from revolutionary.  
At their core, such desires for blank slates are 
reactionary. They serve in the interest of longstanding and 
inequitable sociopolitical structures and the many forms of 
violence they unleash. As Yuen puts it: “Environmental 
catastrophism...is likely to encourage the most 
authoritarian solutions at the state level” (2012: 35; see 
 	 196 
also Baldwin 2012; Gergan et. al. 2018; Katz 1995). 
Extending this, there are real risks that environmental 
catastrophism can encourage similar political forms at the 
community level, ones which involve how to best control 
bodies to maintain community survival. This is a subject 
that cropped up in my conversation with an eco-survivalist 
around the question of gender equality (pages 71-72). In 
this exchange, we saw how a desire for a new social order 
was complexly linked with a desire for masculine supremacy.  
Unfortunately, the desire for a clean slate upon which 
to build a better society is an old trope in 
environmentalist thought. It lazily mirrors the ‘Narrative 
of the Fall’, which assumes that things were once good, are 
no longer, but could be made anew through a catastrophic 
intervention. This brings us to the second limitation: 
idealism. Despite my efforts to weave together a complex 
theory of atavistic bodies and temporality to work through 
eco-survivalism’s idealization of the past––including past 
bodies and environments––the problem of idealism remains. 
To be frank, I do not find Chapter 3’s argument to be a 
convincing one in terms of explaining away the idealism 
that underpins eco-survivalism. Nor do I feel that any 
argument should seek to explain it away, for doing so 
carries the risk of bracketing off the brutalities that 
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march under the banner of idealism. Rather, the intent of 
my theory of atavism and temporality was to draw out other 
ways of understanding our present and potential selves in 
relationship to past bodies and past practices. Yet, still, 
a notion of Eden––with its romanticized human and nonhuman 
bodies harmoniously coexisting in blissful ignorance––hangs 
heavy over central Vermont. 
Of the many problems with Eden, one in particular 
concerns which bodies are welcome, and which are not, 
within the boundaries of an environmental ideal. Certainly, 
the expressed desire to not be “that human” suggests that 
some humans are valued more than others. This brings us to 
the third concern, which revolves around the question of 
cultural appropriation. Indeed, there is a fine line 
between idealism and appropriation. As I discussed in 
Chapter 3, especially in reference to Victor Li’s work 
(2006), it is hard to shake the feeling that the figure of 
the primitive is made to reflect the desires of eco-
survivalism’s adherents, who are primarily white. Put 
differently, the deep respect extended to the non-western 
and pre-civilizational Other, while seemingly innocent, is 
primarily conditioned by white western conceptions and 
representations of the Other. What is not provided, at 
 	 198 
least with any seriousness, is a radical questioning of 
those representations (See hooks 1992: 370).  
Moreover, despite the broad and seemingly inclusive 
reference to Homo sapiens’ low-tech history on this planet, 
it is not clear how connecting to this evolutionary history 
has critical value, especially when that history is 
simultaneously idealized and homogenized. In “Eating the 
Other” (1992), bell hooks offers insight into this 
problematic relationship between appropriation and 
idealization. Worth quoting at length, hooks argues: 
The desire to make contact with those bodies deemed 
Other, with no apparent will to dominate, assuages the 
guilt of the past, even takes the form of a defiant 
gesture where one denies accountability and historical 
connection. Most importantly, it establishes a 
contemporary narrative where the suffering imposed by 
structures of domination on those designated Other is 
deflected by an emphasis on seduction and longing 
where the desire is not to make the Other over in 
one’s image but to become the Other (1992: 369).36 
 
 hooks’ critique is a damning indictment of 
imperialist, masculinist, and gendered fetishization of the 
non-Western Other (see also Banerjee 2006; Said 1978). I do 
not disagree with a single word. And, this critique has 
                     
36 Relatedly, hooks argues: “To make one’s self vulnerable to the 
seduction of difference, to seek an encounter with the Other, does not 
require that one relinquish forever one’s mainstream positionality. 
When race and ethnicity become commodified as resources for pleasure, 
the culture of specific groups, as well as the bodies of individuals, 
can be seen as constituting an alternative playground where members of 
dominating races, genders, sexual practices affirm their power-over in 
intimate relations with the Other” (1992: 367). 
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haunted me over the entire course of my research, from the 
first day in the field until this very moment. Not only 
does it expose the inherent problem of western fantasies 
about the ‘primitive’ Other, it also exposes the numerous 
fault lines that run the gamut of eco-survivalism. Indeed, 
eco-survivalism’s tendencies toward catastrophism, 
idealism, and cultural appropriation more or less precludes 
the possibility of it offering a radical politics. It might 
appear radical in its denunciation of civilization. It 
might also appear so in its stated aim to achieve autonomy 
from technological modernity. Yet, it can never be truly 
radical if it does not hold itself accountable to its own 
problematic desires.  
 
6.3 On uneasy alliances 
 Yet, this cannot be the end of the story. That is, I 
cannot accept critique as the terminus, no matter how valid 
the critique. My reason is not one of stubbornness. Nor 
does it suggest a willingness to sweep these problems under 
a rug. Rather, in the spirit of Haraway’s entreaty to “stay 
with the trouble” (2006), I wish to explore risky 
entanglements with dangerous ideas. That is, I want to 
uncover insights and strategies that emerge from uneasy 
alliances. Toward this end, I return to Stengers’ 
 	 200 
discussion of the pharmakon. Indeed, the pharmakon seems an 
appropriate construct for entering into this treacherous 
terrain.  
 Writing in response to Starhawk’s claim about 
lingering smoke from the burned witches, Stengers proposes 
the following challenge to academic convention: 
We have become used to Michel Foucault’s ‘shocking’ 
ways of questioning our modern pride in matters such 
as psychiatry or penal practices. But the shock may 
well be addressed even to academic followers of 
Foucault, those who have turned his production of 
destabilizing, and even frightening, demands for 
lucidity into a ‘we know better’ industry. What I am 
attempting however is not the ‘I know better’ counter-
move of assimilating social theory and witch hunting. 
I am attempting to slow down and question the way we 
are ourselves constructed, with the modern refrain 
‘they believed/we know’––and the possibility of 
‘putting at a distance’, which this refrain entails 
(2008: 49).  
 
While critique remains a justified strategy, so too 
does resistance to denunciation. This is not to imply that 
hooks’ critique can be easily written off as mere 
denunciation. No. It is a great critique, and important. 
Rather, following Stengers, what I want to suggest is that 
we should not be too quick to denounce problematic ideas, 
especially if doing so only serves to reaffirm our own 
sense of intellectual purity or radical authenticity. If we 
proceed down this path we risk losing out on possibilities 
for ‘collaboration across difference’ (Tsing 2015). That 
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is, we might overlook potential alliances no matter how 
uneasy they might be. Further, we risk losing sight of 
valuable practices that might be gleaned from those whose 
ideas we prefer to keep at a distance.  
Thus, an operative question here is how practices, 
ones which have been drowned out by the drumbeat of 
progress, might be reclaimed and revived. As Stengers 
argues, “reclaiming the past is not a matter of 
resurrecting it as it was, of dreaming to make some ‘true’, 
‘authentic’ tradition come alive. It is rather of 
reactivating it” (2012: 6). Yet, in order that reclaiming 
does not give way to reappropriation, it is imperative to 
directly address the issues discussed above, and to attend 
to lasting legacies of colonial violence. This requires, 
especially for white bodies, listening to the stories of 
those who have suffered and survived the onslaught of the 
very system that has brought forth this era of deep 
environmental uncertainty. As Heather Davis and Zoe Todd 
remark: 
Industrialized capitalism might make us forget our 
entwined relations and dependency on this body of the 
Earth, but we are surrounded by rich traditions and 
many people that have not forgotten this vital lesson. 
If we are to adapt with any grace to what is coming, 
those with power...would do well to begin to listen to 
those voices (2017: 776). 
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This task is a necessary one, but it requires rethinking 
the very terms through which environmentalist fantasies 
often depend on: catastrophism, idealism, and 
appropriation.  
 
6.4 Toward a different utopia 
While this research offers no radical solutions, at 
the very least, these pages offer a strategy that asks us 
to look toward the margins, and to rummage about the weird 
and unruly edges, in order that something might be 
uncovered. That different stories might be told. Ideally, 
what might be uncovered would teach us a thing or two about 
the world with which we are entangled. Here, I think of 
Ursula K. Le Guin, who has been a welcome traveling 
companion through these winding pages with brief stopovers 
at debitage piles, riverbanks crowded with animal sign, and 
marshes offering both life and death. Le Guin writes:  
In order to speculate safely on an inhabitable future, 
perhaps we would do well to find a rock crevice and go 
backward. In order to find our roots, perhaps we 
should look for them where roots are occasionally 
found (1989: 84). 
 
As discussed, looking to the past for guidance is 
risky. It is easy to idealize an environmental past for it 
does not appear as complexly troubled as the present’s, or 
as ill-boding as the future’s. Le Guin recognizes this risk 
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as well, writing: “I am not proposing a return to the Stone 
Age. My intent is not reactionary, not even conservative, 
but simply subversive.... All I’m trying to do is figure 
out how to put a pig on the tracks. Go backward. Turn and 
return” (1989: 85). Simply put, if we want to work toward 
better futures, this might require that we look to the 
past. By doing so, we might rediscover the powers and 
promises of some old ways of doing/making/being. And, we 
might find ourselves occasionally enchanted along the way. 
In this vein, I locate a small measure of hope, 
however guarded it might be, in the lessons gleaned from my 
time with the eco-survivalists. Along with Le Guin I think 
with Tsing’s reminder that our task is to “garden in the 
ruins” (2015). This demands a sobering realization that we 
find ourselves in circumstances that are far from ideal; 
yet, despite this, it is important to continue striving 
toward better futures. Here, in addition to guarded hope, 
we find a fragile utopian thread that weaves its circuitous 
route from unruly pasts, to marginal presents, and into the 
future. (“Utopia”. How dare I utter that word.) 
Yet, this thread leads to a different utopia than that 
offered by the narrative of progress. For Le Guin, the 
standard story of utopia––a utopia that never came to pass–
–is based on Promethean mastery. It is something forged in 
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furnaces and projected onto the world from on high. “Utopia 
has been Euclidean, it has been European, and it has been 
masculine,” suggests Le Guin (1989: 87). “Utopia has been 
yang. In one way or another, from Plato on, utopia has been 
the big yang motorcycle trip. Bright, dry, clear, strong, 
firm, active, aggressive, lineal, progressive, creative, 
expanding, advancing, hot” (1989: 88). 
Le Guin looks a different vision of utopia. In 
contrast to the yang version, Le Guin suggests “we must 
return, go round, go inward, go yinward.” For her, a ‘yin 
utopia’ would be “dark, wet, obscure, weak, yielding, 
passive, participatory, circular, cyclical, peaceful, 
nurturant, retreating, contracting, and cold” (1989: 89). 
In opposition to the Promethean model, Le Guin’s vision of 
utopia “is not a progress towards achievement, followed by 
stasis, which is the machine’s mode, but an interactive, 
rhythmic, and unstable process, which constitutes an end in 
itself” (1989: 9). 
Le Guin’s other utopia is time out-of-joint. It cannot 
come from mastery via division (of nature from society, 
human from nonhuman, etc.), but only from entanglement. 
And, in seeking entanglement, it inevitably tells a 
different kind of story about where we might head, and what 
we might gather as we make our way. Granted, this other 
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utopia might make for strange stories. And these stories 
might ask that we consider doing things that appear odd, 
like poking around a pile of animal scat. And they might 
ask us to strike up risky relationships, like with Atropos 
or Medusa. But, then, accepting such strangeness seems an 
appropriate strategy for cohabiting with the strangeness of 
the world. Taking a cue from the trickster Coyote, Le Guin 
suggests:  
Perhaps the utopist would do well to lose the plan, 
throw away the map, get off the motorcycle, put on a 
very strange-looking hat, bark sharply three times, 
and trot off looking thin, yellow, and dingy across 
the desert and up into the digger pines (1989: 94). 
 
Off the beaten path, in a phrase. It’s good to be 
there. To find it only requires a single, humble step.  
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